yet the minds of men are naturally so suspicious, that, no sooner has a citizen raised himself above his fellows, than they suspect him of a desire of making himself absolute. On one or other of these rocks nearly all democracies have split. Athens banished her best citizens by the ostracism. Rome drove from her Camillus, Coriolanus, Marius, and, above all, Scipio. She fell at last a victim to Cæsar's military power, and his ambition to be King. Holland, after numerous contentions, sunk at last under the sovereignty of the Prince of Orange. Sparta and Venice are mentioned by Machiavel as exceptions to the general rule. But Venice also bought her security dear; for it was only obtained by a custom of excluding from military command all her own citizens, and giving to strangers the richest prizes a state has to bestow. The method adopted by Sparta was somewhat similar to that of England, to which we shall now pass.

The executive power of England is placed nominally in the hands of an hereditary King. His powers are known and defined by law, and are therefore less liable to be exceeded than

those of any extraordinary office not known to the constitution. This was the argument most ably urged by Whitelocke and his coadjutors to the Protector Cromwell, to induce him to accept the title of King. At the same time the current of law, and the established reverence paid to majesty, form a complete estopel to any great man who might wish to make himself absolute. So confirmed is public opinion, that a great general never dreams of overthrowing the liberties of his country. The Duke of Marlborough was dismissed from his command as easily as an ensign, and the Duke of Wellington returned from all his victories and preeminencies to occupy an office of little importance in a cabinet, not distinguished by any singular popularity or commanding genius.

But whilst the King's prerogative forms on the one side an almost invincible barrier to the ambition of any subject, who might wish to become sovereign of the state in which he was born a citizen, it is on the other side, quite open to the general controul of the people.

* See the conferences on this subject. They are to be found in the parliamentary history.

Thus the King has, by his prerogative, the command of the army, but that army is only maintained by virtue of a law to punish mutiny and desertion, passed from year to year. The King has a right to declare war; but if the House of Commons deny supplies, he cannot carry it on for a week. The King may make a treaty of peace, but if it is dishonourable to the country, the ministers who signed it may be impeached. Nor is the King's personal command any excuse for a wrong administration of power. The Earl of Danby was impeached for a letter which contained a postscript in the King's own hand, declaring it was written by his order. The maxim of the constitution is, that the King cannot act without legal advisers. And so far is this maxim carried, that a commitment by the King, although he is the fountain of justice, was held to be void, because there was no minister responsible for it.

From the doctrine of the responsibility of ministers, it follows that they ought to enjoy the confidence of the Commons. Otherwise their measures will be thwarted, their promises will be distrusted, and finding all their steps

obstructed, their efforts will be directed to the overthrow of the constitution. This actually happened in the reign of Charles I. and Charles II. There was but one mode of preventing a recurrence of the same evil. It was by giving to the King a revenue so limited, that he should always be obliged to assemble his Parliament to carry on the ordinary expences of his government. On this point, more important than any provision of the Bill of Rights, a warm contest took place in the House of Commons. The Tories, wishing to please the new King, argued, against all justice and reason, that the revenue which had been given to James for his life, belonged de jure to William for his life. The Whigs successfully resisted this pretension, and passed a vote, granting 420,000l. to the King, by monthly payments. The Commons soon afterwards had all the accounts of King James's reign laid before them. It appeared that his government, without any war, cost on an average 1,700,000l. a-year; a revenue of 1,200,000l. a-year was given to William, with the expences and debt of a formidable war to be provided for.

By this arrangement, the crown was made dependent on Parliament ever after. Without even offering any advice, by a mere symptom of an intention to stop the supplies, the whole system of the King might be defeated, and his ministers dismissed from the council-board. Hence the House of Commons has the power to controul most certainly and effectually the acts of the supreme magistrate. Whatever struggles have been made since, have been made within the House of Commons. Ambitious men, instead of attempting, according to their several views, to abolish the monarchy, or dispense with Parliaments, have either sought to reach the King's closet through the favour of the people's representatives, or to serve the crown by corrupting that assembly with the allurements of influence, and poisoning the sources from which their authority was derived. And whatever may have been said of the prevalence of the latter of these methods of government, it is certain that, after the revolution, power was retained longest by those statesmen whose political principles were stamped by the approbation of their country. A friend of