of the Old, from which the Jewish and Christian Greeks received that phrase of believing in, it hath no such peculiar and accumulative signification. For it is sometimes attributed to God, the author and original cause; sometimes to the prophets, the immediate revealers of the faith; sometimes it is spoken of miracles, the motives to believe; sometimes of the Law of God, the material object of our faith. Among all which varieties of that phrase of speech, it is sufficiently apparent that in this confession of faith it is most proper to admit it in the last acceptation, by which it is attributed to the material ob ject of belief. For the CREED being nothing else but a brief comprehension of the most necessary matters of faith, whatsoever is contained in it beside the first word I believe, by which we make confession of our faith, can be nothing else but part of those verities to be believed, and the act of belief in respect to them nothing but an assent unto them as divinely credible and infallible truths. Neither can we conceive that the ancient Greek Fathers of the Church could have any farther meaning in it, who make the whole body of the CREED to be of the same nature, as so many truths to be believed, acknowledged, and confessed; insomuch as sometimes they use not believing in,* neither for the Father, Son, nor Holy Ghost; sometimes using it as to them, they continue the same to the following articles of, the Catholic Church, the Communion of Saints,† &c. and ge

into the same phrase, but separately by himself, as Exod. xix. 9. "The Lord said unto Moses, Lo, I come unto thee in a thick cloud, that the people may hear

וגם בך יאמין,when I speak with thee

and believe in thee for ever." And therefore when it was objected to St. Basil, that they did believe in Moses, as well as that they were baptized into Moses, and generally is wμoróγηται ἤδη καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γεγενῆσθαι : the Father doth not deny the language, but interprets it: ἡ εἰς αὐτὸν πίστις ἐπὶ τὸν múgiov åvapigɛtai. De Sp. S. c. 14. Neither is this only spoken of Moses and the pɔ. phets, that the Israelites believed in them, but of David, not as a prophet, but as a bare relater of his own actions, 1 Sam.

Δαυίδ ἐν τῷ ̓Αγχούς, LΧΧ. 'Et credidit Achis in David,' Vulg. 'Est ergo fides nostra primo quidem omnium in Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum, consequenter vero etiam in omnes sanctos Patriarchas, vel Prophetas, vel Apostolos Christi.' Orig. in Apol. Pamphil. p. 489. To include, this general phrase of believing in, is originally attributed sometimes to the supreme author of our Faith, as to God; sometimes to the intervenient messengers, as the Prophets; sometimes to the motives of our Faith, Psal.lxxviii.32

σαν ἐν τοῖς θαυμασίοις αὐτοῦ, and they be-
lieved not in his wondrous works; some-
times to the object of it, or that which is
believed, as Psalm cxix. 66.

I have believed in thy command-
ments, as Mark i. 15. TELETE BY TO
εὐαγγελίω.

· Πιστεύομεν οὖν καὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν ἕνα μόνον ἀληθινὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν Θεὸν, καὶ ἕνα τὸν μονογενῆ αὐτοῦ υἱὸν, καὶ ἓν μόνον πνεῦμα ἅγιον. 5. Βαsil. de Fide, c. 4.

Arius and Euzoius in their confession delivered to Constantine: Πιστεύομεν εἰς ἕνα Θεὸν πατέρα, καὶ εἰς ἕνα κύριον Ἰησοῦν, καὶ εἰς τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, καὶ εἰς σαρκὸς ἀνάστασιν, καὶ εἰς ζωὴν τοῦ μέλλοντος αἰῶνος, καὶ εἰς βασιλείαν οὐρανῶν, καὶ εἰς μίαν καθολικὴν ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ Socrat. Hist Eccl. 1. i. c. 26. Sozomen. 1. ii. c. 27. Kathxnois Tay φωτιζομένων σχεδιασθεῖσα εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα ἅγιον, καὶ εἰς μίαν ἁγίαν καθολικὴν ἐκκλησίαν, καὶ εἰς σαρκὸς ἀνάστασιν, καὶ εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον. S. Cyril. Hierosol. Catech. 18. Eig Tò πVEμα τὸ ἅγιον, εἰς μίαν ἁγίαν καθολικὴν καὶ ἀποστολικὴν ἐκκλησίαν. S. Epiphan. in Anc. §. 120. And in a larger confession: Iστεύομεν εἰς μίαν καθολικὴν καὶ ἀποστολικὴν ἐκκλησίαν, καὶ εἰς ἓν βάπτισμα μετανοίας, καὶ εἰς ἀνάστασιν νεκρῶν, καὶ εἰς βασιλείαν ουρανῶν, καὶ εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον. §. 121.

nerally speak of the CREED* as nothing but mere matter of faith, without any intimation of hope, love, or any such notion included in it. So that believing in, by virtue of the phrase or manner of speech, whether we look upon the original use of it in the Hebrew, or the derivative in the Greek, or the sense of it in the first Christians in the Latin Church, can be of no farther real importance in the CREED in respect of God, who immediately follows, than to acknowledge and assert his being or existence. Nor ought this to be imagined a slender notion or small part of the first Article of our faith, when it really is the foundation of this and all the rest; that as the CREED is fundamental in respect of other truths, this is the foundation even of the fundamentals: "for he that cometh to God must believe that he is." (Heb. xi. 6.) And this I take for a sufficient explanation of the phrase, I believe in God, that is, I believe that God is.

As for the matter or truth contained in these words so explained, it admits a threefold consideration, first, of the notion of God, what is here understood by that name; secondly, of the existence of God, how we know or believe that he is; thirdly, the unity of God, in that though "there be gods many, and lords many," (1 Cor. viii. 5.) yet in our CREED we mention him as but one. When, therefore, we shall have clearly delivered what is the true notion of God in whom we believe, how and by what means we come to assure ourselves of the existence of such a Deity, and upon what grounds we apprehend him of such a transcendent nature that he can admit no competitor; then may we be conceived to have sufficiently explicated the former part of the first Article; then may every one understand what he says, and upon what ground he proceeds, when he professeth, I believe in God.

The name of God is attributed unto many, but here is to be understood of him who by way of eminency and excellency bears that name, and therefore is styled God of gods; "the

Greg Nyss. calls them sireßig megl Θεοῦ ὑπολήψεις. And Eusebius in bis Coufession exbibited to the council of Nice, concludes: Πιστεύομεν καὶ εἰς ἓν πνεῦμα ἅγιον, τούτων ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ ὑπάρχειν πιο CTELOTE;: signifying that every particular which he had rehearsed he believed to be. And that was all in the confession intended. Alexander, bishop of Alexandria, after a long declaration of the former articles concerning the Father and the Son, draws to a conclusion on the latter article thus : Πρὸς δὲ τῇ εὐσεβεία (1. εὐσεβεῖ) ταύτῇ περὶ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ δόξη – ἓν πνεῦμα ἅγιον ὁμολογοῦμεν ——μίαν καὶ μόνην καθολι μὴν τὴν ἀποστολικὴν ἐκκλησίαν μετὰ τοῦ τον (vel τοῦτο ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀνάστασιν οἴδαμεν. Theodor. Hist. Eccl. 1. i. c. 4. So Tertull. de Prascript. adv. Hæret. c. 13. Regula est

fidei illa qua creditur,Unum omnino Deum esse:' and adv. Praxeam,c.2.where he makes another rehearsal of his Creed, he begins with Unicum quidem Deum credimus.'

Non est amor Dei Articulus, neque etiam amor proximi; quia etiamsi sint præcepta generalia activa, tamen cum actio contineatur, non oportet eum constituere articulum: sed ista sunt fidei dogmata, quæ sunt columnæ et fundamenta legis divinæ.' Is. Abravanel de cap. fidei, c. 11. Primus est deorum cultus, deos credere.' Sn. Epist. xcv. p. 470.

: יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות לידע שיש the foun שם מצוי ראשון והוא ממציא כל נמצא

dation of foundations and pillar of wisdoms is to know, that the prst Being is, and that it giveth existence to every thing which is Maimonides de Fundamen. Legis, c. 1.

Lord our God is God of gods, and Lord of lords: (Deut. x. 17. Psalm cxxxvi. 2. Dan. ii. 47. xi. 36.) and in the same respect is called "the most high God," (Gen. xiv. 18-20. 22.) (others being but inferior, or under him), and, " God over or above all." (Rom. ix. 5. Ephes. iv. 6.)* This eminency and excellency, by which these titles become proper unto him, and incommunicable to any other, is grounded upon the Divine nature or essence, which all other who are called gods have not, and therefore are not by nature gods. "Then when ye knew not God (saith St. Paul), ye did service to them which. by nature are not gods." (Gal. iv. 8.) There is then a God by nature, and others which are called gods, but by nature are not so: for either they have no power at all, because no being, but only in the false opinions of deceived men, as the gods of the heathen; or if they have any real power or authority, from whence some are called godst in the Scripture, yet they have it not from themselves or of their own nature, but from him who "only hath immortality," (1 Tim. vi. 16.) and consequently only Divinity, and therefore is "the only true God." (John xvii. 3.) So that the notion of a Deity doth at last expressly signify a Being or nature of infinite perfection; and the infinite perfection of a nature or being consisteth in this, that it be absolutely and essentially necessary, an actual being of itself; and potential or causative of all beings beside itself, independent from any other, upon which all things else depend, and by which all things else are governed. It is true, indeed, that to give a perfect definition of God is impossible, neither can our finite reason hold any proportion with infinity; but yet a sense of this Divinity we have, and the first and common notion of it consists in these three particulars; that it is a Being of itself, and independent from any other; that it is that upon which all things which are made depend; that it governs all things. And this I conceive sufficient as to the first consideration, in reference to the notion of a God.

As for the existence of such a Being, how it comes to be known unto us, or by what means we are assured of it, is not so unanimously agreed upon, as that it is. For although some have imagined that the knowledge of a Deity is connatural to the soul of man, so that every man hath a connate inbred notion of a God; yet I rather conceive the soul of man to have no connatural knowledge at all, no particular notion of any thing in it, from the beginning; but being we can have no assurance of its pre-existence, we may more rationally judge it to receive the first apprehensions of things by sense, and by

them to make all rational collections. If then the soul of man be at the first like a fair smooth table, without any actual characters or knowledge imprinted in it; if all the knowledge which we have comes successively by sensation, instruction, and rational collection; then must we not refer the apprehens:on of a Deity to any connate notion or inbred opinion; at least we are assured God never charged us with the knowledge of him upon that account.

Again, although others do affirm, that the existence of God is a truth evident of itself, so as whosoever hears but these terms once named, that God is, cannot choose but acknowledge it for a certain and infallible truth upon the first apprehension that as no man can deny that the whole is greater than any part, who knoweth only what is meant by whole, and what by part: so no man can possibly deny or doubt of the existence of God, who knows but what is meant by God, and what it is to be; yet can we not ground our knowledge of God's existence upon any such clear and immediate evidence: nor were it safe to lay it upon such a ground, because whosoever should deny it, could not by this means be convinced; it being a very irrational way of instruction to tell a man that. doubts of this truth, that he must believe it because it is evident unto him, when he knows that he therefore only doubts of it, because it is not evident unto him.

Although therefore that, God is, be of itself an immediate, certain, necessary truth, yet must it be evidenced and made apparent unto us by its connexion to other truths; so that the being of a Creator may appear unto us by his creature, and the dependency of inferior entities may lead us to a clear acknowledgment of the supreme and independent Being. The wisdom of the Jews thought this method proper," for by the greatness and beauty of the creatures, proportionably the Maker of them is seen :" (Wisd. of Sol. xiii. 5.) and not only they, but St. Paul hath taught us, that "the invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." (Rom. i. 20.)† For if Phidias could so

Hæc propositio, Deus est, quantum in se est, per se nota est, quia prædicatum est idem cum subjecto, Deus enim est suum esse. Sed quia nos non scimus de Deo quid est, non est nobis per se nota, sed indiget demonstrari per ea quæ sunt magis nota quoad nos, et minus nota quoad naturam, scilicet per effectus.' Aquin. 1. p. q. 2. art. 2.

This place must be vindicated from the false gloss of Socinus, who contends, that it cannot be proved from the creature that there is a God, and therefore to this place of St. Paul answers thus: Sciendum est verba a creatione mundi

debere conjungi cum verbo invisibilia-ait igitur eo in loco Apostolus, æternam divinitatem Dei, i. id quod nos Deus perpetuo facere vult (Divinitas enim hoc sensu alibi quoque apud ipsum enunciatur, ut Col. ii. 9.), æternamque potentiam, i. promissiones quæ nunquam intercident (quo sensu paulo superius dixerat Evangelium esse potentiam Dei), hæc, inquam, quæ nunquam postquam mundus creatus est ab hominibus visa fuerant, i. non fuerant eis cognita, per opera, hoc est, per mirabiles ipsius Dei et divinorum hominum, præsertim vero Christi et Apostolorum ejus, operationes, conspecta fuisse.' In

contrive a piece of his own work,* as in it to preserve the memory of himself, never to be obliterated without the destruction of the work, well may we read the great Artificer of the world in the works of his own hands, and by the existence of any thing demonstrate the first cause of all things.

We find by the experience of ourselves, that some things in this world have a beginning, before which they were not; the account of the years of our age sufficiently infer our nativities, and they our conceptions, before which we had no being. Now if there be any thing which had a beginning, there must necessarily be something which had no beginning, because nothing can be a beginning to itself. Whatsoever is, must of necessity either have been made, or not made; and something