demneth? It is Christ that died, yea rather that is risen again, who is even at the right hand of God, who also maketh intercession for us." (Rom. viii. 33, 34.) For he which was accepted in his oblation, and therefore sat down on God's right hand, to improve this acceptation continues his intercession; and having obtained all power by virtue of his humiliation, representeth them both in a most sweet commixtion; by an humble omnipotency, or omnipotent humility, appearing in the presence, and presenting his postulations at the throne of God.* Having thus explicated the session of our Saviour, we are next to consider the description of him at whose right hand he 's set down; which seems to be delivered in the same terms with which the CREED did first begin, I believe in God the Father Almighty: and indeed, as to the expression of his essence, it is the same name of God; as to the setting forth his relation, it is the same name of Father: but as to the adjoining attribute, though it be the same word, it is not the same notion of Almighty. What therefore we have spoken of the nature of God, and the person of the Father, is not here to be repeated, but supposed; for Christ is set down at the right hand of that God and of that Father, which we understand when we say, I believe in God the Father. But because there is a difference in the language of the Greeks between the word which is rendered Almighty in the first Article, and that which is so St. Augustin, discoursing upon that place of St. Paul, 1 Tim. ii. 1. "I exhort that first of all, supplications, prayers, and intercessions, be made for all men,' observeth what is the nature of intercession Pro interpellationibus autem quod nostri habent, secundum codices credo vestros postulationes posuisti. Hæc interim duo, id est, quod alii postulationes, alii interpellationes interpretati sunt, unum verbum transferre voluerunt, quod Græcus habet iuc. Et profecto advertis: sed nosti aliud esse interpellare, aliud postulare. Non enim solemus dicere, postulant interpellaturi, sed interpellant postulaturi. Veruntamen ex vicinitate verbum usurpatum, cui propinquitas ipsa impetrat intellectum, non est velut censoria notatione culpandum. Nam et de ipso Domino Jesu Christo dictum est, quod interpellat pro nobis. Numquid interpellat, et non etiam postulat? Imo vero quia postulat, pro eo positum est, interpellat. Evidenter quippe alibi de eo dicitur, Si quis peccaverit, Advocatum habemus apud Patrem, Jesum Christum justum, ipse est exoratio pro peccatis nostris. Quanquam fortassis codices apud vos etiam in eo loco de Domino Jesu Christo non habent interpellat pro nobis, sed postulat pro nobis. In Græco enim, quo verbo hic positæ sunt interpellationes, quas ipse posuisti postulationes, ipsum et illic ver bum est, ubi scriptum est, interpellat pro + In the first Article it is Παντοκράτως, 1 rendered in the sixth, because that peculiarly signified authority of dominion, this more properly power in operation; therefore we have reserved this notion of omnipotency now to be explained. In which, two things are observable; the propriety, and the universality; the propriety in the potency, the universality in the omnipotency; first, That he is a God of power; secondly, That he is a God of infinite power. The potency consisteth in a proper, innate, and natural force or activity, by which we are assured that God is able to act, work, and produce true and real effects, which do require a true and real power to their production and in respect of this he is often described unto us under the notion of a mighty God. The omnipotency or infinity of this power consisteth in an ability to act, perform, and produce, whatsoever can be acted or produced, without any possibility of impediment or resistance: and in this respect he is represented to us as an Almighty God. And there-fore such an omnipotency we ascribe unto him: which is sufficiently delivered in the Scriptures, first by the testimony of an angel," for with God nothing shall be impossible ;" (Luke i. 37.) secondly, by the testimony of Christ himself, who said, "With men it is impossible, but not with God; for with God all things are possible." (Mark x. 27.) Now he to whom all things are possible and to whom nothing is impossible, is truly and properly omnipotent. Thus whatsoever doth not in itself imply a repugnancy of being or subsisting, hath in reference to the power of God a possibility of production; and whatsoever in respect of the power of God hath an impossibility of production, must involve in itself a repugnancy or contradiction. This truth, though confessed by the heathens, hath yet been denied by some of them; but with poor and insufficient arguments, that we shall need no more than an explication of the doctrine to refute their objections. First, then, we must say God is omnipotent, because all nare, aut revocare defunctos; nec facere ut qui vixit non vixerit, qui honores gessit non gesserit, nullumque habere in præterita jus præterquam oblivionis : atque (ut facetis quoque argumentis societas hæc cum Deo copuletur)ut bis dena viginti non sint, ac multa similiter efficere non posse, per quæ declaratur haud dubie naturæ potentia, idque esse quod Deum vocamus.' Plin. Nat. Hist. 1. ii. c. 7. Add unto these that objection of Elymas the sorcerer, recorded by Dionysius Areopagita: Kaito siy Ελύμας ὁ μάγος, Εἰ παντοδύναμός ἐστιν ὁ Θεὸς, πῶς λέγεται τι μὴ δύνασθαι πρὸς τοῦ καθ' ὑμᾶς θεολόγου; Λοιδορεῖται δὲ τῷ Θείῳ Παύλο φήσαντι, μὴ δύνασθαι τὸν Θεὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀρνήσαbai. De Divinis Nominibus, c. 8. power, whatsoever is in any creature, is derived from him; and well may he be termed Almighty, who is the fountain of all might. There is no activity in any agent, no influence of any cause, but what dependeth and proceedeth from the principal agent or the first of causes. There is nothing in the whole circumference of the Universe but hath some kind of activity, and consequently some power to act* (for nothing can be done without a power to do it): and as all their entities flow from the first of beings, so all their several and various powers flow from the first of powers: and as all their beings cannot be con ceived to depend on any but an infinite essence, so all those powers cannot proceed from any but an infinite power. Secondly, God may be called omnipotent, because there can be no resistance made to his power, no opposition to his will, no rescue from his hands.t "The Lord of hosts hath purposed, and who shall disannul it? his hand is stretched out, and who shall turn it back?" (Isa..xiv. 27.) "He doth according to his will, in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What dost thou?" (Dan. iv. 35.) According to the degrees of power in the agent and the resistent, is an action performed or hindered if there be more degrees of power in the resistent than in the agent, the action is prevented; if fewer, it may be retarded or debilitated, not wholly hindered or suppressed. But if there be no degree of power in the resistent in reference to the agent, then is the action totally vigorous; and if in all the powers, beside that of God, there be not the least degree of any resistance, we must acknowledge that power of his being above all opposition, to be infinite. As Jehosaphat said, "In thine hand, O God, is there not power and might, so that none is able to withstand thee?" (2 Chron. xx. 6.) From hence there is no difficulty with God to perform any thing: no greater endeavour or activity to produce the greatest than the least of creatures; but an equal facility in reference unto all things which cannot be imagined but by an infinite excess of power, above and beyond all resistance.‡ Thirdly, God is yet more properly called omnipotent, be cause his own active power extendeth itself to all things;§ neither is there any thing imaginably possible, which he cannot do. Thus when God several ways had declared his power unto Job, "Job answered the Lord, and said, I know that thou * Ἡ ἀπειροδύναμος τοῦ Θεοῦ διάδοσις εἰς πάντα τὰ ὄντα χωρεῖ, καὶ οὐδέν ἐστι τῶν ὄντων ὃ παντελῶς ἀφήρηται τὸ ἔχειν τινὰ δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ἡ νοερὰν, ἡ λογικὴν, ἡ αἰσθητικὴν, ἡ ζωτι μὴν, ἢ οὐσιώδη δύναμιν. ἔχει· καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ, εἰ θέμις εἰπεῖν, τὸ εἶναι δύναμιν, εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἔχει παρὰ τῆς ὑπερουσίου δυνάμεως. Dionys. Areopag. De Divin. Nom. c. 8. §. 3. Neque enim veraciter ob aliud vocatur omnipotens, nisi quia quicquid vult potest; nec voluntate cujuspiam creaturæ voluntatis omnipotentis impeditur effectus.' S. August. Enchir. ad Laur. c. 96. Nisi omnipotens esset, non una eademque facilitate summa atque ima fecisset.' Fulgent. de Fide ad Petrum, c. 3. Quis est omnipotens nisi qui omnia potest? S. August. de Trin. 1. iv. c 20 8. 27. canst do every thing." (Job xlii. 1, 2.) Now that must needs be infinite activity, which answereth to all kinds of possibility. Thus the power of God is infinite extensively, in respect of its object, which is all things; for whatsoever effects there be of his power yet still there can be more produced: intensively, in respect of the action, or perfection of the effect produced; for whatsoever addition of perfection is possible, is within the sphere of God's omnipotency. The object then of the power of God is whatsoever is simply and absolutely possible, whatsoever is in itself such as that it may be ; and so possible every thing is, which doth not imply a contradiction. Again, whatsoever implieth a contradiction is impossible, and therefore is not within the object of the power of God, because impossibility is the contradiction of all power. For that is said to imply a contradiction, which if it were, it would necessarily follow, that the same thing would be and not be. But it is impossible for the same thing both to be and not to be, at the same time and in the same respect and therefore whatsoever implieth a contradiction, is impossible. From whence it followeth, that it may be truly said, God cannot effect that which involveth a contradiction, but with no derogation from his power and it may be as truly said, God can effect whatsoever involveth not a contradiction, which is the expression of an infinite power. Now an action may imply a contradiction two ways, either in respect of the object, or in respect of the agent. In respect of the object it may imply a contradiction immediately or con sequentially. That doth imply a contradiction immediately, which plainly and in terms doth signify a repugnancy, and so destroys itself, as for the same thing to be and not to be, to have been and not to have been. And therefore it must be acknowledged, that it is not in the power of God to make that not to have been, which hath already been:* but that is no derogation to God's power, because not within the object of any power. And he may certainly have all power, who hath not that which belongeth to no power. Again, that doth imply a contradiction consequentially, which in appearance seemeth not to be impossible, but by necessary consequence, if admitted, leadeth infallibly to a contradiction. As that one Τὸ γεγονὸς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι διὸ ὀρθῶς ̓Αγάθων, Μόνου γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ Θεὸς στερίσκεται, Aristot. Ethic. Eud. 1. v. c. 2. 'Quisquis dicit, Si omnipotens est Deus, faciat ut quæ facta sunt, facta non fuerint; non videt hoc se dicere, Si omnipotens est, faciat ut ea quæ vera sunt, eo ipso quo vera sunt falsa sint.' S. August. contra Fuustum, l. xxvi. c 5. It is granted there fore to be true, which Pliny objects, Nat. Hist. 1. ii. c. 7. Deum non facere ut qui vixit non vixerit, qui honores gessit non gesserit; as this proves nothing against omnipotency, because it is no act of possibility. Had the act objected been feasi ble, and God had not the power to effect it, then had he wanted some power, and consequently had not been omnipotent. But being it is not want of power in the agent, but of possibility in the object, it proveth no deficiency in God. body should be at the same time in two distinct places, speaks no repugnancy in terms; but yet by consequence it leads to that which is repugnant in itself; which is, that the same body is but one body, and not but one. Being then a covert and consequential contradiction is as much and as truly a contradiction as that which is open and immediate, it followeth that it is as impossible to be effected, and therefore comes not under the power of God. That doth imply a contradiction in respect of the agent, which is repugnant to his essential perfection; for being every action floweth from the essence of the agent, whatsoever is totally repugnant to that essence, must involve a contradic tion as to the agent. Thus we may say, God cannot sleep, God cannot want, God cannot die; he cannot sleep, whose being is spiritual; he cannot want, whose nature is all-sufficient; he cannot die, who is essentially and necessarily existent. Nor can that be a diminution of his omnipotency, the contrary whereof would be a proof of his impotency, a demonstration of his infirmity. Thus it is "impossible for God to lie," (Heb. vi. 18.) to whom we say nothing is impossible; and, he who can do all things, "cannot deny himself." (2 Tim. Neque enim et vitam Dei et præscientiam Dei sub necessitate ponimus, si dicamus, Necesse est Deum semper vivere et cuncta præscire; sicut nec potestas ejus minuitur, cum dicitur mori fallique non posse. Sic enim hoc non potest, ut potius, si posset, minoris esset utique potestatis. Recte quippe omnipotens dicitur qui tamen mori et falli non potest. Dicitur enim Omnipotens faciendo quod vult, non patiendo quod non vult: quod si ei accideret, nequaquam esset Omnipotens. Unde propterea quædam non potest, quia Omnipotens est.' S. August. de Civ. Dei, 1. w. c. 10. Nam ego dico quanta non possit. Non potest mori, non potest peccare, non potest mentiri, non potest falli. Tanta non potest; quæ si posset, non esset Omnipotens.' Idem, de Tempore Serm. 119. al. 213. §. 1. + Nunquidnam mentitur Deus? Sed non mentitur; quia impossibile est mentiri Deum. Impossibile autem istud nunquidnam infirmitatis est? Non utique. Nam quomodo omnia potest, si aliquid efficere non potest. Quid ergo ei impossibile? Illud utique quod naturæ ejus contrarium est, non quod virtuti arduum. Impossibile, inquit, est ei mentiri, et impossibile istud non infirmitatis est, sed virtutis et majestatis ; quia veritas non recipit mendacium, nec Dei virtus levitatis errorem.' S. Ambros. Annot. in Num. Si volunt invenire quod Omnipotens non potest, habent prorsus; ego dicam, mentiri non potest. Credamus ergo quod potest, non creden do quod non potest.' S. August. de Civ. Dei, l. xxii. c. 25. This was the argument of Elymas the sorcerer beforementioned, to which Dionysius Areopagita gives this answer: Ἡ ἑαυτοῦ ἄρνησις ἔκπτωσις ἀληθείας ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια ἔν ἐστι, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀληθείας ἔκπτωσις τοῦ ὄντος ἔκπτωσις. Εἰ τοίνυν ἡ ἀλήθεια ν ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ ἄρνησις τῆς ἀληθείας τοῦ ὄντος ἔκπτωσις, ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ἐκπεσεῖν ὁ Θεὸς οὐ δύναται· καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς ἄν τις φαίη τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι οὐ δύναται, καὶ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι κατὰ στέρησιν οὐκ οἶδεν. De Divin. Nom. c. 8. 6. 6. Φαμὲν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐ δύναται αἰσχρὰ ὁ Θεὸς, ἐπεὶ ἔσται ὁ Θεὸς δυνάμενος μὴ εἶναι Θεός· εἰ γὰς αἰσχρὸν δρᾷ ὁ Θεός, οὐκ ἔστι Θεός. Orig cont. Cels. l. v. γ. 23. Jobius gives this soration to the same objection : "Α φαμὲν μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ θεῖον, ταῦτα τῶν μήτε ὄντων ἐστὶ μήτε δυνατῶν ὅλως ὑφεστάναι. ποῦ γὰς ὑφέστηκε τὸ ἀρνήσασθαι τὸν Θεὸν ἑαυτὸν, ἢ ἡ τροπὴ, ἢ ἡ τῆς ἀγαθότητος ἔκπτωσις, ἢ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ψεῦδος γενέσθαι ; Παντοδύναμος δὲ ὑμνεῖται καὶ λέγεται, ὡς τά τα πρέποντα αὐτῷ καὶ σωτήρια τῶν δημιουρ γημάτων πάντα δυνάμενος ὅτε βούλεται. Joh. de Verb. Incarn. l. iii. c. 13. apud Photium in Biblioth. p. 586. Ο Απόστολός φησι περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ πατρὸς, Εν οἷς ἀδύνατον ψεύσασθαι Θεόν· οὐκ ἀσθένειάν τινα κατηγορών τῆς παγκρατους δυνάμεως, ἀλλὰ μεγίστην ῥώμην, ὅτι ἀνεπίδεκτός ἐστι τοῦ ψεύδους ὁ τῆς ἀληθείας πατήρ. Καὶ ἀλλαχόσε δὲ ταύτην ὀχυρῶν τὴν ἔννοιαν ἔφη, Εὰν ἀρνησώμεθα αὐτὸν, ἐκεῖνος πιστὸς μένει· ἀρνήσασθαι γὰς ἑαυτὸν οὐ δύναται. Καὶ τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἀσθενείας ἐστὶν |
