bouring country has led to a similar rise of prices, the currencies of those two countries will no longer continue to bear the same relative value to each other as before. The intrinsic value of a given portion of the one country being lessened, while that of the other remains unaltered, the exchange will be computed between these two countries to the disadvantage of the former. In this manner, a general rise of all prices, a rise in the market price of gold, and a fall of the foreign exchanges, will be the effect of an excessive quantity of circulating medium, in a country which has adopted a currency not exportable to other countries, or not convertible at will into a coin which is exportable."

We have stated somewhat largely the doctrine of the Committee on this subject, because it lies at the foundation of their whole Report. Under their second head they enter largely into the subject of the late depression of the exchanges, and detail the explanations of the cause of that depression which had been given by several merchants who were called before them as witnesses. Many of these gentlemen had described an unfavourable balance of trade, or rather of payments arising from the previous circumstances of our trade, as the sole cause of the depression; while others, and in particular a considerable continental merchant, had affirmed the non-convertibility of our present circulating medium into coin to be one great operating circumstance. He admitted that the occupation of the north of Germany by the troops of the French emperor, and the consequent eagerness to remit money to England at that particular period, had produced, in the first instance, that depression of the exchange, the extent of which was so remarkable; but he observed, that the non-convertibility of our paper into cash had prevented that rectification of the exchanges, which would soon have followed if the Bank had been open.

The Committee, in this part of their Report, after describing what is meant by the Par of Exchange, which implies that a given weight of gold or silver coin in one country is exchanged for an equal weight of gold or silver coin in another, take a distinction between the real and computed course of exchange, and affirm that the real difference of exchange, resulting from the state of trade and payments, can never fluctuate more than the amount of the expense and risk of conveying the precious metals from one country to the other. They state the cost of sending gold from London to Hamburgh, for the last fifteen months, including risk, to have been five and a half or six per cent.; and that of sending it to Holland, in the last five or six months of 1809, to have been four to seven per cent.; and infer from hence, that the fall in our exchanges, though it may have been in part real, has been in part referable to other causes than the state of trade. The balance of our trade in the years 1808 and 1809, so far as it can be judged of from an imperfect though corrected estimate of the Inspector General of the Customs, is shewn to have been particularly favourable in comparison with former years; but the Committee profess to place little confidence in a paper of this description.

The Committee, in the third part of their Report, quote some of the evidence of the Governor and Directors of the Bank of England, who appear to have been uniformly of opinion, that the amount of the paper circulation of the Bank had no reference at all to the state of the Exchanges, or to the price of bullion; sentiments which the Committce here again controvert, adducing a variety of facts in confirmation of their argument. They admit that the first remarkable de pression of the exchange in 1809, was to be ascribed, as stated in the evidence, to commercial events, arising out of the occupation of the

north of Germany by the troops of the French emperor; but they add, "The evil has been, that the exchange when fallen has not had the full means of recovery under the subsisting system. And if those occasional depressions, which arise from commercial causes, are not after a time successively corrected by the remedy which used to apply itself before the suspension of the cash payments of the Bank, the consequences may ultimately be exactly similar to those, which a sudden and extravagant issue of paper would produce. The restoration of the exchange used to be ef fected by the clandestine transmission of guineas, which improved it for the moment by serving as a remittance; and unquestionably also in part, probably much more extensively, by the reduction of the total quantity of the remaining circulating medium; to which reduction the Bank were led to contribute, by the caution which every drain of gold naturally excited. Under the present system, the former of these remedies must be expected more and more to fail, the guineas i circulation being even now apparently so few, as to form no important remittance, and the reduction of paper seems therefore the chief, if not the sole corrective to be resorted to."

The Committee represent their reasonings on this subject to have been confirmed by the labours of the Committee of the House appointed to inquire into the depreciation of the Irish exchange in 1804. Many of the witnesses before that Committee, and in particular the Irish Bank Directors, were unwilling to admit the fall of the exchange to be ascribable to any excess in the circulation, although it had materially increased, and although the balance of trade appeared favourable to Ireland. The improvement which took place in the Irish exchange, is referred by the present Committee to some reduction of Irish paper, which appeared, nevertheless, to be resorted to by the Bank Directors after the Report of the former Committee. On the whole, the Committee declared it to be their opinion," that so long as the suspension of cash payments is permitted to exist, the price of gold bullion, and the general course of exchange with foreign

countries, taken for any considerable period of time, form the best criterion from which any inference can be drawn, as to the sufficiency or excess of paper currency in circulation; and that the Bank of England cannot safely regulate the amount of its issues without having reference to the criterion presented by these two circumstances.

In the fourth part of the Report, the Committee state the amount of Bank of England notes in circula-, tion from the year 1798 to 1809, inclusive: these were, in 1798, about 11,500,000l. in notes of 51. and upwards; and 1,800,000. in notes under 5l.: total about 13,300,0007. In 1799, about 12,400,000l. in notes of 57. and above; and 1,600,000l. in notes under 5l.: total, 14,000,000l. In 1800, and the following years, there was a gradual increase of the notes of both kinds, the total being 16 to 17 millions. In 1809, notes of 51. and upwards were about 14, 100,0007; notes under 51. about 4,800,000l. : total, about 19,000,000l. The total, according to according to a still later return, amounted to above 21,000,000l. The Committee profess, however, to consider the mere numerical return of the amount of bank notes in circu

lation, as not at all deciding the question, whether such paper is or is not excessive, the quantity of currency having no fixed proportion to the quantity of commodities, since much depends on the quickness of circulation, on the general state of confidence, and on the improvements made in the economy of a money medium, which is represented to have had recently considerable effect in sparing the use of notes. The Committee here take occasion to guard their general doctrine, by observing, that, although it ought to be the o mary policy of the Bank Directors to diminish their paper in the event of the long continuance of a high price of bullion and a very unfavourable exchange, yet it is essential to the commercial interests of the country

effecting the resumption of cash payments ought, therefore, in the opinion of your Committee, to be left in a great measure to the discretion of the Bank, and Parliament ought to do little more than to fix, definitively, the time at which cash payments are to become, as before, compulsory. The period allowed ought to be ample, in order that the Bank Directors may feel their way, and that, having a constant watch upon the varying circumstances that ought to guide them, and availing themselves only of fa vourable circumstances, they may tread back their steps slowly, and may preserve both the course of their own affairs as a Company, and that of public and commercial credit, not only safe but unembarrassed.

"With this view, your Committee would suggest, that the restriction on cash payments cannot safely be removed at an earlier period than two years from the present time; but your Committee are of opinion, that early provision ought to be made by Parliament for terminating, by the end of that period, the operation of the several statutes which have imposed and continued that restriction."

We thus commit this important and delicate subject to the consideration of our readers. It is undoubtedly one which is deeply interesting to the public, and especially to the commercial world, and which requires the most dispassionate discussion. Many publications upon it are every day appearing, and when the sitting of Parliament shall be resumed, it will unquestionably occupy their most serious attention,

MR. ABRAHAM GOLDSMID. We alluded in a former number to the distresses of the commercial world, and ventured to hazard an opinion that they had their origin in that unbounded spirit of speculation which the great facilities of raising money, that were afforded by the liberal issues of the Bank of England, had produced. These distresses have issued in some very large failures, and they led, about the beginning of the month, to one event, which made a stronger impression on the public funds, than has been experienced for several years: We allude to the rash act, by which Mr. Abranam Goldsmid, on the 28th of September, put a period to his existence. Mr. Goldsmid had contracted with Government for the last loan, at a price which, when compared

with that of stocks in general, was clearly disadvantageous to the contractors. Of this lean he retained in his own hands 800,0001. For a short time the loan bore a small premium, but afterwards, and especially when general confidence was shaken by the com mercial failures which were daily occurring, it fell to a discount of one, two, and by degrees five, per cent. When this fall began, Mr. Goldsmid, in the hope of producing a favourable change in the market, became a. purchaser of Omnium to the extent of four millions. Finding it impossible, however, to raise the money which was required to meet his various engagements, partly in conse quence of the general difficulty which prevailed, and partly in consequence of a suspicion which began to be entertained, that he was playing too deep a game, he appears to have been so stung with the disappointment, that life became insupportable; and applying a loaded pistol under his chin, he in a moment rid himself of his worldly cares, to encounter others of a still more tremendous aspect. No sooner was this event known in the Stock Exchange, than Omnium fell to a discount of eight, and even ten, per cent. The Government, however, having ordered an investigation to take place into the state of the affairs of the deceased, which turned out more favourable than was apprehended, and the Bank having come forward with a proposal to make advances to a certain extent on Omnium, the alarm has in some degree subsided, and the discount on Omnium for the last three weeks has fluctuated between 5 and 6 per cent.

The unhappy end of Mr. Goldsmid reads an affecting lesson to inercantile men: "They that will be rich, fall into temptation and a snare, and into many foolish and hurtful lusts, which drown men in destruction and perdition." An inordinate love of the world was manifestly the ruling passion of this eminent money broker, and to this cause may, in some measure, be referred the extent of his charitable donations, no less than his general profuse expenditure, and the boldness of his speculations. A long course of prosperous dealing had unfitted his mind to bear the pressure of difficulty, and the pain of disappointed ambition; and no sooner did misfortune threaten him, than all his constancy forsook him; worldly discredit appearing in his eyes a greater evil than the disapprobation of his Judge; and the possibility of being forced to descend from his rank among men, outweighing all the tremendous consequences of an act of deliberate suicide. We say deliberate suicide, for, not