Abbildungen der Seite
PDF
EPUB

others, in their moral claim to kindness in our intention, and gentleness in our manner. So far as the relations of society receive their true moral significance, they bind together all the members of the society by a tie of benevolence; which has, for its natural results, ready and willing good offices of all to all; frank, affable, and courteous intercourse of all with all. If this feeling of benevolence had its due effect, the repulsive forces which social distinctions bring into playthe pride of rank and station, the capricious exclusions of fashion, the supreme regard of each class to its own comfort, the excessive jealousy of interference, the impatience of intrusion-would disappear before it; and, so far as the influence of such a feeling operates upon the members of a community, those repulsive elements will diminish and melt away.

333. The Duties of Order, so far as regards the State, like other Duties, include the Duty of giving a moral significance to the social and civil relations with which they deal. Every man who has any power, or any function in the State assigned him, must exercise it in such a manner as to give a moral meaning to his office. He must act, on the part of the State, as a public representative of its moral character. If he be a Judge, he must administer the Laws impartially, and so as to make them instruments of justice. If he be an administrative officer, he must carry into effect the intentions of the Community; giving to it, as far as the Rules of his office admit, the character of a moral agent acting rightly. If he have assigned to him a vote by which he shares in the election of a legislator or a governor, the vote is a Trust for public purposes (152); and it is grossly immoral to convert such a Trust to purposes of private gain. All such Duties are Public Duties; and Public, no less than Private Duties, require us to use all our external means and powers for the furtherance of Morality.

334. The Laws and Customs which determine how far each person shall have a share in the government of the State, define the Political Rights and Obligations of men; and the general scheme of Government, thus constituted, is the Constitution of the Country. In every country, the Political Rights and Obligations of men ought to be in a great measure fixed; for otherwise the Laws could not remain fixed, and could afford no fixed points to serve as the basis of Duty. It is therefore the Duty of a citizen to use his Political Rights, so as to give to the Laws the fixity which the purposes of Morality require. This is the Political Duty of Conservation. On the other hand, the Political Rights and Obligations of the citizens of a State may change from time to time; for by course of time and circumstance, it often becomes possible to alter the Laws in general, and Political Laws in particular, so as better to further the purposes of Morality. It is the Duty of a citizen to use his Political Rights in promoting changes of this description. This is the Political Duty of Progress.

CHAPTER XII.

INTELLECTUAL DUTIES.

335. BESIDES the Duties of Kindness, which the Duties of Command include, there are other Duties of Command, which require our attention. He who has authority, must issue Commands, not only kind, but also prudent, and wise. He has faculties by which he is enabled to judge of such characters in Rules of Action: and he is bound to employ these faculties, as well as his Affections, in the performance of his Duty. Thus, there are Duties which belong to these faculties. We may term them generally, Duties

of the Intellectual Faculties; but we may conveniently distinguish among them, the Duty of Prudence, and the Duty of Wisdom.

We have already said, that we conceive Prudence as the Virtue by which we select right means for given ends ; while Wisdom implies the selection of right ends, as well as of right means. Those who have authority over others, have to lay down Laws for their conduct; and these Laws may be considered as means, to ends which the Lawgiver contemplates. There are certain objects, which those who possess authority by their social position, may be assumed as having constantly and necessarily in their desires: thus, a head of a family desires sustenance for his family, tranquillity among the members of it, freedom from debts contracted by them; as an employer, he desires to have his work well and carefully done; and the like: and he manifests his Prudence by the Laws, which he lays down, or the Rules on which he acts, with reference to these objects. But perhaps a father makes it his main object that his sons and his daughters should rise to riches and rank: and then, though he may be prudent in the means he takes for such ends, we may doubt whether he is wise in selecting these as his highest ends.

336. But we have to select the ends of action, and the means to them, for ourselves, as well as for others; and Prudence and Wisdom are concerned in this selection, in the former, as in the latter case. We may therefore consider the Duty of Prudence, and the Duty of Wisdom, without any special reference to the offices of command over others, which men may have to execute.

The Duty of Prudence, like other Duties, implies that man has a power over the faculties, which such a Duty requires him to employ. That man has some power over his own thoughts, is evident. He can retain an object of

thought in his mind: contemplate it in various aspects and bearings; scrutinize it; deliberate upon it. This is Inquiry and Consideration; and by this proceeding, he can often discover means to an end, and consequences of an act, which escape his notice, in a more rapid and slight mode of regarding the subject. Now the means to an end have their moral character affected by the end. The consequences of an act contribute to the moral character of the act. The points which Consideration and Inquiry brings into view, may determine whether the act be good or bad. And since we must employ all our Faculties and Powers in order to conform our actions to the Supreme Law, we must exercise this power of Consideration; and thus every man, as a moral agent, is bound by a Duty of Consideration, including a Duty of Inquiry.

337. The Intention is directed by the various Springs of Action, including the Moral Sentiments and the Reason. Morality requires that Intention be directed rightly: that is, towards the Ideas contained in the Supreme Law; Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order. There is a Duty of right Intention, which is included in all other Duties. Now we have here to remark, that this Duty of Right Intention does not replace or supersede the Duty of Consideration. We must consider the means, as they are in themselves, as well as in subservience to the end at which our intention points. We must consider the consequences which will follow upon our act, as well as the act which we directly intend. For a good end does not justify the means which we employ, if a due consideration would shew us that the means are wrongly selected: and that an act is in itself moral, does not justify it, if by a due consideration we might see that it would lead to evil consequences. I may have a wish to improve the character of my child: I may hastily punish him, with such an

intention. But the intention does not justify the haste. If a little thought and care, bestowed upon the subject, would have shown me that these courses would make him worse, and not better, I am to blame. I have violated the Duty of Consideration. And in like manner, the Duty of Consideration is transgressed by any want of a Regard to Consequences. I may heedlessly indulge the desires of a child, or give what a man asks of me. But if the consequences of doing this be mischief to the child or to the man, and mischief which a little thought would have shown to be probable, or certain, I am culpable. Here, also, I have violated the Duty of Consideration. Haste and Heedlessness are grave offenses, in cases which concern the welfare of others. We have already seen that the Law treats such offenses as violations of our Obligations (114): and our Duties, in this, as in other cases, are extensions of our Obligations. If Law require in us a care and consideration for the wellbeing of our fellow-men, Morality must require such care and consideration still more; and must require more care and more consideration than the Law can enforce. Benevolence aims at the good of those among whom we are placed: but she must take to her aid the best exertions of the Intellect, in order to determine by what means such good is to be brought about; and what will be the consequences of any acts which such a purpose may suggest to us.

Is it a violation of any

338. It is in our power to deliberate; but even after deliberation, we may be mistaken. It may be asked, if we are responsible for such a mistake. Duty to select wrong means to good ends, or to err in foreseeing the consequences of actions meant for good? If we here also follow the analogy of the Law, we shall be led to conclude that, in some cases at least, such an errour is blameable. A physician who administers medicaments

« ZurückWeiter »