Personal Identity: Volume 22, Part 2
Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr, Jeffrey Paul
Cambridge University Press, 04.07.2005 - 383 Seiten
What is a person What makes me the same person today that I was yesterday or will be tomorrow Philosophers have long pondered these questions. In Plato's Symposium, Socrates observed that all of us are constantly undergoing change: we experience physical changes to our bodies, as well as changes in our 'manners, customs, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, [and] fears'. Aristotle theorized that there must be some underlying 'substratum' that remains the same even as we undergo these changes. John Locke rejected Aristotle's view and reformulated the problem of personal identity in his own way: is a person a physical organism that persists through time, or is a person identified by the persistence of psychological states, by memory These essays - written by prominent philosophers and legal and economic theorists - offer valuable insights into the nature of personal identity and its implications for morality and public policy.
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MARYA SCHECHTMAN Experience Agency and Personal Identity
LYNNE RUDDER BAKER When Does a Person Begin?
ROBERT A WILSON Persons Social Agency and Constitution
DAVID S ODERBERG Hylemorphic Dualism
EDWARD FESER Personal Identity and SelfOwnership
DAVID COPP The Normativity of SelfGrounded Reason
JENNIFER ROBACK MORSE Rationality Means Being Willing
STEPHEN E BRAUDE Personal Identity and Postmortem Survival
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