Grammar in Early Twentieth-Century PhilosophyRichard Gaskin Routledge, 15.04.2013 - 272 Seiten This book is a systematic and historical exploration of the philosophical significance of grammar. In the first half of the twentieth century, and in particular in the writings of Frege, Husserl, Russell, Carnap and Wittgenstein, there was sustained philosophical reflection on the nature of grammar, and on the relevance of grammar to metaphysics, logic and science. |
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Seite 10
... green' is just all the green objects. That means (given the conception of reference we are 1 1 1 11 11 11 11 working with: pp. 6–9), that in order to understand this 10 Richard Gaskin.
... green' is just all the green objects. That means (given the conception of reference we are 1 1 1 11 11 11 11 working with: pp. 6–9), that in order to understand this 10 Richard Gaskin.
Seite 11
... green' is true, one must first understand it. The circularity which ensues is vicious.37 Of course, there must be some connection between understanding the concept-word 'green' and identifying particular objects as green. Plausibly, to ...
... green' is true, one must first understand it. The circularity which ensues is vicious.37 Of course, there must be some connection between understanding the concept-word 'green' and identifying particular objects as green. Plausibly, to ...
Seite 12
Richard Gaskin. currently green objects. Strictly, Burleigh's point would be met by extending the membership of the set of green objects to include all objects which ever have been, are, and ever will be green.39 But this adjustment does ...
Richard Gaskin. currently green objects. Strictly, Burleigh's point would be met by extending the membership of the set of green objects to include all objects which ever have been, are, and ever will be green.39 But this adjustment does ...
Seite 13
... green' without knowing, in the case of worlds other than the actual world, which things were green in those worlds, and that would in turn require one to think of the green objects in those worlds as green (as satisfying the schema 'a is ...
... green' without knowing, in the case of worlds other than the actual world, which things were green in those worlds, and that would in turn require one to think of the green objects in those worlds as green (as satisfying the schema 'a is ...
Seite 14
... green objects is, as I have suggested, equivalent to understanding the concept-expression which collects the set of actual and possible green objects, we have the result that acquaintance with the Carnapian intension of 'green' is ...
... green objects is, as I have suggested, equivalent to understanding the concept-expression which collects the set of actual and possible green objects, we have the result that acquaintance with the Carnapian intension of 'green' is ...
Inhalt
1 | |
1 Frege and the grammar of truth | 28 |
Husserls tactics of meaning | 54 |
3 Logical form general sentences and Russells path to On Denoting | 74 |
4 Grammar ontology and truth in Russell and Bradley | 116 |
5 A few more remarks on logical form | 142 |
6 Logical syntax in the Tractatus | 163 |
7 Wittgenstein on grammar meaning and essence | 182 |
8 Nonsense and necessity in Wittgensteins mature philosophy | 199 |
9 Carnaps logical syntax | 218 |
10 Heidegger and the grammar of being | 238 |
Index | 253 |
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Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
accept acquainted analysis analytic analytic philosophy argued argument arithmetical atomic sentences Begriffsschrift Bertrand Russell Bradley Cambridge Carnap categorial grammar claim complex concept-word conceptual content constituents corresponding definite descriptions denoting concepts denoting phrases distinction Dummett entities essence example fact factual content false Frege Fregean G. E. M. Anscombe G. H. von Wright Geach given Gödel’s grammatical form grammatical subject green Heidegger hence Husserl Hylton intersubstitutability language system level of reference linguistic logical form logical subject logical syntax meaning meaningful Meinong metaphysics Moorean Russell negation nonsense notion noun phrase objects ostensive definition Oxford Philosophy predicate proper names propositional functions quantifier phrases question reality reject relation rules Russell holds Russell’s Russellian propositions semantic sense simple singular term Socrates surface form symbol syntactic theory of denoting theory of descriptions Theory of Types things thought tion Tractatus transparency thesis true truth truth-value understanding University Press verb Wittgenstein words