С НАР. ХСІІІ.] BATTLE ARRAY OF DARIUS. 161 Asiatics armed as hoplites (called Kardakes), on each side of these Greeks. These men-not distributed into separate divisions, but grouped in one body or multitude'-filled the breadth between the mountains and the sea. On the mountains to his left, he placed a body of 20,000 men, intended to act against the right flank and rear of Alexander. But for the great numerical mass of his vast host, he could find no room to act; accordingly they remained useless in the rear of his Greek and Asiatic hoplites; yet not formed into any body of reserve, or kept disposable for assisting in case of need. When his line was thoroughly formed, he recalled to the left bank of the Pinarus the 30,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry which he had sent across as a protecting force. A part of this cavalry were sent to his extreme left wing, but the mountain ground 1 Arrian, ii. 8, 9. Τοσούτους γὰρ ἐπὶ φάλαγγος ἁπλῆς ἐδέχετο τὸ χώριον, ἵνα ἐτάσσοντο, The depth of this single phalanx is not given, nor do we know the exact width of the ground which it occupied. Assuming a depth of sixteen, and one pace in breadth to each soldier, 4000 men would stand in the breadth of a stadium of 250 paces; and therefore 80,000 men in a breadth of twenty stadia (see the calculation of Rüstow and Köchly (p. 280) about the Macedonian line). Assuming a depth of twenty-six, 6500 men would stand in the breadth of the stadium, and therefore 90,000 in a total breadth of 14 stadia, which is that given by Kallisthenes. But there must have been intervals left, greater or less, we know not how many; the covering detachments, which had been thrown out before the river Pinarus, must have found some means of passing through to the rear, when recalled. Mr. Kinneir states that the breadth between Mount Amanus and the sea varies between one mile and a half (English) and three miles. The fourteen stadia of Kallisthenes are equivalent to nearly one English mile and three-quarters. Neither in ancient nor in modern times have Oriental armies ever been trained, by native officers, to regularity of march or array-see Malcolm, Hist. of Persia, ch. xxiii. vol. ii. p. 498; Volney, Travels in Egypt and Syria, vol. i. p. 124. VOL. XII. M Battle of was found unsuitable for them to act, so that they were forced to cross the right wing, where accordingly the great mass of the Persian cavalry became assembled. Darius himself in his chariot was in the centre of the line, behind the Grecian hoplites. In the front of his whole line ran the river or rivulet Pinarus; the banks of which, in many parts naturally steep, he obstructed in some places by embankments'. As soon as Alexander, by the retirement of the Persian covering detachment, was enabled to perceive the final dispositions of Darius, he made some alteration in his own, transferring his Thessalian cavalry by a rear movement from his right to his left wing, and bringing forward the lancer-cavalry or sarissophori, as well as the light infantry, Pæonians, and archers, to the front of his right. The Agrianians, together with some cavalry and another body of archers, were detached from the general line to form an oblique front against the 20,000 Persians posted on the hill to outflank him. As these 20,000 men came near enough to threaten his flank, Alexander directed the Agrianians to attack them, and to drive them farther away on the hills. They manifested so little firmness, and gave way so easily, that he felt no dread of any serious aggressive movement from them. He therefore contented himself with holding back in reserve against them 1 Arrian, ii. 10, 2. Kallisthenes appears to have reckoned the mercenaries composing the Persian phalanx at 30,000—and the cavalry at 30,000. He does not seem to have taken account of the Kardakes. Yet Polybius in his criticism tries to make out that there was not room for an array of even 60,000; while Arrian enumerates 90,000 hoplites, not including cavalry (Polyb. xii. 18). CHAP. XCIII.] BATTLE OF ISSUS. 163 a body of 300 heavy cavalry; while he placed the Agrianians and the rest on the right of his main line, in order to make his front equal to that of his enemies'. Having thus formed his array, after giving the troops a certain halt after their march, he advanced at a very slow pace, anxious to maintain his own front even, and anticipating that the enemy might cross the Pinarus to meet him. But as they did not move, he continued his advance, preserving the uniformity of the front, until he arrived within bowshot, when he himself, at the head of his cavalry, hypaspists, and divisions of the phalanx on the right, accelerated his pace, crossed the river at a quick step, and fell upon the Kardakes or Asiatic hoplites on the Persian left. Unprepared for the suddenness and vehemence of this attack, these Kardakes scarcely resisted a moment, but gave way as soon as they came to close quarters, and fled, vigorously pressed by the Macedonian right. Darius, who was in his chariot in the centre, perceived that this untoward desertion exposed his person from the left flank. Seized with panic, he caused his chariot to be turned round, and fled with all speed among the foremost fugitives. He kept to 1 Arrian, ii. 9; Kallisthenes ap. Polyb. xii. 17. The slackness of this Persian corps on the flank, and the ease with which Alexander drove them back-a material point in reference to the battle-are noticed also by Curtius, iii. 9, 11. 2 Arrian, ii. 11, 6. εὐθὺς, ὡς εἶχεν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἅρματος, σὺν τοῖς πρώτοις ἔφευγε, &c. This simple statement of Arrian is far more credible than the highly wrought details given by Diodorus (xvii. 34) and Curtius (iii. 11, 9) about a direct charge of Alexander upon the chariot of Darius, and a murderous combat immediately round that chariot, in which the horses his chariot as long as the ground permitted, but quitted it on reaching some rugged ravines, and mounted on horseback to make sure of escape; in such terror, that he cast away his bow, his shield, and his regal mantle. He does not seem to have given a single order, nor to have made the smallest effort to repair a first misfortune. The flight of the king was the signal for all who observed it to flee also; so that the vast host in the rear were quickly to be seen trampling one another down, in their efforts to get through the difficult ground out of the reach of the enemy. Darius was himself not merely the centre of union for all the miscellaneous contingents composing the army, but also the sole commander; so that after his flight there was no one left to give any general order. became wounded and unmanageable, so as to be on the point of overturning it. Chares even went so far as to affirm that Alexander had come into personal conflict with Darius, from whom he had received his wound in the thigh (Plutarch, Alex. 20). Plutarch had seen the letter addressed by Alexander to Antipater, simply intimating that he had received a slight wound in the thigh. In respect to this point, as to so many others, Diodorus and Curtius have copied the same authority. Kallisthenes (ap. Polyb. xii. 22) stated that Alexander had laid his plan of attack with a view to bear upon the person of Darius, which is not improbable (compare Xenoph. Anab. i. 8, 22), and was in fact realized, since the first successful charge of the Macedonians came so near to Darius as to alarm him for the safety of his own person. To the question put by Polybius-How did Alexander know in what part of the army Darius was ?--we may reply, that the chariot and person of Darius would doubtless be conspicuous: moreover, the Persian kings were habitually in the centre-and Cyrus the younger, at the battle of Kunaxa, directed the attack to be made exactly against the person of his brother Artaxerxes. After the battle of Kunaxa, Artaxerxes assumed to himself the honour of having slain Cyrus with his own hand, and put to death those who had really done the deed, because they boasted of it (Plutarch, Artax. 16). CHAP. XCIII.] BATTLE OF ISSUS. 165 immediate Darius sians. This great battle-we ought rather to say, that Alarm and which ought to have been a great battle-was thus fight of lost, through the giving way of the Asiatic hoplites defeat of on the Persian left, and the immediate flight of Da- the Perrius, within a few minutes after its commencement. But the centre and right of the Persians, not yet apprised of these misfortunes, behaved with gallantry. When Alexander made his rapid dash forward with the right, under his own immediate command, the phalanx in his left centre (which was under Kraterus and Parmenio) either did not receive the same accelerating order, or found itself both retarded and disordered by greater steepness in the banks of the Pinarus. Here it was charged by the Grecian mercenaries, the best troops in the Persian service. The combat which took place was obstinate, and the Macedonian loss not inconsiderable; the general of division, Ptolemy son of Seleukus, with 120 of the front rank men or choice phalangites, being slain. But presently Alexander, having completed the rout on the enemies' left, brought back his victorious troops from the pursuit, attacked the Grecian mercenaries in flank, and gave decisive superiority to their enemies. These Grecian mercenaries were beaten and forced to retire. On finding that Darius himself had fled, they got away from the field as well as they could, yet seemingly in good order. There is even reason to suppose that a part of them forced their way up the mountains or through the Macedonian line, and made their escape southward'. 1 This is the supposition of Mr. Williams, and it appears to me probable, though Mr. Ainsworth calls it in question, in consequence of the |