"evident consequence," that a tendency to diminish the happiness of the people, is a proof, that power exceeds a "boundary," beyond which it ought not to "go;" the matter is brought to this single point, whether taking our money from us without our consent, depriving us of trial by jury, changing constitutions of government, and abolishing the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, by seizing and carrying us to England, have not a greater tendency to diminish our happiness, than any enormities a king can commit under pretence of prerogative, can have to diminish the happiness of the subjects in England. To come to a decision upon this point, no long time need be required. To make this comparison, is stating the claim of parliament in the most favourable light: for it puts

"Of great importance to the public is the preservation of this personal liberty for if once it were left in the power of any, the highest magistrate, to imprison arbitrarily, whomever he or bis officers thought proper, (as in France it is daily practised by the crown) there would soon be an end of all other rights and immunities."- "A natural and regular consequence of this personal liberty is that every Englishman may claim a right to abide in his own country so long as be pleases, and not to be driven from it unless by the sentence of law. Exile or transportation is a punishment unknown to the common law.”——” The king cannot constitute a man lord lieutenant of Ireland against his will, nor make him a foreign ambassador. For this might in reality be no more than an honorable exile." I BLACKSTONE, 135 to 138.

"These precedents collected by the reverend and learned judge, chief justice Anderson, and all written with his own hand, do fully resolve for the maintenance of the ancient and fundamental point of liberty of the person, to be regained by habeas corpus, when any one is imprisoned." PARL. Hist. 7. 418.

the assumed power of parliament, to do, IN ALL "CASES WHATSOEVER," what they please, upon the same footing with the acknowledged power of the king, "to make what peers-pardon what "offences, &c. be pleases." But in this light, that power is not intitled to be viewed. Such is the wisdom of the English constitution, that it "declares" the king may transgress a "boundary "laid down by evident consequence," even by using the power with which he is expressly vested by the constitution, in doing those very acts which he is expressly trusted by the constitution to doas by creating too many or improper persons, peers; or by pardoning too many or too great offences, &c. But has the constitution of ENGLAND expressly "declared," that the parliament of Greatmay take away the money of English colo

Britain nists without their consent, and deprive them of trial by jury, &c? It cannot be pretended. True it is, that it has been solemnly declared by parliament, that parliament has such a power. But that declaration leaves the point just as it was before: for if parliament had not the power before, the declaration could not give it. Indeed if parliament is really" omnipotent," that power is just and constitutional.

I BLACKSTONE, 161.

We further observe, that the constitution has not expressly drawn the line beyond which, if a king, shall "go," resistance becomes lawful. The learned author of those commentaries, that notwithstanding some human frailties, do him so much honour, has thought proper, when treating of this subject, to point out the " precedent" of the revolution, as fixing the line. We would not venture any reflection on so great a man. It may not become us. Nor can we be provoked by his expressions concerning colonists; because they perhaps contain his real, though hasty sentiments. Surely, it was

not his intention to condemn those excellent men, who casting every tender consideration behind them, nobly presented themselves against the tyranny of the unfortunate and misguided Charles's reign; those men, whom the house of commons, even after the restoration, would not suffer to be censured.

WE are sensible of the objection that may be made, as to drawing a line between rights on each side, and the case of a plain violation of rights.We think it not material. Circumstances have actually produced, and may again produce this question. -What conduct of a prince renders resistance lawful? James the second and his father violated express rights of their subjects, by doing what their own express rights gave them no

+

title to do, as by raising money, and levying troops, without consent of parliament. It is not even settled, what violation of those will justify resistance. But may not some future prince, confining himself to the exercise of his own express rights, such as have been mentioned, act in a manner, that will be a transgression of a "boundary" laid down by "evident consequence," the "constitution declar. "ing he should go no further?" May not this exercise of these his express rights, be so far extended, as to introduce universal confusion and a subversion of the ends of government? The whole may be oppressive, and yet any single instance legal. The cases may be improbable; but we have seen and now feel events once as little expected. Is it not possible, that one of these cases may happen;if it does, has the constitution expressly drawn, a line, beyond which resistance becomes lawful? It has not. But it may be said, a king can not arm against his subjects-he cannot raise money, without consent of parliament. This is the constitutional check upon him. If he should, it would be a violation of their express rights. If their purses are shut, his power shrinks. True. Unhappy colonists! Our money may be taken from us-and standing armies established over us, without our consent-every expressly declared constitutional check dissolved, and the modes of opposition for relief so contracted, as to leave us only

the miserable alternative of supplication or viòlence. And these, it seems, are the liberties of Americans.Because the constitution has not "expressly declared" the line between the rights of the mother country and those of her colonists, therefore, the latter have no rights.-A logic, equally edifying to the heads and hearts of men of sense and humanity.

WE assert, a line there must be, and shall now proceed with great deference to the judgment of others, to trace that line, according to the ideas we entertain and it is with satisfaction we can say, that the records, statutes, law-books, and most approved writers of our mother country, those “dead "but most faithful counsellors" (as sir Edward Coke calls them) "who cannot be daunted by fear, nor "muzzled by affection, reward, or hope of pre"ferment, and therefore may safely be believed,” confirm the principles we maintain.

LIBERTY, life, or property, can, with no consistency of words or ideas, be termed a right of the possessors, while others have a right of taking them away at pleasure. The most distinguished authors, that have written on government, declare it to be" instituted for the benefit of the people; "and that it never will have this tendency, where 2 T

VOL. I.