ceases to be the proper object of rewards or punishment. Without moral liberty, man may be the instrument of actions which in their effects are salutary or pernicious; but in the agent there can be neither virtue nor vice. To constitute any course of actions good, in a moral sense, the agent must be conscious of his duty, and possess a disposition and power to perform it. Actions in which the will of the agent is not concerned, have no property of virtue; and in their production the powers of a moral being are not exercised. The manner in which the faculties of the human mind are used, determines the moral character. The intention fixes the moral complexion of human conduct. The same action in this man is a virtue, and in that a vice. An example will fully illustrate this remark. Two men unite to feed and clothe a hungry and naked fellow-being; one discharges this humane office from a conviction that it is a social duty, of indispensable obligation-and in him the duty is virtuous and worthy of praise; the other adopts this form of benevolence towards a suffering object, as the means to gain his confidence, and thereby to ensnare and ruin him-and this malignant intention renders the action vile and wicked. Reason to distinguish good from evil, and liberty to choose the one and refuse the other, render men capable of moral conduct and moral government. This distinction between free and necessary agents being taken away, men are let down to the level of beasts, or they become mere machines, and there is no more moral worth in their actions than there is in the effects. produced by the established laws of the natura

kingdom. To suspect the motive, would be uncharitable, when the conduct is habitually goodbecause the life furnishes to us the best evidence of the state of the heart; but God judgeth not as men judge: he looketh at the heart, and decideth on the moral worth of our conduct from our secret intention and purpose. From every view we can take of our subject, it will appear, that as rational and free beings we are subjected to moral laws, and that it is in the right exercise of our reason and liberty that we become religious men.

2. I infer, it is the duty of men to improve all the means they enjoy, to enlighten their minds on the subject of religion.

To act rationally and freely in the important concerns of religion, we must know its foundation, and be made acquainted with its essential truths and duties. We cannot consistently perform the offices of religion, while ignorant of its first principles, any more than we can converse intelligibly in a language with which we are unacquainted. Suppose an individual educated in a country where the true religion is professed-yet a traditional reception of it, without a knowledge of the grounds of his faith or the reasons of his hope, would not entitle him to praise. Had he been born in a different country, he would have embraced its religion, however false and absurd. Is there no advantage, then, it will be asked, in the traditional reception of the true religton? Much every way; chiefly because this is a providential means of acquiring the knowledge of many religious truths and moral duties, of which an individual would otherwise have been ignorant :

these he admits on divine authority; and, to maintain a good conscience, he lives in their habitual exercise, and is thereby formed to a virtuous disposition. But his faith, being founded on an accidental circumstance of his nativity, and not being the result of inquiry and conviction, has in itself no worth. The Parent of Life favourably appointed the place of his birth, and by this circumstance his religious superstructure is erected on the basis of truth; but from it he himself can claim no merit. But in the man, who cultivates his intellectual powers, who examines the foundation of his religion, weighs its evidence, and adopts it on conviction of its truth, faith is a moral exercise, acceptable to God. This man has preserved his mind free from the influence of prejudice, and his heart from the bias of sin; and obedience in him is the act of an enlightened judgment, as well as of a sound conscience.

The observations made respecting religion as a system will apply to its several parts. If our understanding must be convinced before we can consistently profess the belief that a particular religion is true, then its peculiar doctrines must be examined and understood before we can consistently embrace them. To believe as this master in theology, or as that church believes, is not to give a sufficient reason for our faith. We stand on our own foundation, not theirs; their answers will not be accepted as ours in the day of judgment. The right of · private judgment will not be questioned. If we voluntarily resign it, we part with our religious capacity, we undermine the foundation of personal re

ligion, and can no longer live in the rational exercise of faith or hope. Implicit confidence can never be safely reposed on human authority. Religious instructers are forbidden to exercise dominion over the faith of their fellow-men, but they are directed to be the helpers of their joy.

We are commanded to call no man father, knowing that one is our Father, who is in heaven. We are solemnly warned not to judge one another, knowing that every one shall account for himself to God. When we resign our understandings and consciences to fallible men, and receive human formularies as the standard of sound doctrine, we remove ourselves from the foundation of the gospel, and have no sure basis on which to rest; and we shall be exposed to all the impositions which the weakness or ignorance, the worldly interests or the personal ambition of men can introduce into the Christian church. Reason and revelation, I think, warrant the position, that every man who seriously endeavours to acquire the knowledge of divine truth, and habitually practises according to the dictates of an enlightened conscience, will be accepted at the final judgment; but the individual who complies with this condition of acceptance can be positively ascertained only by him who knows the heart. To the serious consideration of those who feel disposed to condemn a brother merely for his Christian opinions, I present the reproof of our Saviour to his disciples, Ye know not what spirit ye are of.

As the understanding of a man must be enlightened, and his judgment convinced, before he can

consistently embrace any system of doctrine, I infer,

3. That uniformity of religious opinion is not to be expected even among Christians.

The natural understandings of men differ, their education is dissimilar, and their course of life is various. These circumstances lead to different views of religion and of all other subjects. A truth that is plain and evident to the man of ten talents, may be unintelligible to him who possesses but one. What you deem to be a mere rite of religion, your neighbour may hold as a fundamental principle of the gospel. No one ought to adopt the opinion of another against the dictates of his own mind. Speculative differences, when accompanied with Christian virtues in the life, should not be made the occasion of uncharitableness among disciples who ac. knowledge a common Master. Is this opening too widely the door of charity? Look into the New Testament, and there learn the term of admission into the Christian church. This is simply a confession of faith in Jesus as the Messiah. Such was the confession of Peter-We believe and are sure that thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God. And of Mary-I believe that thou art the Christ, the Son of God. On this confession, Philip baptized the Samaritan converts and the eunuch of Ethiopia. On a similar profession of faith, St. Paul baptized the jailer and other Gentile disciples. If the acknowledgment of Jesus Christ as the Son of God was all the apostles required for admission into the Christian community, shall we demand more, and deny the Christianity of the man who, professing