the opinion of Charidemus, in full expectation of receiving an affirmative reply. So completely were the hopes of Charidemus bound up with the success of Darius, that he would not suppress his convictions, however unpalatable, at a moment when there was yet a possibility that they might prove useful. He replied (with the same frankness as Demaratus had once employed towards Xerxes), that the vast multitude now before him were unfit to cope with the comparatively small number of the invaders. He advised Darius to place no reliance on Asiatics, but to employ his immense treasures in subsidizing an increased army of Grecian mercenaries. He tendered his own hearty services either to assist or to command. To Darius, what he said was alike surprising and offensive; in the Persian courtiers, it provoked intolerable wrath. Intoxicated as they all were with the spectacle of their present muster, it seemed to them a combination of insult with absurdity, to pronounce Asiatics worthless as compared with Macedonians, and to teach the king that his empire could be defended by none but Greeks. They denounced Charidemus as a traitor who wished to acquire the king's confidence in order to betray him to Alexander. Darius, himself stung with the reply, and still farther exasperated by the clamours of his courtiers, seized with his own hands the girdle of Charidemus, and consigned him to the guards for execution. "You will discover too late (exclaimed the Athenian), the truth of what I have said. My avenger will soon be upon you'." CHAP. XCIII.] HE PUTS CHARIDEMUS TO DEATH. 147 abandoned plans, just when he ag- best defen at the time his act. bad the sive posi tion for Filled as he now was with certain anticipations Darius of success and glory, Darius resolved to assume in Memnon's person the command of his army, and march down to overwhelm Alexander. From this moment, land-army became the really important and gressive force, with which he himself was to Herein we note his distinct abandonment of the them with executing plans of Memnon-the turning-point of his future effect. fortune. He abandoned them, too, at the precise moment when they might have been most safely and completely executed. For at the time of the battle of the Granikus, when Memnon's counsel was originally given, the defensive part of it was not easy to act upon; since the Persians had no very strong or commanding position. But now, in the spring of 333 B.C., they had a line of defence as good as they could possibly desire; advantages, indeed, scarcely to be paralleled elsewhere. In the first place, there was the line of Mount Taurus, barring the entrance of Alexander into Kilikia; a line of defence (as will presently appear) nearly inexpugnable. Next, even if Alexander had succeeded in forcing this line and mastering Kilikia, there would yet remain the narrow road between Mount Amanus and the sea, called the Amanian Gates, and the Gates of Kilikia and Assyria-and after that, the passes over Mount Amanus itself—all indispensable for Alexander to pass through, and capable of being held, with proper precautions, against the strongest force of attack. A better portunity, for executing the defensive part of Memnon's scheme, could not present itself; and he him op Darius recalls the Grecian mercenaries from the fleet. Criticism of self must doubtless have reckoned that such advantages would not be thrown away. The momentous change of policy, on the part of the Persian king, was manifested by the order which he sent to the fleet after receiving intelligence of the death of Memnon. Confirming the appointment of Pharnabazus (made provisionally by the dying Memnon) as admiral, he at the same time dispatched Thymôdes (son of Mentor and nephew of Memnon) to bring away from the fleet the Grecian mercenaries who served aboard, to be incorporated with the main Persian army'. Here was a clear proof that the main stress of offensive operations was henceforward to be transferred from the sea to the land. It is the more important to note such desertion of policy, on the part of Darius, as the critical turning-point in the Greco-Persian dramabecause Arrian and the other historians leave it out of sight, and set before us little except secondary points in the case. Thus, for example, they condemn the imprudence of Darius, for coming to fight Alexander within the narrow space near Issus, instead of waiting for him on the spacious plains beyond Mount Amanus. Now, unquestionably, granting that a general battle was inevitable, this step augmented the chances in favour of the Macedonians. But it was a step upon which no material consequences turned; for the Persian army under Darius was hardly less unfit for a pitched battle in the open plain; as was afterwards proved at Arrian, ii. 2, 1; ii. 13, 3. Curtius, iii. 3, 1. CHAP. XCIII.] IMPOLICY OF DARIUS-ARRIAN'S REMARKS. 149 Arbela. The real imprudence-the neglect of the Memnonian warning-consisted in fighting the battle at all. Mountains and defiles were the real strength of the Persians, to be held as posts of defence against the invader. If Darius erred, it was not so much in relinquishing the open plain of Sochi, as in originally preferring that plain with a pitched battle, to the strong lines of defence offered by Taurus and Amanus. The narrative of Arrian, exact perhaps in what it affirms, is not only brief and incomplete, but even omits on various occasions to put in relief the really important and determining points. B.C. 333, summer. from through gonia and Kappa dokia. While halting at Gordium, Alexander was joined by those newly-married Macedonians whom he had sent home to winter, and who now came back with Alexander reinforcements to the number of 3000 infantry and Gordium 300 cavalry, together with 200 Thessalian cavalry, Paphlaand 150 Eleians'. As soon as his troops had been sufficiently rested, he marched (probably about the latter half of May) towards Paphlagonia and Kappadokia. At Ankyra he was met by a deputation from the Paphlagonians, who submitted themselves to his discretion, only entreating that he would not conduct his army into their country. Accepting these terms, he placed them under the government of Kallas, his satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. Advancing farther, he subdued the whole of Kappadokia, even to a considerable extent beyond the Halys, leaving therein Sabiktas as satrap2. Having established security in his rear, Alexan- B.C. 333. 1 Arrian, i. 29, 6. 2 Arrian, ii. 4, 2; Curtius, iii. 1, 22; Plutarch, Alex. 18. at the line of Mount He arrives der marched southward towards Mount Taurus. He reached a post called the Camp of Cyrus, at the northern foot of that mountain, near the pass of the pass. Tauri-pylæ, or Kilikian Gates, which forms the Taurus difficulties regular communication, between Kappadokia on the north side, and Kilikia on the south, of this great chain. The long road ascending and descending was generally narrow, winding, and rugged, sometimes between two steep and high banks; and it included, near its southern termination, one spot particularly obstructed and difficult. From ancient times, down to the present, the main road from Asia Minor into Kilikia and Syria has run through this pass. During the Roman empire, it must doubtless have received many improvements, so as to render the traffic comparatively easier. Yet the description given of it by modern travellers represents it to be as difficult as any road ever traversed by an army'. Seventy years before Alexander, it had been traversed by the younger Cyrus with the 10,000 Greeks, in his march up to attack his brother Artaxerxes; and Xenophon, who then went through it, pronounces it absolutely impracticable for an army, if opposed by any occupying 1 Respecting this pass, see Vol. IX. Ch. lxix. p. 27 of the present History. There are now two passes over Taurus, from Erekli on the north side of the mountain-one the easternmost, descending upon Adana in Kilikia-the other, the westernmost, upon Tarsus. In the war (1832) between the Turks and Ibrahim Pacha, the Turkish commander left the westernmost pass undefended, so that Ibrahim Pacha passed from Tarsus along it without opposition. The Turkish troops occupied the easternmost pass, but defended themselves badly, so that the passage was forced by the Egyptians (Histoire de la Guerre de Mehemed Ali, par Cadalvène et Barrault, p. 243). 2 Alexander crossed Taurus by the easternmost of the two passes. ? Xenoph. Anabas. i. 2, 21; Diodor. xiv. 20. |