by which we reason from fundamental principles, when we have anyhow attained or assumed these; it is also the faculty by which we apprehend fundamental principles. By our Reason, we not only reason from the axioms of Geometry, but also see the truth of the axioms.

The special substantive, a reason, denotes a step in reasoning.

11. Of the processes which have been mentioned as belonging to the Reason, some are also ascribed to the Understanding, but not all. The Reason and the Understanding have not been steadily distinguished by English writers. The most simple way to use the substantive Understanding in a definite sense, is to make it correspond, in its extent, with the verb understand. To understand anything, is to apprehend it according to certain assumed ideas and rules; we do not include, in the meaning of the word, an examination of the ground of the ideas and rules, by reference to which we understand the thing. We understand a Language, when we apprehend what is said, according to the established vocabulary and grammar of the language; without inquiring how the words came to have their meaning, or what is the ground of the grammatical rules. We understand the sense, without reasoning about the etymology and syntax. Again, we understand a Machine when we perceive how its parts will work upon one another according to the known laws of mechanics, without inquiring what is the ground of these laws.

Reasoning may be requisite to understanding. We may have to reason about the syntax, in order to understand the sense: we may have to reason upon mechanical principles, in order to understand the machine. But understanding leaves still room for reasoning: we may understand the elliptical theory of Mars's motions, and may still require a reason for the theory. Also we may understand what is not

conformable to Reason; as when we understand a man's arguments, and think them unfounded in Reason.

We understand a thing, as we have said, when we apprehend it according to certain assumed ideas and rules. We reason, in order to deduce such rules from first principles, or from one another. But the rules and principles, which must be expressed when we reason, may be only implied when we understand. We may understand the sense of a speech, without thinking of rules of grammar. We may understand the working of a machine, without thinking of propositions in the sciences of geometry and mechanics.

The Reason is employed both in understanding and in reasoning; but the Principles which are explicitly asserted in reasoning, are only implicitly applied in understanding. The Reason includes, as we have said, both the Faculty of seeing First Principles, and the Reasoning Faculty by which we obtain other Principles. The Understanding is the Faculty of applying Principles however obtained.

The Reason, of which we here speak, is the Speculative Reason. We shall hereafter have to speak of the Practical Reason also.

12. The term Intellect is derived from a verb (intelligo) which signifies to understand: but the term itself is usually so applied as to imply a Faculty which recognizes Principles explicitly as well as implicitly; and abstract as well as applied; and therefore agrees with the Reason rather than the Understanding; and the same extent of signification belongs to the adjective intellectual.

13. Man not only can contemplate external things; he can also act upon them and with them. He can gather the fruits of the earth, and make bread.

He can take

such things to himself, as his property, or give them to another man, as a reward.

The word Action may be applied, in the most general

manner, to all exercise of the external or internal faculties of man. But we do not always so use the word.

internal thought,

We also often

We often distinguish external action from though thought is also a kind of activity. distinguish actions from words, as when we say man's actions contradict his words. Yet in a more general sense, we include a man's words in his actions. We say that a man's actions correspond with his words, when he performs what he has promised; though the performance itself should be words; as when he has promised to plead a cause.

14. We direct our thoughts to an action which we are about to perform: we intend to do it: we make it our aim: we place it before us, and act with purpose (propositum): we design it, or mark it out beforehand (designo).

15. Will, or Volition, is the last step of intention, the first step of action. It is the internal act which leads

to external acts.

An action that proceeds from my will or volition is my act. But if it do not proceed from my will, it is not my act, though my limbs may be employed in it; as for instance, if my hand, moved by another man whose strength overmasters mine, strikes a blow. In such a case, I am not a Free Agent. Human Actions suppose the Freedom of the Agent. In order to act, a man must be so circumstanced that his volitions take effect on his limbs and organs, according to the usual constitution of man.

The Will is stimulated to action by certain Springs of Action, of which we shall afterwards speak.

Laws.

16. Among the Springs of Action, are Rules or

There are Laws of Human Action, as well as Laws of Nature (8). But while the Laws of Nature are assertions only, as; Mars revolves in an ellipse; a solar eclipse will take place at the new moon; the Laws of human action are commands: as, Steal not; or, Thou shalt not

steal: We must be temperate. These imperative Laws of Human Action, we shall call Rules. Such Rules, when adjusted with due regard to the Springs of Action, direct the Will.

17. Actions may lead to events, as causes to effects: they may have consequences, immediate or remote. Το steal, is an action which may have the gain of a shilling for its immediate, and whipping for its remote consequence.

An End is a consequence intended, aimed at, purposed, designed (14). When we act with purpose, we have an End, to which the action is a Means. To possess the fruit being my end, I purposely cultivate the plant as the means.

18. The Rules of Action (16) may command actions as means to an end: thus: Steal not, that thou be not whipt. Be temperate, in order to be healthy.

19. We have often a Series of Actions each of which is a means, towards the next, as an end. We dig the ground, that we may make the plant to grow; we make a spade, that we may dig the ground; we take a branch of a tree, to make a handle for the spade.

20. To discern the consequences of actions; to act with purpose; and to consider our actions as means to an end; are processes which are ascribed to the Reason, as well as the mental operations which have already been spoken of (10).

As possessing Reason, man is called rational or reasonable. But the latter term is often used in a more special sense; meaning, agreeable to such rules and measures as man, by the use of his reason, may discover.

21. The Reason, when employed in such processes as have been noticed already (10), is the Speculative Reason: we oppose to this the Practical Reason, which guides us in applying Rules to our actions, and discerning the consequences of actions (20). The Speculative Reason tends to

speculative Truth; in which ideas, conceptions, and abstract propositions are contemplated: the Practical Reason guides us to truth, so far as it concerns our actions. By the Practical Reason, we apprehend objects and facts in a manner conformable to their true relations; and hence, we discern the true consequences of our actions, though the relations and the actions are not explicitly contemplated. The true apprehension of the relations of things is only implied in the Act of the Will, by which we take such means as lead to our ends.

22. The ideas, relations, rules, conceptions of ends and means, and the like, which are implicitly involved in the exercise of the Practical Reason, may be unfolded, so as to be matter of contemplation. In this manner, the Practical Reason is developed into the Speculative Reason. Such a developement of the human mind is produced by the exercise of Thought.

23. Animals, as well as man, conform their actions to the true relations of objects (21), and perform actions which look like means to ends (17). Thus, bees build cells in hexagonal forms, so as to fill space; and birds build nests, so as to shelter themselves and their young. But in the case of animals, the tendency to action cannot be unfolded into ideas, and conceptions of ends. Bees have no conceptions of hexagons, separate from their cells. Birds do not contemplate an end, when they build a nest build nests in a state of captivity, where there is be answered. The tendencies to such actions are implanted in the constitution of the animal, but are not capable of being unfolded into ideas, as in a rational nature they are (21). Hence such tendencies are called Instincts, and are distinguished from Practical Reason.

for they

no end to

24. Instinct, as well as Reason, operates through the Will, to direct the actions. In both cases, the Will is stimu