114

CHAP. XIV.

POLITICAL LIBERTY.

I believe the love of politicel liberty is not an errror; but, if it is one, I am sure I shall never be converted from it, and I hope you never will. If it be an illusion, it is one that has brought forth more of the best qualities and exertions of the human mind than all other causes put together; and it serves to give an interest in the affairs of the world, which without it would be insipid. Fox, Letter to one of his Friends.

THE two kinds of liberty of which we have spoken, viz. civil and personal liberty, have existed to a certain degree in states which we usually term despotic. The monarchies of modern Europe have all been more or less governed by fixed laws, deriving their sanction from prescription. The monarchy of Prussia, which is altogether unlimited, allowed, from the time of Frederick II. great latitude of religious and political discussion.

As long, however, as the supreme power of the state is placed in the hands of one or many

over whom the people have no controul, the tenure of civil and personal liberty must be frail and uncertain. The only efficient remedy against oppression is for the people to retain a share of that supreme power in their own possession. This is called political liberty. And what is called a love of liberty means the wish that a man has to have a voice in the disposal of his own property, and in the formation of the laws by which his natural freedom is to be restrained. It is a passion inspired, as Sidney truly says, by Nature herself. In the manner of exercising this power, and satisfying this desire of the people, and in the portion of controul retained by them, free states have differed; and in these forms consist their respective constitutions. Authors who have written upon these subjects have distinguished three powers, viz. the Legislative, the Judicial, and the Executive. These powers, they maintain, ought to be separated. They never have been, and never can be so thoroughly. The judicial, indeed, which, properly exercised, means nothing more than applying general rules or laws to particular cases, without any discretion, may be

so separated and we have already seen, that in the English Constitution this division has been very wisely and effectually made. The judicial power is in England independent and unconnected with any political subserviency.

The two other powers may be properly called the Executive and the Deliberative. The term Legislative implies merely making laws, which in no state that I remember has been totally disjoined from the Executive. These two powers are in fact, in every constitution, continually influencing and acting upon each other. The deliberative power in England is lodged in three authorities, one of which is chosen by the people themselves. Of representation, generally, we have already spoken.

Nothing is of more importance to a state, however, than to place in hands, worthy to hold it, the power of negociating treaties; of deciding upon foreign relations; of directing in time of war the operations of fleets and armies; and, in short, all that is called the Executive Power. This power has been generally disposed of in one of two ways.

The first is that of putting it into the hands of one person, called an Emperor, Sultan, or King, without any controul. The obvious disadvantage of this mode is, that talent is not hereditary, and, as it was well put by Lord Halifax, "no man chooses a coachman because his father was a coachman before him." It is a necessary consequence of this form of government, that the peace and security of the state entirely depend upon one ill-educated man. For it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, that a king should receive a good education. All his passions and all his follies are indulged; his ignorance is called genius, and his imbecillity wisdom. But, above all, no object can be offered to him that can excite labour or emulation. Other men, whether nobles or ploughmen, can only be distinguished from amongst their equals by the excellence of their moral character, the superiority of their talents, or the advantages they have derived from industry. But a King, without any exertion, moral or intellectual, is placed above every one. Hence, in utter dearth of all useful ambition. he tries to be celebrated by drinking, or fiddling,

or some other art of easy attainment; or else, which is much worse, he aims at fame by commanding armies, and destroying provinces. The state, in the mean while, totally under his guidance, becomes weak with his weakness, vicious with his vice, poor with his extravagance, and wretched from his ambition. Absolute monarchy, then, is a scheme for making one man worse than the rest of the nation, and then placing the whole nation under his guidance.

The other method of government, which is at least more plausible, is that of putting the executive power in the hands of a citizen elected to that office for a certain period of time, and subject to the controul of the people at large.

The inconvenience of this method is, that men who have once held great power of this kind, and who have become in undisputed preeminence the first men in the state, naturally wish to retain their power for a longer time than it was granted, and even for their lives. Even if they unite what is very seldom united, a desire of performing great actions with a just fear of infringing the liberties of their country,