and glaringly, of Ridicule. Ridicule implies that the object which excites it is so palpably below the standard which we apply to it, that the comparison is extravagant and absurd. The Desire of Admiration produces a Fear and Dread of this Contempt and Ridicule. But the Desire of being admired, for other than moral excellences, has in it nothing of Virtue. He who desires the Esteem of others, desires them to regard him as good; and will, for the most part, be disposed to sympathize with them in their admiration for what is good. The Desire of Esteem therefore is easily consistent with Virtue.

The Desire of Admiration produces a ready belief that we are admired, and a Joy and Elation of Mind accompanying such belief. This Disposition is Vanity. One who is treated with marks of general esteem among men, is brought to Honour. One who is pointed at as an object of general disesteem, is brought to Disgrace; and, if he feel the Disgrace, is put to Shame. But Honour and Shame likewise indicate, subjectively, the Sensibility of the man to those indications of general Esteem and Disesteem. We speak also of False Honour, and False Shame; meaning Dispositions to be influenced by Applause on the one side, and Blame or Ridicule on the other, even when they are not rightly bestowed. True Honour is a Regard for what is right and good, considered especially as the object of sympathy and esteem among men. A man of Honour, an honourable man, has an especial abhorrence of the Vices of Fraud and Falsehood. The Desire of Admiration in another form is the Love of Glory. In Civil Society are established marks of Public Honour, as Rank, Titles, Decorations, and the like. Dispositions, for the most part, allied to Vanity, fasten upon these objects; and thus we have the Love of Rank, or the like. But such marks of honour are often accompanied with Political Power; as when, in England, a

man is made a Peer. In this case, the Desire of Rank may be Ambition, rather than Vanity.

262. When I have formed a conception of myself, I am led to regard myself as the object of my own moral sentiments. If I approve my own character, I feel Selfesteem. If I am the object of my own Admiration, without requiring the sympathy of others, this feeling is Pride; a Vice which estranges me from other men. The Satisfaction which is felt in my own Admiration, is Self-complacency; a feeling which blinds men to their true character.

I ought to render my Character such as to deserve esteem, and therefore, such as to deserve my own esteem, if I contemplate my own character. If I do this, I may reject wrong acts and emotions, as unsuited to the character which I thus ascribe to myself. The Disposition to do this, appears to be what is meant by a Proper Pride: but this way of regarding one's own character appears to involve a share of Self-complacency. Men reckon among virtues, the Magnanimity which disregards small dangers and small injuries or offenses. The opposite term, Pusillanimity, denotes cowardice; a quick sensibility to offenses is Captiousness.

Pride is, in its tendency, at variance with the Benevolent Virtues, Meekness, Reverence, Courtesy. But the virtue which is especially opposed to Pride, is Humility. He who is humble in his estimate of himself, is also modest in comparing himself with others; but, as we have said (256), Female Modesty has a more especial meaning. When Pride is manifested so as to imply Contempt of others, it is Haughtiness, Disdain; if Unkindness be added, it is Insolence. The insolent man is overbearing, domineering, arrogant. Self-esteem, so far as it regards the Operation of the Intellect, is Selfopinion. When this excludes all mistrust of one's self, it is Self-sufficiency: and, as taking much for granted, it is Presumption. When Pride fastens upon special points, it is Conceit.

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263. The Habits of mind by which we resist the impulses of desire and affection, so as to conform to rules of virtue or prudence, are Self-control, Self-command, Self-watchfulness; Self-mistrust; when the desires which we control are so lively that we cannot suppress them, though we resist them, it is Self-denial. When we seek our own gratification, in disregard of more virtuous objects, it is Self-seeking. When we let our Will take its course, in spite of manifest warnings of prudence, it is Self-will.

The Habit of making ourselves the principal object of our attention and solicitude, is the Vice of Selfishness. A man is selfish, if the Desires which tend to himself (the Desires of the Body, the Desire of Property, and the like), rather than the Affections, are his leading Springs of Action. These may be termed Selfish Desires. The term implies an Excess in the attention which we give to ourselves, a Defect in that which we give to others; and is always used in an unfavourable sense. Hence the term is not applied to the predominance of those Desires which do not interfere with the claims of others. We call a man selfish, in whom the Love of Money or of Bodily Ease prevails, because such Dispositions make him disregard the claims of others; but we do not call a man selfish, in whom the Love of Knowledge or of Society is strong; for my pursuit of knowledge takes nothing from other persons; and my love of society implies an acknowledgment of some kind of merit or value in other Pride and Vanity are selfish dispositions; for the proud man is too much occupied with his own admiration of himself, and the vain man with admiration of himself proceeding from other men, to regard, with due attention, the claims of his neighbours.

men.

The Selfish Man thinks only of himself: hence he has no Consideration for others: no due care for their feelings, condition, and claims. This Virtue is required in all; there

is a higher degree of it, Unselfishness; the disposition of a person who pays no regard to his own gratification when that of another person comes in competition with it. A still higher degree of such virtue is Self-devotion; the virtue of him who willingly incurs pain, danger, or death, to procure benefits for another.

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264.

There are some dispositions regarded as Virtues, which are conceived to go beyond the standard of common characters. Such virtues are called noble; and when elevated still higher in our thoughts, they are heroic or heroical. Heroism generally implies great Fortitude or Courage, combined with Self-devotion. History is full of heroic acts; as that of Regulus, who refused to counsel his countrymen to peace, and returned to Carthage to die in tortures; that of Virginius, who stabbed his daughter to preserve her from dishonour; that of the elder Brutus, who, as judge, condemned his own sons to death; that of Lucilius, who saved the younger Brutus by offering himself to the pursuers as Brutus; that of Socrates, who preferred to receive death in obedience to the Laws of his country, though escape was offered him by his friends. The acts of Martyrs, who died for the Truth, when they might have saved their lives by denying it, are heroical.

265. The Moral Vocabulary of which we have taken a survey, the Collection of Terms describing Virtues and Vices, is used to express the judgments of mankind in general, respecting the Dispositions and Characters of men. The approval or disapproval implied in each Term is, for the most part, so well understood, that the mere use of the term pronounces a moral sentence on the subject to which it is applied. And the moral judgment of mankind, thus expressed in a recognized form, is very efficacious in forming the moral sentiments of each person; and hence, in modifying the characters and affections of men. The Vocabulary of Virtues and Vices is a constant moral Lesson; perpetually

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operating to bring each man's moral sentiments into agreement with the general judgment of men. Every man is taught, by the use of moral language, to admire Gratitude and Filial Love, to condemn Revenge and Cruelty; and the like.

For the most part, this Lesson agrees with the Lesson of true Morality, and points rightly to the Supreme Law of Human Action. This may be readily understood. For the Supreme Law of Human Action must be a Law in which all men, as men, sympathize (98). Hence the common moral judgment, of which we have been speaking, which is expressed and communicated by the moral language commonly in use among men, will, in general at least, conform to the Supreme Law. What are universally held as Virtues, must be dispositions in conformity with this Law. What are universally reckoned Vices, must be wrong.

And a man, in so far as he is taught and formed by the general judgment of men, thus conveyed in the language of the Morality universally recognized, will be rightly taught. A man whose character contains what all men reckon Virtues, and is free from what are universally reckoned Vices, will be a good man. His affections and desires being thus regulated, he will tend to the possession of the Operative Moral Principles of Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order; which we have stated as the Elements of the Supreme Law.

266. To the doctrine, that the common judgment of mankind respecting Virtues and Vices agrees, generally, with true Morality; it may be objected, that there are dispositions which we reckon vicious; and which yet, in many ages and countries, have been esteemed laudable, as Revenge. To this we reply, that men do not conceive themselves pronouncing the moral judgment of mankind when, under the influence of strong emotion, they speak of the satisfaction arising from Revenge, or appeal to the sympathy of other