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a garrison of Peloponnesians from Argos; Asander, satrap of the country; and Nikias, collector of tribute'. The freedom granted to the Lydians, whatever it may have amounted to, did not exonerate them from paying the usual tribute.

from Sardis

Ephesus.

From Sardis, he ordered Kallas, the new satrap He marches of Hellespontine Phrygia-and Alexander son of to the coast. Aëropus, who had been promoted in place of Kallas Capture of to the command of the Thessalian cavalry-to attack Atarneus and the district belonging to Memnon, on the Asiatic coast opposite Lesbos. Meanwhile he himself directed his march to Ephesus, which he reached on the fourth day. Both at Ephesus and at Miletus-the two principal strongholds of the Persians on the coast, as Sardis was in the interior -the sudden catastrophe at the Granikus had struck unspeakable terror. Hegesistratus, governor of the Persian garrison (Greek mercenaries) at Miletus, sent letters to Alexander offering to surrender the town on his approach; while the garrison at Ephesus, with the Macedonian exile Amyntas, got on board two triremes in the harbour, and fled. It appears that there had been recently a political revolution in the town, conducted by Syrphax and other leaders, who had established an oligarchical government. These men, banishing their political opponents, had committed depredations on the temple of Artemis, overthrown the statue of Philip of Macedon dedicated therein, and destroyed the sepulchre of Heropythus the liberator in the agora?.

Arrian, i. 17, 5-9; Diodor. xvii. 21.

2 Arrian, i. 17, 12. Respecting these commotions at Ephesus, which had preceded the expedition of Alexander, we have no information:

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the first re

sistance at Miletus.

Some of the party, though abandoned by their garrison, were still trying to invoke aid from Memnon, who however was yet at a distance. Alexander entered the town without resistance, restored the exiles, established a democratical constitution, and directed that the tribute heretofore paid to the Persians should now be paid to the Ephesian Artemis. Syrphax and his family sought refuge in the temple, from whence they were dragged by the people and stoned to death. More of the same party would have been despatched, had not the popular vengeance been restrained by Alexander; who displayed an honourable and prudent moderation'.

Thus master of Ephesus, Alexander found himself in communication with his fleet, under the command of Nikanor; and received propositions of surrender from the two neighbouring inland cities, Magnesia and Tralleis. To occupy these cities, he despatched Parmenio with 5000 foot (half of them Macedonians) and 200 of the Companion-cavalry ; while he at the same time sent Antimachus with an equal force in a northerly direction, to liberate the various cities of Æolic and Ionic Greeks. This officer was instructed to put down in each of them the ruling oligarchy, which acted with a mercenary garrison as an instrument of Persian supremacy-to place the government in the hands of

nor are we told who Heropythus was, or under what circumstances he had liberated Ephesus. It would have been interesting to know these facts, as illustrating the condition of the Asiatic Greeks previous to Alexander's invasion.

1 Arrian, i. 17, 10-13.

the citizens—and to abolish all payment of tribute. He himself-after taking part in a solemn festival and procession to the temple of Ephesian Artemis, with his whole army in battle array-marched southward towards Miletus; his fleet under Nikanor proceeding thither by sea'. He expected probably to enter Miletus with as little resistance as Ephesus. But his hopes were disappointed: Hegesistratus, commander of the garrison in that town, though under the immediate terror of the defeat at the Granikus he had written to offer submission, had now altered his tone, and determined to hold out. The formidable Persian fleet2, four hundred sail of Phenician and Cyprian ships of war with welltrained seamen, was approaching.

This naval force, which a few weeks earlier would have prevented Alexander from crossing into Asia, now afforded the only hope of arresting the rapidity and ease of his conquests. What steps had been taken by the Persian officers since the defeat at the Granikus, we do not hear. Many of them had fled, along with Memnon, to Miletus3; and they were probably disposed, under the present desperate circumstances, to accept the command of Memnon as their only hope of safety, though they had despised his counsel on the day of the battle. Whether the towns in Memnon's principality of Atarneus had attempted any resistance against the Macedonians, we do not know. His interests however were so closely identified with those of Persia, that he had sent up his wife and children as hostages, to induce 2 Arrian, i. 18, 10-13.

1 Arrian, i. 18, 5, 6.

3 Diodor. xvii. 22.

Near ap

proach of

the Persian

fleet. Memnon is

made com

mander-in

chief of the

Persians.

The Mace

donian fleet

harbour of

Miletus, and keeps out the Persians.

Alexander

declines naval combat.

His debate

menio.

Darius to entrust him with the supreme conduct of the war. Orders to this effect were presently sent down by that prince'; but at the first arrival of the fleet, it seems not to have been under the command of Memnon, who was however probably on board. It came too late to aid in the defence of Mioccupies the letus. Three days before its arrival, Nikanor the Macedonian admiral, with his fleet of one hundred and sixty ships, had occupied the island of Ladê, which commanded the harbour of that city. Alexander found the outer portion of Miletus evacuated, and took it without resistance. He was making with Par- preparations to besiege the inner city, and had already transported 4000 troops across to the island of Ladê, when the powerful Persian fleet came in sight, but found itself excluded from Miletus, and obliged to take moorings under the neighbouring promontory of Mykalê. Unwilling to abandon without a battle the command of the sea, Parmenio advised Alexander to fight this fleet, offering himself to share the hazard aboard. But Alexander disapproved the proposition, affirming that his fleet was inferior not less in skill than in numbers; that the high training of the Macedonians would tell for nothing on shipboard; and that a naval defeat would be the signal for insurrection in Greece. Besides debating such prudential reasons, Alexander and Parmenio also differed about the religious promise of the case. the stern of the Macedonian ships, Parmenio had seen an eagle, which filled him with confidence that the ships would prove victorious. But Alex

On the sea-shore, near

1 Diodor. xvii. 23.

ander contended that this interpretation was incorrect. Though the eagle doubtless promised to him victory, yet it had been seen on land-and therefore his victories would be on land: hence the result signified was, that he would overcome the Persian fleet, by means of land-operations'. This part of the debate, between two practical military men of ability, is not the least interesting of the whole; illustrating as it does, not only the religious susceptibilities of the age, but also the pliancy of the interpretative process, lending itself equally well to inferences totally opposite. The difference between a sagacious and a dull-witted prophet, accommodating ambiguous omens to useful or mischievous conclusions, was one of very material importance in the ancient world.

besieges

Capture of

Alexander now prepared vigorously to assault Alexander Miletus, repudiating with disdain an offer brought Miletus. to him by a Milesian citizen named Glaukippus- the city. that the city should be neutral and open to him as well as to the Persians. His fleet under Nikanor occupied the harbour, blocked up its narrow mouth against the Persians, and made threatening demonstrations from the water's edge; while he himself brought up his battering-engines against the walls, shook or overthrew them in several places, and then stormed the city. The Milesians, with the Grecian mercenary garrison, made a brave defence, but were overpowered by the impetuosity of the assault. A large number of them were slain, and there was no way of escape except by jumping into little boats, or swimming off upon the hollow of the

1 Arrian, i. 18, 9–15; i. 20, 2.

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