ARMING THE NEGROES. the river at all salient stations below Natchez. 57 But just at that time the question of putting muskets into the hands of the blacks was a mooted one. There was a great deal of mawkish sentimentality on the subject at the North lest such a step should unnecessarily exasperate the South. Many who then halted at the expediency and propriety of arming and allowing the negroes to combat our common foe, soon afterwards saw the folly of their scruples and learned that colored men were susceptible, under proper officers, of being made fit for any duty. Gen. Butler, whether because of political considerations or not I do not know, did not act with that promptness in utilizing the blacks which the exigencies of the service required. Had he put arms in their hands and sent them forward to our support, instead of frittering away his time in an unnecessary epistolary warfare with Gen. Phelps, we should not have seen the fruits of our three months' toil and exposure slipping from our grasp as we did when directed to retrace our steps to New Orleans. As soon as Gen. Butler got rid of Gen. Phelps, he began forming colored regiments. But instead of seeking to promote their efficiency, he seemed, rather, to aim to make them as of little service as possible. For instance, there were a large number of ex-pugilists and bullies who found their way to New Orleans from Boston and New York, and several of these disreputable characters applied for, and received, commissions in these colored regiments. They were wholly unfit to be entrusted with duties so responsible and some of them, I understand, were afterwards cashiered or dismissed from the service. After evacuating Baton Rouge, 58 CAMP WILLIAMS-CHANGES IN FIELD AND STAFF. we returned to Carrolton, which place we reached on the 21st, and with other troops were ordered into camp near Metarie Ridge, at a point some two miles inland from the river, for the better protection, as was alleged, of the City of New Orleans. The locality selected for this encampment was quite as unhealthy as that which, but a short time. before, we had quitted at Vicksburg; and although named Camp "Williams," in honor of the memory of our late commander, soon became known as the Camp of Death in consequence of the great mortality which prevailed in the entire command during our sojourn there, but more especially in those regiments that had participated in the Vicksburg and Baton Rouge campaign. About this time several important changes took place in the regiment among the officers of the field and staff. I On the 26th of August Lieut.-Col. Fullam resigned. was made Colonel, and Captains Peck and Porter were promoted, the former being made Lieutenant-Colonel, and the latter Major of the regiment. On the 26th of August our faithful and efficient Quartermaster, Capt. E. A. Morse, who, up to that time, had shared all our dangers and hardships, also resigned to accept promotion to the office of Captain and Assistant Quartermaster of United States Volunteers, and subsequently, and until the close of the war, greatly distinguished himself in the discharge of many important trusts and responsible duties appertaining to that branch of the service. CHANGES IN FIELD AND STAFF. 59 On the 8th of September Surgeon Francis W. Kelley also resigned, and Assistant Surgeon Enoch Blanchard was promoted and commissioned as Surgeon, which office he filled. with much fidelity and ability until September 20th, 1865, when he was honorably discharged. CHAPTER IV. GENERAL BUTLER AND THE SEVENTH. 1862. DRURY'S BLUFF. * [A SKETCH.] * "Beauregard attacked Smith, * * ** * although obliged to fall back, succeeded in checking the rebel onset. "Butler might have redeemed the day had he moved up Gillmore, whose force had not "fired a shot. * * But instead of this, * * * he directed the whole "line to fall back to the peninsula of Bermuda Hundred, * * across the "neck of which a strong line of entrenchments reached, defending him against any 66 attack, "-General Grant. "His (Butler's) army, therefore, though in a position of "great security, was as completely shut off from further operations against Richmond as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked." * ** * * Gen. Grant." In taking charge of a department where there are no great battles to "be fought, but a dissatisfied element to control, no one could manage better than "Gen. Butler. * * If the Department of Missouri and Kansas, and the "States of Illinois and Indiana could be merged, and Gen. Butler put over it, I think "the good of the service would be subserved. FORT FISHER.- * * "In connection with this expedition an experiment "had been suggested by Gen. Butler from which he hoped important results. His "idea was to blow up a vessel loaded with gunpowder in the neighborhood, "with the expectation that the fort would be injured, if not destroyed, by the explosion. * The opinion of the engineers was adverse, and Grant did not believe "a particle in it. * * The explosion took place; the shock was not severe, "and was scarcely felt a short distance off, and to the watchers on the fleet * * "the report seemed no louder than the discharge of a piece of artillery. It was, however, heard at Wilmington, and a telegram was sent to the rebel commander inquiring as to the cause, who replied, One of the enemy's gunboats exploded. No damage "of any description was done to the rebel works or forces, and the experiment was an "absolute failure.' 66 * * * "I am constrained to request the removal of Major- * * is a lack of confidence in his military ability, making him an unsafe commander for "a large army. * * His administration of the affairs of his department is * I ask that prompt action be taken in the matter." On the 7th of January Butler was relieved. He never received another "also objectionable. * * ** command. ** (See Badeau's Life of Grant, Index Title Butler.) GEN. BUTLER AND THE SEVENTH. 61 Upon our arrival at Camp Williams, we received intimations that statements, emanating from some of the Indiana officers, had recently become current which reflected upon the Seventh for the part it had taken in the battle of Baton Rouge. But as the rumors that reached us were neither definite or tangible in form, we paid but little attention to them. On the 26th of August I was ordered to report to Gen. Butler in person, and was informed that I had been recommended for the vacant Colonelcy occasioned by the death of Col. Roberts. It was then that I learned for the first time, officially, that certain accusations had been made to him to the effect that the Seventh had refused to support the Indiana regiment at a critical stage of the action, and during the fight not only broke in confusion, but ran away leaving its colors on the field. Gen. Butler also informed me, in substance, that he had, upon the strength of these charges, (which I ascertained originated chiefly from verbal complaints made by Col. McMillan and other officers of the 21st Indiana), already prepared an order rebuking the regiment for, what he was pleased to term, its "discreditable behavior in the face of the enemy." Further than this, I was not apprised of the nature of the charges or the purport of his proposed order, but I then and there indignantly denied that there was anything in the conduct of the officers or men which was at all deserving of reproach, or which called for censure; and I repelled as forcibly as I could the imputations that the regiment had refused to support the Indianians, or that it broke in confusion, or retired from the field in disorder, or left its colors thereon. I also reminded Gen. Butler that the official |