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F THE CREED.

CLE I.

HE FATHER ALMIGHTY, AVEN AND EARTH.

I believe, giveth a denomination to th, from thence commonly called word to be imagined not to stand it to be carried through the whole though it be but twice actually ceive it virtually prefixed to the we say, I believe in God the Father erstood to say, I believe in Jesus as I believe in the Holy Ghost, so rch. Neither is it to be joined ly; but where any article is not nsive, there it is to be looked single truth, contained in that first, I believe in God, I believe e that Father to be Almighty, be the Maker of heaven and ve, rightly considered, mulble number of the articles, our times contained in the pregnant and diffusive, art of our confession of ve CREED nor Confesration, and more ample is properly applicable

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CREED.

I believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of Heaven and Earth: And in Jesus Christ his only Son our Lord: Which was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary: Suffered under Pontius Pilate, Was crucified, dead, and buried: He descended into Hell, the third day he rose again from the dead: He ascended into Heaven, and sitteth at the right hand of God the Father Almighty: From thence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead: E believe in the Holy Ghost; The Holy Catholick Church; The Communion of Saints; The Forgiveness of Sins; The Resurrection of the Body; And the Life everlasting.

AN

EXPOSITION OF THE CREED.

ARTICLE I.

I BELIEVE IN GOD THE FATHER ALMIGHTY,
MAKER OF HEAVEN AND EARTH.

As the first word CREDO, I believe, giveth a denomination to the whole confession of faith, from thence commonly called the CREED; So is the same word to be imagined not to stand only where it is expressed, but to be carried through the whole body of the confession. For though it be but twice actually rehearsed, yet must we conceive it virtually prefixed to the head of every article: that as we say, I believe in God the Father Almighty, so we are also understood to say, I believe in Jesus Christ his only Son, our Lord; as I believe in the Holy Ghost, so also I believe the Catholic Church. Neither is it to be joined with every complete article only; but where any article is not a single verity, but comprehensive, there it is to be looked upon as affixed to every part, or single truth, contained in that article as, for example, in the first, I believe in God, I believe that God to be the Father, I believe that Father to be Almighty, I believe that Father Almighty to be the Maker of heaven and earth. So that this Credo, I believe, rightly considered, multiplieth itself to no less than a double number of the articles, and will be found at least twenty-four times contained in the CREED. Wherefore, being a word so pregnant and diffusive, so necessary and essential to every part of our confession of faith, that without it we can neither have CREED nor Confession, it will require a more exact consideration, and more ample explication, and that in such a notion as is properly applicable to so many and so various truths.

Now by this previous expression, I believe, thus considered, every particular Christian is first taught, and then imagined, to make confession of his faith; and, consequently, this word, so used, admits a threefold consideration: First, As it supposeth belief, or faith, which is confessed. Secondly, As it is a confession, or external expression of that faith so supposed Thirdly, as both the faith and confession are of necessary and particular obligation. When, therefore, we shall have clearly delivered, First, What is the true nature and notion of belief Secondly, What the duty of confessing of our faith; Thirdly

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What obligation lies upon every particular person to believe and confess; then may we be conceived to have sufficiently explicated the first word of the CREED, then may every one understand what it is he says, and upon what ground he pro ceeds, when he professeth, I believe.

For the right understanding of the true nature of Christian faith, it will be no less than necessary to begin with the general notion of belief; which being first truly stated and defined, then by degrees deduced into its several kinds, will at last make the nature of Christian faith intelligible: a design, if I mistake not, not so ordinary and usual, as useful and necessary.

Belief in general I define to be an assent to that which is credible, as credible. By the word assent * is expressed that act or habit of the understanding, by which it receiveth, acknowledgeth, and embraceth any thing as a truth; it being the nature of the soul so to embrace whatsoever appeareth true unto it, and so far as it so appeareth. Now this assent, or judgment of any thing to be true, being a general act of the understanding, and so applicable to other habits thereof as well as to faith, must be specified by its proper object, and so limited and determined to its proper act, which is the other part left to complete the definition.

This object of faith is expressed by that which is credible; for every one who believeth any thing, doth thereby without question assent unto it as to that which is credible and therefore all belief whatsoever is such a kind of assent. But though

* Πίστις δὲ πρόληψις ἑκούσιός ἐστιν, θεοσεβείας συγκατάθεσις. Clem. Αlex. Strom. I. ii. p. 156. lin. 17. ed. Commelin. 1592. Πίστις μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ συγκατάθεσις ἀδιάκριτος τῶν ἀκουσθέντων ἐν πληροφορίᾳ τῆς ἀληθείας τῶν κηρυχθέντων Θεοῦ χάριτι. S. Basil. Ascet. de Fide, c. 1. The Basilidians, 'Ogiζονται γοῦν οἱ ἀπὸ Βασιλείδου τὴν πίστιν ψυχῆς συγκατάθεσιν πρός τι τῶν μὴ κινούντων αἴσθησιν διὰ τὸ μὴ παρεῖναι. Clem. Αlex. Strom. 1. ii. p. 160. 11. Κατὰ δὲ τὸν ἡμέ τερον λόγον, πίστις ἐστὶν ἑκούσιος τῆς ψυχῆς συγκατάθεσις. Theodoret. Therap. Serm. 1. And yet he also afterward acknowledgeth they had that definition from the Greeks: Τὴν μὲν γὰρ πίστιν καὶ οἱ ὑμέτεροι φιλόσοφοι ὡείσαντο εἶναι ἐθελούσιον τῆς ψυχῆς συγκατά Θεσιν. • Credere est cum assensione cogitare,' S. August. de Prædestin. Sanct. §. 5. And de Spir. et Litter. ad Marcellin. tih. §. 54. • Quid est credere, nisi consentire verum esse quod dicitur?' So I take the συγκατάθεσις used by the Greek fathers to signify assensum or assensionem, as A. Gellius translateth the Stoic, συγκατατίθεται, sua assensione approbat, l. xix. 1. and before him Cicero,' Nunc de assensione atque approbatione, quam Græci συγκατά Θεσιν vocant, pauca dicamus. In Lucullo, 6. 37. 50 ἀπιστία and συγκατάθεσις, are op

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posed by the Greeks. As Sextus Empiricus, speaking of Admetus seeing Alcestis brought back by Hercules from Hades : Επεί μέντοι ήδει ὅτι τέθνηκε, περιεσπᾶτο αὐτοῦ ἡ διάνοια ἀπὸ τῆς συγκαταθέσεως, καὶ πρὸς ἀπιστίαν ἔκλινε. Pyrrh. Hypot. 1. i. 33.

Η Φιλαλήθης ή ψυχὴ οὐδέποτε κατὰ τὸ ψεῦδος ἀνεχομένη διατίθεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φανὲν ἀληθὲς πάντως καὶ εὐθύς. Simplic. in 3. Arist. de Anima. Καν τις τἀληθὲς σκοπῇ, εὑρήσει τὸν ἄνθρωπον φύσει διαβεβλημένον μὲν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ψεύδους συγκατάθεσιν, ἔχοντα δὲ ἀφορμὰς πρὸς πίστιν τἀληθοῦς. Clem. Αler. Strom. 1. ii. p. 105. 48.

† Ας συγκατάθεσις the Greek word used for this assent is applied to other acts of the understanding as well as that of belief, so Clemens Alexandrinus speaking of the definition of faith: "Αλλοι δ' ἀφανοῦς πράγματος ενωτικὴν συγκατάθεσιν ἀπέδωκαν εἶναι τὴν πίστιν, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀγνοουμένου πράγματος φανερὰν συγ κατάθεσιν. Strom. 1. ii. p. 156. 21. And again: Πᾶσα οὖν δόξα, καὶ κρίσις, καὶ ὑπόληψις, καὶ μάθησις, οἷς ζῶμεν καὶ σύνεσμεν αἰεὶ, τῷ γένει τῶν ἀνθρώπων συγκατάθεσί; ἐστιν· ἡ δ ̓ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἡ πίστις εἴη ἄν· ἥ τε ἀπιστία, ἀποσύστασις οὖσα τῆς πίστεως, δυνατὴν δείκνυσι τὴν συγκατάθεσίν τε καὶ πίσ στιν. p. 165. 45.

all belief be an assent to that which is credible, yet every such assent may not be properly faith; and therefore those words make not the definition complete. For he that sees an action done, knows it to be done, and therefore assents unto the truth of the performance of it because he sees it but another person to whom he relates it, may assent unto the performance of the same action, not because himself sees it, but because the other relates it; in which case that which is credible is the object of faith in one, of evident knowledge in the other. To make the definition therefore full, besides the material object or thing believed, we have added the formal object, or that whereby it is properly believed, expressed in the last term, as credible, which being taken in, it then appears, that, First, Whosoever believeth any thing, assenteth to something which is to him credible, and that as it is credible; and again, Whosoever assenteth to any thing which is credible, as it is credible, believeth something by so assenting: which is sufficient to shew the definition complete.

But for the explication of the same, farther observations will be necessary. For if that which we believe be something which is credible, and the notion under which we believe be the credibility of it, then must we first declare what it is to be credible, and in what credibility doth consist, before we can understand what is the nature of belief.

Now that is properly credible which is not apparent of itself, nor certainly to be collected, either antecedently by its cause, or reversely by its effect; and yet, though by none of these. ways, hath the attestation of a truth. For those things which are apparent of themselves, are either so in respect of our sense, as, that snow is white, and fire is hot; or in respect of our understanding, as, that the whole of any thing is greater than any one part of the whole, that every thing imaginable either is or is not. The first kind of which being propounded to our sense, one to the sight, the other to the touch, appear of themselves immediately true, and therefore are not termed credible, but evident to sense; as the latter kind, propounded to the understanding, are immediately embraced and acknowledged as truths apparent in themselves, and therefore are not called credible, but evident to the understanding. And so those things which are* apparent, are not said properly to be believed, but to be known.

Again, other things, though not immediately apparent in themselves, may yet appear most certain and evidently true, by an immediate and necessary connexion with something formerly known for, being every natural cause actually applied doth necessarily produce its own natural effect, and every na

Apparentia non habent fidem, sed agnitionem.' Greg. 4. Dial. cap. 5. 'Habet Fides oculos suos, quibus quodam

modo videt, verum esse quod nondum videt, et quibus certissime videt, nondum se videre quod credit.' S. August. Ep. 222

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