Grammar in Early Twentieth-Century PhilosophyRichard Gaskin Routledge, 15.04.2013 - 272 Seiten This book is a systematic and historical exploration of the philosophical significance of grammar. In the first half of the twentieth century, and in particular in the writings of Frege, Husserl, Russell, Carnap and Wittgenstein, there was sustained philosophical reflection on the nature of grammar, and on the relevance of grammar to metaphysics, logic and science. |
Im Buch
Ergebnisse 1-5 von 23
Seite 7
... conceptsentence name word (Satz) (Eigenname) (Begriffswort) ↓ ↓ ↓ sense of sense of sense of sentence proper name concept-word (Gedanke) ↓ ↓ ↓ referent of referent of referent of sentence proper name concept-word, → object21 ...
... conceptsentence name word (Satz) (Eigenname) (Begriffswort) ↓ ↓ ↓ sense of sense of sense of sentence proper name concept-word (Gedanke) ↓ ↓ ↓ referent of referent of referent of sentence proper name concept-word, → object21 ...
Seite 8
... concept-words in the way he does. In particular, why does Frege not treat the object(s) satisfying a concept-word as ... word must have reference is just truistic, but it by no means follows that it must be satisfied by anything. It is ...
... concept-words in the way he does. In particular, why does Frege not treat the object(s) satisfying a concept-word as ... word must have reference is just truistic, but it by no means follows that it must be satisfied by anything. It is ...
Seite 9
... conceptword maps each world/time pair to the set of objects satisfying the concept-word in that world at that time. (It is important here to stipulate that the identification proceed only in respect of semantically simple expressions ...
... conceptword maps each world/time pair to the set of objects satisfying the concept-word in that world at that time. (It is important here to stipulate that the identification proceed only in respect of semantically simple expressions ...
Seite 10
... concept-expressions Frege's reason for not treating the objects which satisfy a concept-word as its referent is inadequate. The fact that a concept-word may be empty without that word's ceasing to be scientifically useful is of course ...
... concept-expressions Frege's reason for not treating the objects which satisfy a concept-word as its referent is inadequate. The fact that a concept-word may be empty without that word's ceasing to be scientifically useful is of course ...
Seite 11
... concept-word an understander needs to be acquainted with those objects, and needs to think of them when entertaining that concept-word. But that in turn means that the understander's understanding of that concept-word will consist in ...
... concept-word an understander needs to be acquainted with those objects, and needs to think of them when entertaining that concept-word. But that in turn means that the understander's understanding of that concept-word will consist in ...
Inhalt
1 | |
1 Frege and the grammar of truth | 28 |
Husserls tactics of meaning | 54 |
3 Logical form general sentences and Russells path to On Denoting | 74 |
4 Grammar ontology and truth in Russell and Bradley | 116 |
5 A few more remarks on logical form | 142 |
6 Logical syntax in the Tractatus | 163 |
7 Wittgenstein on grammar meaning and essence | 182 |
8 Nonsense and necessity in Wittgensteins mature philosophy | 199 |
9 Carnaps logical syntax | 218 |
10 Heidegger and the grammar of being | 238 |
Index | 253 |
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Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
accept acquainted analysis analytic analytic philosophy argued argument arithmetical atomic sentences Begriffsschrift Bertrand Russell Bradley Cambridge Carnap categorial grammar claim complex concept-word conceptual content constituents corresponding definite descriptions denoting concepts denoting phrases distinction Dummett entities essence example fact factual content false Frege Fregean G. E. M. Anscombe G. H. von Wright Geach given Gödel’s grammatical form grammatical subject green Heidegger hence Husserl Hylton intersubstitutability language system level of reference linguistic logical form logical subject logical syntax meaning meaningful Meinong metaphysics Moorean Russell negation nonsense notion noun phrase objects ostensive definition Oxford Philosophy predicate proper names propositional functions quantifier phrases question reality reject relation rules Russell holds Russell’s Russellian propositions semantic sense simple singular term Socrates surface form symbol syntactic theory of denoting theory of descriptions Theory of Types things thought tion Tractatus transparency thesis true truth truth-value understanding University Press verb Wittgenstein words