EVERY wise state has found it expedient to transfer a large portion of power out of the hands of the people, for whom all power is held, and to entrust it to a single person, or select council; for a very numerous body are found incapable of transacting public affairs with that secrecy, or of deciding upon them with that celerity which the foreign relations of a state so often require. Hence the great council of Venice was, by the advice of the wisest senators, excluded by degrees from

all deliberations which required delicacy and dispatch. Hence the republic of Holland found it necessary to name a few persons, to whom all foreign negociations were confided.†

But for whatever purpose power may be confided to a few persons, or however worthy they may be of the trust reposed in them, human nature is such, that there ought always to remain with the people an extreme remedy by which they may punish the abuse, or restrain the power itself that has been abused. In states really free this extreme remedy will always be found to exist, either by custom or by law. Thus the Roman people, when they felt themselves aggrieved, retired to the Mons Sacer, or refused to be inscribed as soldiers in the army that was about to march against the foreign enemy. There could not be apparently two more dangerous expedients; but such was the moderation of the Roman people, that I know not they ever pushed their resistance beyond the bounds of reason. Indeed, the long period that elapsed before the plebeians could

* Daru, Hist. de Venise.

+ Sir W. Temple.

be elected consuls, and the long period which followed that before any plebeian was really elected, are sufficient proofs of their temperance, both in advancing a claim, and in making use of a right.

The English have, in the same manner, an extreme remedy. If the King abuses a just, or uses an oppressive power, the representatives of the people have it in their option to refuse the money required to carry on the government. This remedy, however, was for a long time far from being so efficacious as those employed by the Roman people. In spite of the resistance of the nation, Charles II. and James found means, with the aid of packed Parliaments, and drawing from the French treasury, to slip the -bridle from their necks. In fact, until the expulsion of the Stuarts, our Kings enjoyed a revenue independent of Parliament, which enabled them to keep their Commons out of sight in ordinary times. The parliamentary check was made perfect at the Revolution; but the influence of the Crown in the body which ought to exercise it, has continually deadened its effect. The voice of the people,

however, has sometimes enforced the constitutional interference of the House of Commons. The most remarkable instance, perhaps, of the use of this right took place at the end of the American war. The House of Commons declared by a resolution, that the farther prosecution of offensive war on the continent of North America, tended to weaken this country, and to prevent a reconciliation with America. An address, in conformity to this vote, having been carried to the throne; and the King having returned a gracious answer, complying with the address, the House of Commons voted, that they should consider as enemies of His Majesty and this country all those who should advise the farther prosecution of the war in North America, for the purpose of reducing the revolted colonies to obedience by force. In this, as in a few other instances, although the word supplies is not mentioned, it must always be understood; and there is, in fact, a tacit menace of refusing supplies in every interference of the House of Commons with the exercise of the prerogative.

This power, it is quite clear, would enable the House of Commons, if so disposed, to declare themselves the sovereigns, and to take away every efficient prerogative from the Crown; but such is the moderation of the English people, that they have never desired such an increase of the power of their representatives; nor did they, at the Revolution, bate a jot of the powers necessary to maintain the monarchy. For I am convinced, the true reason that the King and the House of Lords maintain their prerogative and privileges unimpaired, lies more in the temper of the nation, than, as some would teach us, in the present composition of the House of Commons. The country has a deeprooted affection for kingly government, and would highly resent any attempt to change or destroy this key-stone of the constitution. There appears to me, I must confess, as great an attachment to monarchy in the people of Yorkshire, as in the proprietor of Old Sarum, and fully as much loyalty in the farmers of Norfolk, as in the corporation of Devizes.