CHAP. XCV.] GRECIAN HOPES FROM MEMNON. 371 sentiment; all that we know of its proceedings consisted in congratulations to Alexander on his victories. There is no Grecian history of public or political import; there are no facts except the local and municipal details of each city-" the streets and fountains which we are repairing, and the battlements which we are whitening," to use a phrase of Demosthenes the good management of the Athenian finances by the orator Lykurgus, and the contentions of orators respecting private disputes or politics of the past. spirit been called into action, if the Per sians had played their game well. But though Grecian history is thus stagnant and Grecian suspended during the first years of Alexander's might have Asiatic campaigns, it might at any moment have become animated with an active spirit of selfemancipation, if he had experienced reverses, or if the Persians had administered their own affairs with skill and vigour. I have already stated, that during the first two years of the war, the Persian fleet (we ought rather to say, the Phenician fleet in the Persian service) had a decided superiority at sea. Darius possessed untold treasures which might have indefinitely increased that superiority and multiplied his means of transmarine action, had he chosen to follow the advice of Memnon, by acting vigorously from the sea and strictly on the defensive by land. The movement or quiescence of the Greeks therefore depended on the turn of affairs in Asia; as Alexander himself was well aware. During the winter of 334-333 B.C., Memnon with the Persian fleet appeared to be making progress among the islands in the Egean2, and the 1 Demosthen. Olynthiac. iii. p. 36. 2 Arrian, ii. 1. Hopes raised in Greece, first by the Persian fleet in the Ægean, two great Persian armies on land. anti-Macedonian Greeks were expecting him farther westward in Euboea and Peloponnesus. Their hopes being dashed by his unexpected death, and still more by Darius's abandonment of the Memnonian next by the plans, they had next to wait for the chance of what might be achieved by the immense Persian landforce. Even down to the eve of the battle of Issus, Demosthenes' and others (as has already been mentioned) were encouraged by their correspondents in Asia to anticipate success for Darius even in pitched battle. But after the great disaster at Issus, during a year and a half (from November 333 B.c. to March or April 331 B.C.), no hope was possible. The Persian force seemed extinct, and Darius was so paralysed by the captivity of his family, that he suffered even the citizens of Tyre and Gaza to perish in their gallant efforts of defence, without the least effort to save them. At length, in the spring of 331 B.C., the prospects again appeared to improve. A second Persian army, countless like the first, was assembling eastward of the Tigris ; Alexander advanced into the interior, many weeks' march from the shores of the Mediterranean, to attack them; and the Persians doubtless transmitted encouragements with money to enterprising men in Greece, in hopes of provoking auxiliary movements. Presently (October 331 B.C.) came the catastrophe at Arbela; after which no demonstration against Alexander could have been attempted with any reasonable hope of success. Such was the varying point of view under which the contest in Asia presented itself to Grecian spec 1 Eschines cont. Ktesiph. p. 552. CHAP. XCV.] ATHENS DURING ALEXANDER'S LIFE. 373 tators, during the three years and a half between the landing of Alexander in Asia and the battle of Arbela. As to the leading states in Greece, we have to look at Athens and Sparta only; for Thebes had been destroyed and demolished as a city; and what had been once the citadel of the Kadmeia was now a Macedonian garrison'. Moreover, besides that garrison, the Boeotian cities, Orchomenus, Platæa, &c., were themselves strongholds of Macedonian dependence; being hostile to Thebes of old, and having received among themselves assignments of all the Theban lands. In case of any movement in Greece, therefore, Antipater, the viceroy of Macedonia, might fairly count on finding in Greece interested allies, serving as no mean check upon Attica. and policy decidedly pacific. At Athens, the reigning sentiment was decidedly Public acts pacific. Few were disposed to brave the prince at Athenswho had just given so fearful an evidence of his force by the destruction of Thebes and the enslavement of the Thebans. Ephialtes and Charidemus, the military citizens at Athens most anti-Macedonian in sentiment, had been demanded as prisoners by Alexander, and had withdrawn to Asia, there to take service with Darius. Other Athenians, men of energy and action, had followed their example, and had fought against Alexander at the Granikus, where they became his prisoners, and were sent to Macedonia to work in fetters at the mines. Ephialtes perished at the siege of Halikarnassus, while 1 Vita Demosthenis ap. Westermann, Scriptt. Biograph. p. 301. φρουρὰν καταστήσαντος ̓Αλεξάνδρου ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις μετὰ τὸ κατασκάψαι τοὺς Θηβαίους, &c. 2 Pausanias, i. 25, 4. Phokion and De leading ministers defending the place with the utmost gallantry; Charidemus suffered a more unworthy death from the shameful sentence of Darius. The anti-Macedonian leaders who remained at Athens, such as Demosthenes and Lykurgus, were not generals or men of action, but statesmen and orators. They were fully aware that submission to Alexander was a painful necessity, though they watched not the less anxiously for any reverse which might happen to him, such as to make it possible for Athens to head a new struggle on behalf of Grecian freedom. But it was not Demosthenes or Lykurgus who mades were now guided the general policy of Athens'. For the twelve years between the destruction of Thebes and the death of Alexander, Phokion and Demades were her ministers for foreign affairs; two men of nizing po- totally opposite characters, but coinciding in pacific views, and in looking to the favour of Alexander and Antipater as the principal end to be attained. Twenty Athenian triremes were sent to act with the Macedonian fleet, during Alexander's first campaign in Asia; these, together with the Athenian prisoners taken at the Granikus, served to him farther as a guarantee for the continued submission of the Athenians generally. There can be no doubt that the pacific policy of Phokion was now prudent and essential to Athens, though the same cannot be said (as I have remarked in the proper at Athens -they were of macedo litics. 1 "Since Macedonian dominion became paramount (observes Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 331), Æschines and men of his stamp are in full ascendency and affluence-I am impotent: there is no place at Athens for free citizens and counsellors, but only for men who do what they are ordered, and flatter the ruling potentate." Arrian, i. 29, 8. CHAP. XCV.] DEMOSTHENES AND LYKURGUS. 375 place) for his advocacy of the like policy twenty years before, when Philip's power was growing and might have been arrested by vigorous opposition. It suited the purpose of Antipater to ensure his hold upon Athens by frequent presents to Demades, a man of luxurious and extravagant habits. Phokion, incorruptible as well as poor to the end, declined all similar offers, though often made to him, not only by Antipater, but even by Alexander'. But sthenes and though not ascendent are never theless still public men of importance. Fi nancial Lykurgus. It deserves particular notice, that though the Demomacedonising policy was now decidedly in the Lykurgus, ascendent-accepted, even by dissentients, as the in only course admissible under the circumstances, politically, and confirmed the more by each successive victory of Alexander-yet statesmen, like Lykurgus and Demosthenes, of notorious anti-Macedonian sentiment, still held a conspicuous and influential activity of position, though of course restricted to matters of internal administration. Thus Lykurgus continued to be the real acting minister of finance, for three successive Panathenaic intervals of four years each, or for an uninterrupted period of twelve years. He superintended not merely the entire collection, but also the entire disbursement of the public revenue; rendering strict periodical account, yet with a financial authority greater than had belonged to any statesman since Perikles. He improved the gymnasia and stadia of the city-multiplied the donatives and sacred furniture in the temples,-enlarged, or constructed anew, docks and arsenals, provided a considerable stock of arms 1 Plutarch, Phokion, 30. |