CHAP. XCIII.] NEW ARMY AND POSITION OF DARIUS. 211 thing in the ground to favour the operation both of the vast total, and the special forces, of Darius; who fancied that his defeat at Issus had been occasioned altogether by his having adventured himself in the narrow defiles of Kilikia-and that on open and level ground his superior numbers must be triumphant. He was even anxious that Alexander should come and attack him on the plain. Hence the undefended passage of the Tigris. ment and tion rous chariots For those who looked only to numbers, the host His equipassembled at Arbêla might well inspire confidence; preparafor it is said to have consisted of 1,000,000 of better arms infantry'-40,000 cavalry-200 scythed chariots--numeand fifteen elephants; of which animals we now scythed read for the first time in a field of battle. But elephants. besides the numbers, Darius had provided for his troops more effective arms; instead of mere javelins, strong swords and short thrusting pikes, such as the Macedonian cavalry wielded so admirably in close combat-together with shields for the infantry and breastplates for the horsemen2. He counted much also on the terrific charge of the chariots, each of which had a pole projecting before the horses and terminating in a sharp point, together This is the total given by Arrian as what he found set forth (déyero), probably the best information which Ptolemy and Aristobulus could procure (Arrian, iii. 8, 8). Diodorus (xvii. 53) says 800,000 foot, 200,000 horse, and 200 scythed chariots. Justin (xi. 12) gives 400,000 foot and 100,000 horse. Plutarch (Alex. 31) talks generally of a million of men. Curtius states the army to have been almost twice as large as that which had fought in Kilikia (iv. 9, 3); he gives the total as 200,000 foot, and 45,000 horse (iv. 12, 13). 2 Diodor. xvii. 53; Curtius, iv. 9, 2. B.C. 331, array of Darius. with three sword-blades stretching from the yoke on each side, and scythes also laterally from the naves of the wheels'. Informed of the approach of Alexander, about the time when the Macedonian army first reached and battle the Tigris, Darius moved from Arbela, where his baggage and treasure were left-crossed by bridges the river Lykus or Great Zab, an operation which occupied five days-and marched to take post on the prepared ground near Gaugamela. His battle array was formed-of the Baktrians on the extreme left, under command of Bessus the satrap of Baktria; next, the Dahæ and Arachôti, under command of Barsäentes, satrap of Arachosia; then the native Persians, horse and foot alternating,-the Susians, under Oxathres, and the Kadusians. On the extreme right were the contingents of Syria both east and west of the Euphrates, under Mazæus; then the Medes, under Atropates; next, the Parthians, Saka, Tapyrians, and Hyrkanians, all cavalry, under Phrataphernes; then the Albanians and the Sakesinæ. Darius himself was in the centre, with the choice troops of the army near and around him-the Persian select Horse-guards, called the king's kinsmen-the Persian foot-guards, carrying pikes with a golden apple at the butt-end-a regiment of Karians, or descendants of Karians, who had been abstracted from their homes and planted as colonists in the interior of the empire 1 1 Curtius, iv. 9, 3; Diodor. xvii. 53. Notwithstanding the instructive note of Mützel upon this passage of Curtius, the mode in which these chariots were armed is not clear on all points. CHAP. XCHI.] BATTLE ARRAY OF DARIUS. 213 the contingent of Mardi, good archers—and lastly, the mercenary Greeks, of number unknown, in whom Darius placed his greatest confidence. Such was the first or main line of the Persians. In the rear of it stood deep masses of Babylonians, -inhabitants of Sittakê down to the Persian Gulf -Uxians, from the territory adjoining Susiana to the east-and others in unknown multitude. In front of it were posted the scythed chariots, with small advanced bodies of cavalry-Scythians and Baktrians on the left, with one hundred chariots -Armenians and Kappadokians on the right, with fifty more—and the remaining fifty chariots in front of the centre'. Alexander had advanced within about seven miles B.C. 331, September. of Alex discussions menio and of the Persian army, and four days' march since Preliminary his crossing the Tigris-when he first learnt from movements Persian prisoners how near his enemies were. He anderat once halted, established on the spot a camp with Parwith ditch and stockade, and remained there for other offfour days, in order that the soldiers might repose. On the night of the fourth day, he moved forward, connoitring yet leaving under guard in the camp the baggage, the prisoners, and the ineffectives. He began his The Persian battle order here given by Arrian (iii. 11), is taken from Aristobulus, who affirmed that it was so set down in the official scheme of the battle, drawn up by the Persian officers, and afterwards captured with the baggage of Darius. Though thus authentic as far as it goes, it is not complete, even as to names-while it says nothing about numbers or depth or extent of front. Several names, of various contingents stated to have been present in the field, are not placed in the official return-thus the Sogdiani, the Arians, and the Indian mountaineers are mentioned by Arrian as having joined Darius (iii. 8); the Kossaans, by Diodorus (xvii. 59); the Sogdiani, Massagetæ, Belitæ, Kossæans, Gortyæ, Phrygians, and Kataonians, by Curtius (iv. 12). cers. His careful re in person. march, over a range of low elevations which divided him from the enemy, hoping to approach and attack them at daybreak. But his progress was so retarded, that day broke, and the two armies first came in sight, when he was still on the descending slope of the ground, Inore than three miles distant. On seeing the enemy, he halted, and called together his principal officers, to consult whether he should not prosecute his march and commence the attack forthwith'. Though most of them pronounced for the affirmative, yet Parmenio contended that this course would be rash; that the ground before them, with all its difficulties, natural or artificial, was unknown, and that the enemy's position, which they now saw for the first time, ought to be carefully reconnoitred. Adopting this latter view, Alexander halted for the day; yet still retaining his battle order, and forming a new entrenched camp, to which the baggage and the prisoners were now brought forward from the preceding day's encampment. He himself spent the day, with an escort of cavalry and light troops, in re 1 Arrian, iii. 9, 5–7. 2 Arrian, iii. 9, 2-8. It is not expressly mentioned by Arrian that the baggage, &c. was brought forward from the first camp to the second. But we see that such must have been the fact, from what happened during the battle. Alexander's baggage, which was plundered by a body of Persian cavalry, cannot have been so far in the rear of the army as the distance of the first camp would require. This coincides also with Curtius, iv. 13, 35. The words yvw droλeine (Arr. iii. 9, 2), indicate the contemplation of a purpose which was not accomplished— ὡς ἅμ ̓ ἡμέρᾳ προσμίξαι τοῖς πολεμίοις (iii. 9, 3). Instead of " coming into conflict" with the enemy at break of day-Alexander only arrived within sight of them at break of day; he then halted the whole day and night within sight of their position; and naturally brought up his baggage, having no motive to leave it so far in the rear. CHAP. XCIII.] MOVEMENTS OF ALEXANDER. 215 connoitring both the intermediate ground and the enemy, who did not interrupt him, in spite of their immense superiority in cavalry. Parmenio, with Polysperchon and others, advised him to attack the enemy in the night; which promised some advantages, since Persian armies were notoriously unmanageable by night', and since their camp had no defence. But on the other hand, the plan involved so many disadvantages and perils, that Alexander rejected it; declaring—with an emphasis intentionally enhanced, since he spoke in the hearing of many others—that he disdained the meanness of stealing a victory; that he both would conquer, and could conquer, Darius fairly and in open daylight2. Having then addressed to his officers a few brief encouragements, which met with enthusiastic response, he dismissed them to their evening meal and repose. tions of for the troops. On the next morning, he marshalled his army, Disposi consisting of 40,000 foot, and 7000 horse, in two Alexander lines. The first or main line was composed, on attackthe right, of the eight squadrons of Companion- array of the cavalry, each with its separate captain, but all under the command of Philôtas son of Parmenio. Next (proceeding from right to left) came the Agêma or chosen band of the Hypaspistæ-then the remaining Hypaspistæ, under Nikanor-then the phalanx properly so called, distributed into six divisions, under the command of Konus, Perdikkas, Meleager, Polysperchon, Simmias, and Kraterus, respectively. Next on the left of the pha 1 Xenoph. Anabas. iii. 4, 35. Arrian, iii. 10, 3; Curtius, iv. 13, 4-10. 3 Arrian, iii. 12, 1–9. 4 Arrian, iii. 11; Diodor. xvii. 57; Curtius, iv. 13, 26–30. |