tribute all they can to their own and others' happiness. This is to suppose, that God has power to create rational creatures, and it is a favour that this is allowed; but that he has no authority to prescribe them laws, seeing the rules of justice rise from the nature of things, and he is confined to act by them, as much as those he has created; that he has no justice to glorify when he is provoked, but is obliged to be kind to all his creatures, whether they obey him, or rebel against him: in short, that he is an indolent Being, such as was the god of the Epicureans; that man is independent of him who created him, and preserves him; that he is to be his own judge, whether he answers the end of his creation, by promoting his own happiness, and that of others.

noon.

Thus the irrational stuff, which was hissed off the stage, with just contempt, when it was introduced by Epicurus, is afresh brought on, to shew the sufficiency of human reason, in our enlightened age of search and enquiry. It would be doing too much honour to such monstrous absurdity, to go about gravely to confute them; and it would be labour and time as ill spent, as it would be to argue with a man that stiffly denies that two and three make five, or to wrangle with one who will have it, that it is as light at midnight as at The assurance with which such irrational fancies are vented, does not prove that their assertors have more brains, or brighter parts than others, but only that they have harder foreheads and thicker skulls than the generality of men. These bold champions of infidelity deny that man's reason is impaired by the fall; but they give the fullest demonstration that it is greatly sunk, even almost to a degree of brutality, in themselves; and by this afford us, though stupidly, and against their wills, a sensible proof of the fall of man, which they banter and insipidly ridicule. Were not the rational faculties greatly decayed, no person could ever dream of a God of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, having no motive, on his own account, to give his creatures laws, or to punish the breach of them,

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and that men are not accountable to him that made them. It is not worth while to talk with creatures who have so much laid aside the use of reason; it is throwing pearls to swine: we can only refer the decision to the hour, which a few years will introduce, and then these rebels against Heaven will find whether they are accountable to their Maker or not.

All that has been said of late, by way of panegyric upon reason, and the light of nature, is founded on a mere fallacy. The adversaries of revelation do not speak of reason, as it is in this or the other man, as it may be less clear in one than another, but they speak of reason in the abstract, and in that sense it may be allowed to be of a very large extent. No one will be so silly as to say, that reason, in the abstract idea of it, is insufficient and imperfect, for nothing is to be regarded which is contrary to reason. The question is not then, whether reason abstractly considered is imperfect, for that would be questioning whether truth is truth, or whether right reason is right reason; which would be only trifling, and spending words to no purpose. True reason is right; and what is right, cannot, as such, be said to be imperfect: however, this poor and mean quibble is all that the pleaders for the sufficiency of reason have to talk upon. It would be ridiculous for any one to say, that the light of the sun is not sufficient to enable a man to keep his path; but it signifies very little, when a man is involved in the shade of the evening, to tell him he must not question that the sun's light is sufficient for him to see by. The question really is whether reason, as it is now in men, whether the light of nature, as it is in men in their present state, which none can venture to say, in fact, is not a state of degeneracy, is a sufficient rule to inform men what they ought to believe and receive, to shew them how they may find out what is true and right, and to direct them in the more private walks of life, as well as when they appear on the public stage of the world, where they may have the advantage of seeing the examples of others; it is, whether natural religion, of

itself, discovers all that a man is to believe concerning God, all the methods necessary for him to take, in order to be reconciled to him, and regain his favour, and all that is required of man in his private, relative, and social character.

When we enquire whether reason is now a sufficient rule, the only sense in which we can take the light of nature, or natural religion, is, for the remains of natural light in men of superior reason, who have been left entirely without the help of revelation of any kind; and if it is tried carefully, or viewed in this light, it will appear to be very imperfect and deficient. It is easy to tell us, that reason is reason, truth is truth, and virtue is virtue; but what are we the wiser by being told such fine things, if we find ourselves and others deficient in reason, puzzled about truth, and apt to take vice for virtue? No one will say cruelty is good, but how many think that persecution, an enormous vice, is lawful, because it is designed for good ends, to set men right, and to keep them from leading others wrong! It is easy for men to pick things out of Scripture, and to prove them agreeable to reason, since there is nothing in the oracles of God, but what is consonant to the highest reason; by this means a very beautiful system of morality may be put together; but can this be a delineation of the religion of nature. The only way to judge of the sufficiency, on the one hand, and of the defects, on the other, of the light of nature, is to examine whether it brightly shined, or was greatly shaded, in such as had nothing else to illuminate them, and who yet had as clear intellectuals, as great knowledge of the world, as any now; and who, in learning and politeness, exceeded many of our new luminaries, or rather comets, who, instead of increasing our light, hurry the world, and spread error and irreligion. If it is thus tried, the light of nature will not be found to resemble the sun, when, crowned with surpassing glory, it illuminates the earth, but rather to be like it, when, in dim eclipse, it sheds gloom and twilight over some parts of the world, and so puzzles and perplexes such

as are not acquainted with the natural causes of its being darkened, and throws them into a state of doubt and uncertainty.

II. I shall shew that reason is not a perfect rule in matters of religion; and shall answer some pleas that are offered in behalf of the monstrous and extravagant supposition, that it is a sufficient guide in sacred matters.

I would not be thought to have respect only or prin cipally to professed Deists, but chiefly to regard those treacherous advocates for Christianity, who, under pretence of writing in its vindication, basely and vilely betray the noblest of causes to avowed infidels. It is only to have the good word of the enemies of revelation, who happen, through the degeneracy of our unhappy times, to gain a great vogue, that these base, ignoble, and ungenerous souls prove false to the interest of him whom they call their Master, and traiterously give it up to his open enemies. That they give up the cause of Christianity to the adversaries of revelation, is most certain, for if reason is of itself a sufficient rule, any addition to what is of itself sufficient, is impertinent and needless; this is evident to the dullest capacity: and all that can be said in favour of revelation, by such as make this concession, is only shewing, that they can contradict themselves; for if reason is of itself sufficient, in matters of religion, what need can there be of the Christian revelation? was there any necessity to make known any thing new, and to require it to be believed, when what was known before was sufficient without it? This is granting to the Deists, that though there may be some good things in Christianity, yet there was no absolute necessity for it, which is what they desire to have yielded to them, and then it is easy for them to shew the absurdity of adding any thing to what was good enough of itself, without any such addition. It is very well known, that the Deists are not wanting to make use of this extravagant concession; and any one who consults their writings, may easily see that they, in reality, say very little, but what is put into their mouths, by such

as would appear to stand up in the defence of revelation against them, but either through ignorance, or treachery, betray the cause to them: whether it is through folly or knavery that this is done, it is certain, they who are guilty of doing it, have much to answer for, seeing they have done a great deal more hurt to the interest of Christ, than all the avowed enemies of it, of themselves, ever did or could do.

It is a very poor way of arguing, for any* to tell us, "That the true preference of Christianity is (not that reason, in any state of men, is sufficient of itself to virtue and happiness, but) that Christianity is a clearer and more powerful guide, having improved the light of reason by the supernatural evidence and declaration of God's will, and final intention of saving sinners, by the free pardon of them for the sake and merits of the death of Christ, which mere reason was not able to discover or determine, and which plain declaration of the means of man's redemption is a more powerful motive and obligation to universal obedience, than reason could ever with certainty propose." This is a mere heap of confusion and inconsistency. It is very likely there is a juggle in using that odd expression, "Reason, in any state of men;" but if it means any thing, it must have respect to reason in man's present corrupt state: Now, if reason, of itself, is a sufficient guide to virtue and happiness, can man need any thing more sufficient than a sufficient guide; can he need to be guided to any thing better than to virtue and happiness? certainly no. If so, then there is no necessity for a clearer and more powerful guide, or for its being improved by the supernatural declaration of God's will,

• See the Plea for Human Reason, pp. 47, 48. This is said, how truly I know not, to be written by Mr. Jackson, the noted Arian, the amanuensis to Dr. Clarke, in the memorable dispute with Dr. Waterland, about the supreme divinity of our blessed Lord, which is called by the ignorant blasphemer who wrote this Plea, a wretched Antichristian Hypothesis. If Mr. Jackson is the author of the Plea, we may judge what was the design of Dr. Clarke and him, in advancing Arianism viz. to open the way for Deism. Several things have been written on both sides, on the question I am upon, since these Sermons were preached, which was in November, 1730, but I have chosen to let them appear as they were first composed.