CHAP. XCII.] CONDITION AND POWER OF PERSIA. 101 Hellespont and the Asiatic seaboard'. He procured the recall of his brother Memnon, who with his brother-in-law Artabazus had been obliged to leave Asia from unsuccessful revolt against the Persians, and had found shelter with Philip. He farther subdued, by force or by fraud, various Greek and Asiatic chieftains on the Asiatic coast; among them, the distinguished Hermeias, friend of Aristotle, and master of the strong post of Atarneus3. These successes of Mentor seem to have occurred about 343 B.C. He, and his brother Memnon after him, upheld vigorously the authority of the Persian king in the regions near the Hellespont. It was probably by them that troops were sent across the strait both to rescue the besieged town of Perinthus from Philip, and to act against that prince in other parts of Thrace; that an Asiatic chief, who was intriguing to facilitate Philip's intended invasion of Asia, was seized and sent prisoner to the Persian court; and that envoys from Athens, soliciting aid against Philip, were forwarded to the same place3. Ochus, though successful in regaining the full extent of Persian dominion, was a sanguinary tyrant, 1 See, in reference to these incidents, my last preceding volume, Vol. XI. Ch. xc. p. 610 seq. 2 Diodor. xvi. 52; Curtius, vi. 4, 25; vi. 5, 2. Curtius mentions also Manapis, another Persian exile, who had fled from Ochus to Philip. 3 Diodor. xvi. 52. About the strength of the fortress of Atarneus, see Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 2, 11; Diodor. xiii. 65. It had been held in defiance of the Persians, even before the time of Hermeias-Isokrates. Compare also Isokrates, Or. iv. (Panegyr.) s. 167. Letter of Alexander, addressed to Darius after the battle of Issus, apud Arrian. ii. 14, 7. Other troops sent by the Persians into Thrace (besides those despatched to the relief of Perinthus), are here alluded to. * Demosthenes, Philippic. iv. p. 139, 140; Epistola Philippi apud Demosthen. p. 160. of the Per sian crown -Ochus Darius Co domannus. Succession who shed by wholesale the blood of his family and courtiers. About the year 338 B.C., he died poisoned by the eunuch Bagôas, who placed upon the throne Arses, one of the king's sons, killing all the rest. After two years, however, Bagôas conceived mistrust of Arses, and put him to death also, together with all his children; thus leaving no direct descendant of the regal family alive. He then exalted to the throne one of his friends named Darius Codomannus (descended from one of the brothers of Artaxerxes Mnemon), who had acquired glory, in a recent war against the Kadusians, by killing in single combat a formidable champion of the enemy's army. Presently, however, Bagôas attempted to poison Darius also; but the latter, detecting the snare, forced him to drink the deadly draught himself'. In spite of such murders and change in the line of succession, which Alexander afterwards reproached to Darius 2-the authority of Darius seems to have been recognised, without any material opposition, throughout all the Persian empire. Prepara tions of Darius for defence. Succeeding to the throne in the early part of B.C. 336, when Philip was organising the projected invasion of Persia, and when the first Macedonian division under Parmenio and Attalus was already making war in Asia-Darius prepared measures of defence at home, and tried to encourage anti-Macedonian movements in Greece. On the assassination of Philip by Pausanias, the Persian king publicly proclaimed himself (probably untruly) as having instigated the deed, and alluded in con1 Diodor. xvii. 5; Justin, x. 3; Curtius, x. 5, 22. 2 Arrian, ii. 14, 10. 3 Diodor. xvii. 7. CHAP. XCII.] TARDINESS OF DARIUS. 103 temptuous terms to the youthful Alexander'. Conceiving the danger from Macedonia to be past, he imprudently slackened his efforts and withheld his supplies during the first months of Alexander's reign, when the latter might have been seriously embarrassed in Greece and in Europe by the effective employment of Persian ships and money. But the recent successes of Alexander in Thrace, Illyria, and Boeotia, satisfied Darius that the danger was not past, so that he resumed his preparations for defence. The Phenician fleet was ordered to be equipped the satraps in Phrygia and Lydia got together a considerable force, consisting in part of Grecian mercenaries; while Memnon, on the seaboard, was furnished with the means of taking 5000 of these mercenaries under his separate command2. of Memnon arrival. We cannot trace with any exactness the course Operations of these events, during the nineteen months be- before tween Alexander's accession and his landing in Alexander's Asia (August 336 в.c. to March or April 334 B.C.). We learn generally that Memnon was active and even aggressive on the north-eastern coast of the Ægean. Marching northward from his own territory (the region of Assus or Atarneus skirting the Gulf of Adramyttium3) across the range of Mount Ida, he came suddenly upon the town of Kyzikus on the Propontis. He failed, however, though only by a little, in his attempt to surprise it, and was forced to content himself with a rich booty from the district around1. The Macedonian generals 1 1 Arrian, ii. 14, 11. 2 Diodor. xvii. 7. 3 Diodor. xvii. 7: compare Arrian, i. 17, 9. ènì τηv xwpav τηv Méμvovos éteμver—which doubtless means this region, conquered by Mentor from Hermeias of Atarneus. 4 ✦ Diodor. xvii. 7; Polyænus, v. 34, 5. Superiority of the Per sians at sea: their im letting Alexander cross the Hellespont Parmenio and Kallas had crossed into Asia with bodies of troops. Parmenio, acting in Æolis, took Grynium, but was compelled by Memnon to raise the siege of Pitanê; while Kallas, in the Troad, was attacked, defeated, and compelled to retire to Rhœteium1. We thus see that during the season preceding the landing of Alexander, the Persians were in considerprudence in able force, and Memnon both active and successful even against the Macedonian generals, on the region north-east of the Egean. This may help to explain unopposed. that fatal imprudence, whereby the Persians permitted Alexander to carry over without opposition his grand army into Asia, in the spring of 334 B.C. They possessed ample means of guarding the Hellespont, had they chosen to bring up their fleet, which, comprising as it did the force of the Phenician towns, was decidedly superior to any naval armament at the disposal of Alexander. The Persian fleet actually came into the Egean a few weeks afterwards. Now Alexander's designs, preparations, and even intended time of march, must have been well known not merely to Memnon, but to the Persian satraps in Asia Minor, who had got together troops to oppose him. These satraps unfortunately supposed themselves to be a match for him in the field, disregarding the pronounced opinion of Memnon to the contrary, and even overruling his prudent advice by mistrustful and calumnious imputations. At the time of Alexander's landing, a powerful Persian force was already assembled near Zeleia in 1 Diodor. xvii. 7. We read also of military operations near Magnesia, between Parmenio and Memnon (Polyænus, v. 34, 4). CHAP. XCII.] PERSIAN ARMY IN PHRYGIA. 105 force as under Ar others. the Hellespontine Phrygia, under command of Ar- Persian sites the Phrygian satrap, supported by several sembled in other leading Persians-Spithridates (satrap of Phrygia, Lydia and Ionia), Pharnakes, Atizyes, Mithridates, sites and Rhomithres, Niphates, Petines, &c. Forty of these men were of high rank (denominated kinsmen of Darius), and distinguished for personal valour. The greater number of the army consisted of cavalry, including Medes, Baktrians, Hyrkanians, Kappadokians, Paphlagonians, &c.' In cavalry they greatly outnumbered Alexander; but their infantry was much inferior in number2, composed however, in large proportion, of Grecian mercenaries. The Persian total is given by Arrian as 20,000 cavalry, and nearly 20,000 mercenary foot; by Diodorus as 10,000 cavalry, and 100,000 infantry; by Justin even at 600,000. The numbers of Arrian are the more credible; in those of Diodorus, the total of infantry is certainly much above the truth-that of cavalry probably below it. Memnon, to avoid land, and to fighting on employ the aggressive Macedonia fleet for warfare in Memnon, who was present with his sons and Advice of with his own division, earnestly dissuaded the Persian leaders from hazarding a battle. Reminding them that the Macedonians were not only much superior in infantry, but also encouraged by the leadership of Alexander-he enforced the necessity of employing their numerous cavalry to destroy the forage and provisions, and if necessary, even towns themselves-in order to render any considerable advance of the invading force impracticable. While keeping strictly on the defen 1 Diodor. xvii. 18, 19; Arrian, i. 12, 14; i. 16, 5. 2 Arrian, i. 12, 16; i. 13, 4. and Greece. |