ANTECEDENTS OF CAPT. YOUNG-NEW ORLEANS. 157

Woodstock. He was made Captain of H Company, and went to Ship Island with his regiment in March 1862. In 1864 he returned to Vermont on recruiting service, and while there married Esther Gould of Tunbridge, Vt. On his return South he served in Florida until his honorable and heroic death on the battlefield at Mariana, September 27th, 1864.

Capt. Young, as will be seen by the above sketch, was a very young man when he entered the service. Like so many of the youth who rushed to the war, he was inspired with the spirit embodied in the following lines of an old author:

"Arouse the youth—it is no human call

Our country's 'leagured-haste to man the wall;
Haste where the-banner waves on high.

Signal of honored death, or victory."

As Col. Pingree well says, he met with an "honorable and heroic death," although he did not live to see the final victory. Gen. Asboth never fully recovered from the wounds he received at Mariana; at the close of the war he was appointed Minister to one of the South American States, and died, I believe, somewhere in Brazil; his death being accelerated from a fresh breaking out of the wounds he received in this action.

While stationed at Annunciation Square, the regiment was employed principally in performing guard duty. We had not enough space to indulge much in battalion drill, but company drills were gone through with every day, and we also drilled extensively in Street manoeuvres and firing. Quite

158

MAJ. GEN. E. R. S. CANBY.

a number of the officers were detailed for duty on Military Commissions and Courts Martial.

At this time the Department of the Gulf formed a part of the "Military Division of West Mississippi," which was commanded by Major-Gen. E. R. S. Canby, a regular officer, and one of the most discreet, accomplished and courageous soldiers in the army. His headquarters were at New Orleans. We were shortly destined, under his leadership, to participate in the Mobile campaign, which resulted in the capture of the city of Mobile, and led to the surrender of Gen. Richard Taylor's army, the third largest in size in the Confederacy.

CHAPTER VIII.

DEPARTURE FOR MOBILE POINT-MOBILE CAMPAIGN-MARCH TO AND INVESTMENT OF SPANISH FORT-CAPTURE OF CAPT. STEARNS AND PICKETS-OPERATIONS AND TER

MINATION OF SIEGE-INCIDENTS-BLAKELY

EN. C. C. ANDREWS, in his history of the Campaign of Mobile,* says that "Early in January it was de"cided that operations should be undertaken against Mobile "but the plan was not arranged until some time afterwards. 66 * * * Canby's movable forces had lately been organ"ized into brigades of the Reserve Corps of the Military "Division of the West Mississippi, and consisted of about ten "thousand men. Subsequently other troops were added, "and this Reserve Corps was merged into and organized

66

as the Thirteenth Army Corps, comprising three divisions, "of which Major-General Gordon Granger was given the com"mand. The troops constituting this corps were all veterans.”

* History of the Campaign of Mobile, by Brevet Maj. Gen. C. C. Andrews, late commanding 2d Division, 13th Army Corps.

160

JOINING 13TH CORPS-MOBILE POINT.

On the 19th of February we received orders to embark on the steamer "Clinton" and report to Gen. Granger at Mobile Point. We arrived there on the 21st and were assigned to Brig.-Gen. Benton's Division of the 13th Corps. This point of land is situated at the entrance to Mobile Bay, and forms a long, low peninsular of white sand as destitute of verdure and as bleak and barren as Ship Island itself, to which it bears a close resemblance. Here we were stationed for three weeks, living under shelter tents, and subsisting upon exceedingly "short commons." Gen. Canby's theory was that efficiency and mobility would be secured by rejecting everything not essential to field service, and he accordingly issued an order, for the campaign, that clothing should be limited to the suit the soldier had on, and a change of under garments and an extra pair of shoes; that coats should not be issued when blouses could be supplied; that camp equipage should be reduced to the lowest possible limit, and that shelter tents only would be issued; that all cumbrous articles should be left behind; that the equipment of officers should correspond to that of the men, and everything in excess of the established allowance was to be rejected by the inspectors. Subsistence also was to be limited to the essential articles of bread and meat, and a reduced amount of small rations, and when obtainable, "bacon and hard tack" were to be given the perference. The troops also were "habitually" to have on hand three days cooked rations "so as to be in readiness to move at any moment." With such a bill of fare, and under such a programme it will be seen that we did not “riot in

sumptuous living," nor was it possible to obtain any luxuries. Sutlers, those wonderful purveyors of small comforts, were rigidly interdicted, consequently all dainties from that source were cut off, and so we were brought down to the rugged realities of "glorious war." We had experienced, it is true, greater deprivations and hardships before, but still we did not find "camping out" under such circumstances altogether agreeable. The periodical February and March storms were not at all conducive to a comfortable life under shelter tents, located as ours were, upon a promontory, across which the breezes had a purchase in every direction, nor did the continuous rains add to the felicities of the occasion. When, therefore, marching orders were received there were none who regretted leaving Mobile Point.

Gen. Andrews in speaking of the plan of operations says: "The fortifications around Mobile were so strong that a “direct movement on the place from the western shore would "have encountered unequal resistance, and involved a pro"tracted siege. It was therefore determined to flank them. "The base would be fixed on the eastern shore, and the "main army moving upon that shore, with the aid of the "navy, would carry the forts on the islands and mainland, "and then approach Mobile by the Tensas river or one of the "channels coming in above. On this plan a large portion "of the troops and supplies could be moved by water into "Fish river, affording a secure base within twenty miles of * Spanish fort. * * If the reduction of the eastern "shore defences demanded too long a time, then the army "would pass them, move on to Montgomery-which was