may rather suppose that there is, not so much any distinct immorality in their Principles, as understood by themselves ; but rather some confusion in their language, or some incoherence in their generalizations.

For, though opinion leads to practice, and false opinion seems to be the first step to wrong action; there is, in the nature of man, a very general inconsistency, which prevents this connexion from being at all certain or universal. Men who hold false general opinions, compensate an errour of belief, by another errour, of reasoning; and derive, from false speculations, blameless or moral Rules of Practice. The recollection that this may be so, should temper, not the promptitude of our rejection of false opinions, but the vehemence of our condemnation of those who hold these opinions.

452. So to abstain from condemning seemingly wrong Principles, is to tolerate them; and this Duty of Toleration is incumbent upon us, as we have just seen, in virtue of the imperfection of the human Faculties, and their general insufficiency for the task of constructing, in each man's mind, a perfect connected system of Moral Truth. And thus, we are led to pronounce that Ignorance and Errour, especially with regard to very general and abstract Principles, are to be tolerated.

453. Further: Ignorance and Errour, on moral subjects, may arise, not only from the imperfection of the human Faculties, but also from external Circumstances, as Education, and the defects of the National Standard of Morality. These exert an influence upon our minds, through the use of language, as we have said (450); and in other ways. The Ignorance and Errour thus arising are not absolutely unavoidable; for every man may raise, by moral self-culture, his standard of Morality above that of his Education, or of his Nation; but they are difficult to avoid ; for

the very power of self-culture is affected by the Habits of youth, and by the national customs. Hence, we may consider the Ignorance and Errour, which arise from such causes, as difficultly vincible: and as in some measure, involuntary. Hence, such Ignorance and Errour excuse, in some degree, the transgression of Moral Rule, which they occasion. They do not remove altogether, but they diminish the blame. A youth of a savage nation, who has been bred up to look upon theft as innocent or meritorious, does not incur the same moral stain by praising an act of theft, as a boy who has been brought up amid a strict respect for property. But then, on the other hand, the moral culture of the former is very imperfect. His moral nature is very scantily unfolded; his conscience is very dark. This, as we have said, is a calamity, if it be not a fault.

454. A further reason why Ignorance and Errour, when they arise from external Causes, and are hardly avoidable, may be deemed to diminish the amount of the transgression, is, that in such cases, the moral defects of the character may often admit of remedy. The defective Moral Culture may afterwards be carried further onwards, by the help of external circumstances more favourable. A bad Education may be succeeded by a better. A low standard of Morality may be superseded by a higher, when this latter is brought before the mind. The dark conscience may be enlightened; and thus, the Ignorance and the Errour may be in some measure removed. Hence, the interruption or inversion of the moral progress, produced or indicated by transgressions, which take place in such a condition of Ignorance or Errour, are not so great, nor their remedy so hopeless, as when the transgressions proceed more entirely from the internal character, without this influence of external causes. And thus, according to what was said respecting the amount of transgressions (353), offenses, arising from such hardly avoidable

Ignorance or Errour, are diminished in their heinousness, by their being so occasioned.

455. Ignorance and Errour may be considered under one other aspect, which it is important to attend to; namely, when they are wilful, or as it is sometimes termed by moralists, affected. Such would be, for instance, these cases: A man who will not examine the Title-deeds of his estate; because he fears to find that it is not his by Right: A man who will not enquire into the amount of his income; because he fears that, when he does so, he will discover the necessity of diminishing his expenses: A man who will not attend to the proofs of the immorality of a practice which he follows; for instance, slave-dealing; A man who, really believing that negros have human faculties, pretends to believe that they have not, in order to justify his making slaves of them and generally, A man who either refuses to attend to the proofs of his duties, because he does not intend to perform them; or who denies some proposition, merely because it would tend to establish the proof of such duties. Such wilful and affected Ignorance does not, in any degree, excuse or exculpate the transgressions which it accompanies. Indeed, it seems rather to aggravate them: for it adds to the moral regression which the offense implies, a perversion of the intellect, adopted with a view to a consistency in immorality.

It may be thought, perhaps, that assumed or affected Ignorance or Errour should be spoken of as an Offense against Truth; that is, against Truthfulness: and in many cases it may be so. But in moral doctrines, and especially in those of an abstract and general kind, there is, as we have just said, room for considerable vagueness and incoherency, in the obscure region of transition from particular to general propositions and hence, it may often be difficult to say whether or not a man really holds the opinion which he

asserts. Some of those who assert property to be an immoral institution, have probably rather confused than immoral minds. Those who assert the negros not to have human faculties, and yet make laws against their human faculties being educated, may perhaps not quite disbelieve their own assertion; though it is inconsistent with their conduct. There is room for some self-deceit on such subjects; and this may, to some extent, liberate a man from the blame of Falsehood. But even if there be not Falsehood, there is often, in such cases as we have described, and in many others, Ignorance and Errour which may be called wilful: and such Ignorance and Errour are no excuses for transgression.

456. Thus the general result of our view of this subject is, that Ignorance and Errour, when unavoidable, are excuses for offenses: when difficultly vincible, they diminish the offense; when wilful, they do not at all diminish it. We have seen, too, that on very general and abstract moral doctrines, Ignorance and Errour are to be tolerated, out of regard for the imperfection of man's faculties.

CHAPTER XIX.

PROGRESSIVE STANDARDS OF MORALITY.

457. NATIONS and Communities, as well as individuals, have their Standards of right and wrong, which assume the reality of a Universal Standard of right and wrong. They have not only Laws, which determine Rights and Obligations, but also current moral Precepts and Rules, which express the conceptions of Duties and Virtues. The assumed existence of a Standard of right and wrong shows itself in the sentiments which are associated with the conceptions

and names of Virtues and Vices. Vices are, in all ages and countries, named only to be condemned. Violence, Fraud, Falsehood, Indecency, are objects of aversion at all times and places. There is no nation or language, which has not the means of expressing this; and none, which does not express it.

It is true, the actions, to which this aversion and condemnation are applied, are different in different ages and countries. In some countries, plunder of strangers, slavery, polygamy, have been regarded as blameless; to us, they are offenses and vices. This difference arises from the diversity of the Definitions of Rights in different times and places: for, as we have seen, Rights are defined by Law, and Virtues and Duties depend upon Rights. Yet the variety of Laws, in various nations, does not prevent Rights from being a necessary element of man's condition; and in like manner, the diversity of Standards of Morality does not prevent Virtue from being a necessary object of man's approval; nor hinder Conscience, which recognizes Virtue, from being a universal attribute of mankind.

458. There must be, in all cases, a great connexion between the National Laws and the National Standard of Morality. Both the one and the other express that which is deemed right. Laws are enacted, or upheld, because it is considered right that they should be so. Actions also are approved or disapproved according as they are looked upon as right or wrong. And the consciences of individuals accommodate themselves, in a great measure, to the law. If the national law allow polygamy, or slavery, the individual commonly practises it without self-condemnation. The exhortation of the National Moralist is, in the first place, To obey the Law. The National Moral Precepts take for granted the National Laws. The national conceptions of