Grammar in Early Twentieth-Century PhilosophyRichard Gaskin Routledge, 15.04.2013 - 272 Seiten This book is a systematic and historical exploration of the philosophical significance of grammar. In the first half of the twentieth century, and in particular in the writings of Frege, Husserl, Russell, Carnap and Wittgenstein, there was sustained philosophical reflection on the nature of grammar, and on the relevance of grammar to metaphysics, logic and science. |
Im Buch
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Seite vii
... Words at Face Value?' (1996). His book Rule-Following and Realism appeared in 1997. Richard Gaskin is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Liverpool. He works on ancient, medieval, and modern metaphysics and philosophy of ...
... Words at Face Value?' (1996). His book Rule-Following and Realism appeared in 1997. Richard Gaskin is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Liverpool. He works on ancient, medieval, and modern metaphysics and philosophy of ...
Seite 1
... words or senses, but of 'the entities indicated by words' (1903: 47), which Russell calls 'terms'. There we are told: Whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in any true or false proposition, or can be counted as one, I call ...
... words or senses, but of 'the entities indicated by words' (1903: 47), which Russell calls 'terms'. There we are told: Whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in any true or false proposition, or can be counted as one, I call ...
Seite 6
... word has its full force as a verbal noun, and is not a synonym of 'referent' – and, on the semantic conception of sense, there is no distinction to be drawn between sense and reference (verbal noun), notwithstanding the clear ...
... word has its full force as a verbal noun, and is not a synonym of 'referent' – and, on the semantic conception of sense, there is no distinction to be drawn between sense and reference (verbal noun), notwithstanding the clear ...
Seite 7
... word (Gedanke) ↓ ↓ ↓ referent of referent of referent of sentence proper name concept-word, → object21 falling i.e. truth-value i.e. object i.e. concept (Begriff) under the concept I have already remarked that Frege's reason for ...
... word (Gedanke) ↓ ↓ ↓ referent of referent of referent of sentence proper name concept-word, → object21 falling i.e. truth-value i.e. object i.e. concept (Begriff) under the concept I have already remarked that Frege's reason for ...
Seite 8
... words in the way he does. In particular, why does Frege not treat the object(s) satisfying a concept-word as its ... words ('witch', say) that they are empty depends upon their having reference: otherwise nothing would be expressed by ...
... words in the way he does. In particular, why does Frege not treat the object(s) satisfying a concept-word as its ... words ('witch', say) that they are empty depends upon their having reference: otherwise nothing would be expressed by ...
Inhalt
1 | |
1 Frege and the grammar of truth | 28 |
Husserls tactics of meaning | 54 |
3 Logical form general sentences and Russells path to On Denoting | 74 |
4 Grammar ontology and truth in Russell and Bradley | 116 |
5 A few more remarks on logical form | 142 |
6 Logical syntax in the Tractatus | 163 |
7 Wittgenstein on grammar meaning and essence | 182 |
8 Nonsense and necessity in Wittgensteins mature philosophy | 199 |
9 Carnaps logical syntax | 218 |
10 Heidegger and the grammar of being | 238 |
Index | 253 |
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Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
accept acquainted analysis analytic analytic philosophy argued argument arithmetical atomic sentences Begriffsschrift Bertrand Russell Bradley Cambridge Carnap categorial grammar claim complex concept-word conceptual content constituents corresponding definite descriptions denoting concepts denoting phrases distinction Dummett entities essence example fact factual content false Frege Fregean G. E. M. Anscombe G. H. von Wright Geach given Gödel’s grammatical form grammatical subject green Heidegger hence Husserl Hylton intersubstitutability language system level of reference linguistic logical form logical subject logical syntax meaning meaningful Meinong metaphysics Moorean Russell negation nonsense notion noun phrase objects ostensive definition Oxford Philosophy predicate proper names propositional functions quantifier phrases question reality reject relation rules Russell holds Russell’s Russellian propositions semantic sense simple singular term Socrates surface form symbol syntactic theory of denoting theory of descriptions Theory of Types things thought tion Tractatus transparency thesis true truth truth-value understanding University Press verb Wittgenstein words