Escape of
Darius in
person.
Capture of

camp, and

the next day. Darius had merely passed through it, leaving an undefended town, with his bow, shield, the Persian chariot, a large treasure, and rich equipage, as prey to the victor. Parmenio had also occupied without resistance the Persian camp near the field of battle, capturing the baggage, the camels, and the elephants'.

of Arbela.

Loss in the

battle. Complete

ness of the

victory.

Entire and

irreparable dispersion of the Per

To state any thing like positive numbers of slain or prisoners, is impossible. According to Arrian, 300,000 Persians were slain, and many more taken prisoners. Diodorus puts the slain at 90,000, Curtius at 40,000. The Macedonian killed were, sian army. according to Arrian, not more than 100-according to Curtius, 300: Diodorus states the slain at 500, besides a great number of wounded. The estimate of Arrian is obviously too great on one side, and too small on the other; but whatever may be the numerical truth, it is certain that the prodigious army of Darius was all either killed, taken, or dispersed, at the battle of Arbela. No attempt to form a subsequent army ever succeeded; we read of nothing stronger than divisions or detachments. The miscellaneous contingents of this once mighty empire, such at least among them as survived, dispersed to their respective homes and could never be again mustered in mass.

Causes of

the defeat

The defeat of Arbela was in fact the death blow of cowardice the Persian empire. It converted Alexander into the Great King, and Darius into nothing better than a fugitive pretender. Among all the causes of the defeat-here as at Issus-the most prominent and

of Darius. Uselessness of his immense numbers.

1 Arrian, iii. 15, 14; Curtius, v. 1, 10.

2 Arrian, iii. 15, 16; Curtius, iv. 16, 27; Diodor. xvii. 61.

CHAP. XCIII.]

CAUSES OF THE DEFEAT.

227

indisputable was the cowardice of Darius himself. Under a king deficient not merely in the virtues of a general, but even in those of a private soldier, and who nevertheless insisted on commanding in person-nothing short of ruin could ensue. To those brave Persians whom he dragged into ruin along with him and who knew the real facts, he must have appeared as the betrayer of the empire. We shall have to recall this state of sentiment, when we describe hereafter the conspiracy formed by the Baktrian satrap Bessus. Nevertheless, even if Darius had behaved with unimpeachable courage, there is little reason to believe, that the defeat of Arbela, much less that of Issus, could have been converted into a victory. Mere immensity of number, even with immensity of space, was of no efficacy without skill as well as bravery in the commander. Three-fourths of the Persian army were mere spectators, who did nothing, and produced absolutely no effect. The flank movement against Alexander's right, instead of being made by some unemployed division, was so carried into effect, as to distract the Baktrian troops from their place in the front line, and thus to create a fatal break, of which Alexander availed himself for his own formidable charge in front. In spite of amplitude of space-the condition wanting at Issus,— the attacks of the Persians on Alexander's flanks and rear were feeble and inefficient. After all, Darius relied mainly upon his front line of battle, strengthened by the scythed chariots; these latter being found unprofitable, there remained only the direct conflict, wherein the strong point of the Macedonians resided.

of Alexander.

Generalship On the other hand, in so far as we can follow the dispositions of Alexander, they appear the most signal example recorded in antiquity, of military genius and sagacious combination. He had really as great an available force as his enemies, because every company in his army was turned to account, either in actual combat, or in reserve against definite and reasonable contingences. All his successes, and this most of all, were fairly earned by his own genius and indefatigable effort, combined with the admirable organization of his army. But his good fortune was no less conspicuous in the unceasing faults committed by his enemies. Except during the short period of Memnon's command, the Persian king exhibited nothing but ignorant rashness alternating with disgraceful apathy; turning to no account his vast real power of resistance in detail-keeping back his treasures to become the booty of the victor-suffering the cities which stoutly held out to perish unassisted—and committing the whole fate of the empire, on two successive occasions, to that very hazard which Alexander most desired.

B.C. 331,
Oct.-Nov.

Surrender

and Susa, the two

great

Persia.

The decisive character of the victory was manifested at once by the surrender of the two great of Babylon capitals of the Persian empire-Babylon and Susa. To Babylon, Alexander marched in person; to capitals of Susa, he sent Philoxenus. As he approached Babylon, the satrap Mazæus met him with the keys of the city; Bagophanes, collector of the revenue, decorated the road of march with altars, acquired in sacrifices, and scattered flowers; while the general both places. Babylonian population and their Chaldæan priests poured forth in crowds with acclamations and pre

Alexander

enters

Babylon. Immense treasures

CHAP. XCIII.] CAPTURE OF BABYLON AND SUSA.

229

sents. Susa was yielded to Philoxenus with the same readiness, as Babylon to Alexander'. The sum of treasure acquired at Babylon was great: sufficient to furnish a large donative to the troops -600 drachms per man to the Macedonian cavalry, 500 to the foreign cavalry, 200 to the Macedonian infantry, and something less to the foreign infantry2. But the treasure found and appropriated at Susa was yet greater. It is stated at 50,000 talents3 (= about £11,500,000 sterling), a sum which we might have deemed incredible, if we did not find it greatly exceeded by what is subsequently reported about the treasures in Persepolis. Of this Susian treasure four-fifths are said to have been in uncoined gold and silver, the remainder in golden Darics; the untouched accumulations of several preceding kings, who had husbanded them against a season of unforeseen urgency. A moderate portion of this immense wealth, employed by Darius three years earlier to push the operations of his fleet, subsidize able Grecian officers, and organize anti-Macedonian resistance-would have preserved both his life and his crown.

November,

Alexander rested his troops for more than thirty B.C. 331, days amidst the luxurious indulgences of Babylon. December. He gratified the feelings of the population and the Chaldæan priests by solemn sacrifices to Belus, as well as by directing that the temple of that God,

1 Arrian, iii. 16, 5-11; Diodor. xvii. 64; Curtius, v. 1, 17-20.

2 Curtius, v. 1, 45; Diodor. xvii. 64.

3 Arrian states this total of 50,000 talents (iii. 16, 12).

Alexander of Persia,

acts as king

and nominates

satraps. He marches to Susa. He remodels

the divi

I have taken them as Attic talents; if they were Æginæan talents, sions of his

the value of them would be greater in the proportion of five to three.

4 Curtius, v. 2, 11; Diodor. xvii. 66.

army.

230

[PART II.

and the other temples destroyed in the preceding century by Xerxes, should be rebuilt'. Treating the Persian empire now as an established conquest, he nominated the various satraps. He confirmed the Persian Mazæus in the satrapy of Babylon, but put along with him two Greeks as assistants and guarantees-Apollodorus of Amphipolis, as commander of the military force-Asklepiodorus as collector of the revenue. He rewarded the Persian traitor Mithrines, who had surrendered at his approach the strong citadel of Sardis, with the satrapy of Armenia. To that of Syria and Phenicia, he appointed Menes, who took with him 3000 talents, to be remitted to Antipater for levying new troops against the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus. The march of Alexander from Babylon to Susa occupied twenty days; an easy route through a country abundantly supplied. At Susa he was joined by Amyntas son of Andromenes, with a large reinforcement of about 15,000 men-Macedonians, Greeks, and Thracians. There were both cavalry and infantry-and what is not the least remarkable, fifty Macedonian youths of noble family, soliciting admission into Alexander's corps of pages. The incorporation of these new comers into the army afforded him the opportunity for remodelling on several points the organization of his different divisions, the smaller as well as the larger1.

1 Arrian, iii. 16, 6-9: compare Strabo, xvi. p. 738.

2 Arrian, iii. 16, 16; Curtius, v. 1, 44; Diodor. xvii. 64. Curtius and Diodorus do not exactly coincide with Arrian; but the discrepancy here is not very important.

3 Curtius, v. 1, 42: compare Diodor. xvii. 65; Arrian, iii. 16, 18.

Arrian, iii. 16, 20; Curtius, v. 2, 6; Diodor. xvii. 65. Respecting