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prehensions were entertained, at all events it was politic to express them. The Shah believed, or affected to believe, that the integrity of his frontier was threatened. But Dost Mahomed had, at this time, no intention of marching on to Herat. independence of Afghanistan lay very near to his heart; and a few months before he had been deeply offended by the Persian Government, which had offered to aid him with money and troops against all foreign powers, if he would acknowledge his dependence on the Shah. But he was not prepared to move forward without ascertaining the wishes of the British-Indian Government, who had no power to interfere in the affairs of Herat, and did not encourage a forward movement.* The Shah, however, pretended to see danger where no danger was, and seized the opportunity, in defiance of his engagements with our Government, to equip an expedition for the reduction of Herat.

Our

It is time now that we should turn our attention towards the progress of events on the Persian side of the frontier. diplomatic connexion with the court of Teheran commenced with the present century. It originated in the apprehensions of the Governor-general of India, respecting the invasion of that country by the Afghans. It was our policy then, to encourage what we have since been so anxious to avert -a Persian attack upon the Afghan frontier. The Shah of Persia was to be stimulated to advance upon Herat, in order that the necessity of facing a present danger in one direction might draw him away from his designs of conquest in another. Internal revolt, however, anticipated the work of foreign invasion; and before the English envoy reached Teheran, Zemaun Shah had been rendered harmless by the rebellion of his own brother. Our policy was then, as since, of a defensive character. The enemies whom we dreaded were the Afghans, and we looked to Persia to protect us by creating seasonable diversions on the western frontier of Afghanistan.

But this scheme of defence soon underwent a material change. The French took the place of the Afghans as the enemies, against whom it seemed expedient to protect ourselves by diplomatic efforts beyond our north-western frontier. Persia, Afghan

* When Dost Mahomed, in the early part of 1855, entered into the treaty of general amity with Great Britain, to which reference has been made in the text, he was anxious to bring Herat into the federation, and to obtain from the British Government a guarantee for the independence of Afghanistan; but Hyder Khan, who represented the Ameer, was satisfied with our general assurances, that we should not regard with indifference any attempt on the part of Persia to extend her dominion into the Afghan country.

istan, Scinde, and the Punjab were all to be brought into a great defensive confederacy. The year 1809 witnessed the completion of a treaty with each of these several states. With the Punjab we entered into no specific engagement. The treaty was one only of general amity. The treaty with Scinde was little more, except that the Ameers undertook not to allow the settlement in their country of 'the tribe of the French.' With Caubul our engagements were of a more decided character. The first article of the treaty set forth that as the French and Persians 'have entered into a confederacy against the state of Caubul, if they should wish to pass through the king's dominions, the 'servants of the Heavenly Throne shall prevent their passage, ' and exerting themselves to the extent of their power in making 'war upon, and repelling them, shall not permit them to cross into British India.'

So far, the Afghans and the Persians would seem to have changed places as regarded their relative positions towards the British Government in India. In 1800, we leagued ourselves with the Persians against the Afghans; and in 1809 with the Afghans against the Persians. But whilst, in that last-named year, we were thus entering into engagements hostile to the Persians, we were, at the very same time, contracting friendly relations with them-among which was an engagement pledging the Persians, 'in case the dominions of His Britannic Majesty 'in India are attacked or invaded by the Afghans or any other 'power,' to afford a force for the protection of the said domi'nions;' whilst another article of the treaty specified that, in case war takes place between His Persian Majesty and the 'Afghans, His Majesty the King of Great Britain shall not 'take any part therein, unless it be at the desire of both parties 'to afford his mediation for peace.' The reciprocity, indeed, of these treaties reminds us of the well known school-boy trick, 'Heads, I win; tails you lose.' If either the Persians or the Afghans attacked our dominions, the other was to defend us; but if either attacked the other, we were to leave him to his fate. It may appear to be good diplomacy to accomplish this; but we may be sure that, however advantageous it may be for a time, in the long run' it cannot succeed. It is short-sighted policy at the best. It raises, not unjustly or unreasonably, a suspicion of our good faith, and causes us to be regarded as a nation on whom no dependence is to be placed, and from an alliance with whom nothing is to be gained but disappointment, in the hour of difficulty and danger.

But, although the British Government thus repudiated all intervention in the quarrels of the Persians and Afghans, it

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undertook a specific engagement for the prevention of an European attack upon the Persian territories. In return for the pledge of the King of Persia 'not to permit any European 'force whatever to pass through Persia, either towards India, or 'towards the parts of that country,' His Britannic Majesty undertook, in the event of any European forces invading the Persian territories, to furnish a force, or, in lieu of it, a subsidy with warlike ammunition, such as guns, muskets, &c., and officers, to the account that it may be to the advantage of both parties, for the expulsion of the invading force.' These engagements were confirmed in the definitive treaty which was concluded in 1814 by Messrs. Morier and Ellis, and the amount of subsidy was fixed at 200,000 tomaums annually.' It was stipulated, however, that the subsidy should not be paid in case the war were produced by an aggression on the 6 part of Persia.' At the same time Great Britain undertook, in the event of Persia going to war with one of our allies, to use our best endeavours to bring Persia, and such European 'power, to a friendly understanding.'

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For some years there was no occasion to test the sincerity with which Persia and Great Britain had entered into these engagements. France had ceased to be formidable in Asia; and the treaty of Goolistan restrained for a while the aggressive impulses of Russia. But in 1826, war again broke out between Persia and Russia; and a question then arose, as to the obligations of Great Britain to pay the subsidy contemplated in the treaty of 1814, or to mediate between the contending parties. Upon a deliberate review of all the circumstances of the case, and of the opinions expressed by the highest contemporary authorities, it is difficult to escape the conviction that the English Government abandoned her ally in the hour of need. The question of the subsidy turned upon the fact of aggression. Was Russia or Persia the aggressor? We learn from some correspondence recently published in Mr. Kaye's 'Life of Sir John Malcolm,' that the Duke of Wellington, after a full consideration of the terms of the treaty, and all the circumstances of the late war, gave it as his opinion, that, although the ori'ginal provocation was given by the Emperor (of Russia) by 'the seizure in time of peace of the districts of Gokchah and Balilkloo, avowedly belonging to the King of Persia, the existing hostilities were to be attributed to the latter.' But he added, even though it should be decided that, as the aggressor, the King of Persia cannot have his (the King of England's) 'assistance and support, he will still remain with the claim of 'his Majesty's interference in his favour.' Sir John Malcolm

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wrote to the Duke, saying, You certainly are right. There is a positive claim in faith for mediation.' But Mr. Canning, who was then at the Foreign Office, was disposed to question this claim: Does not,' he asked the Duke of Wellington, the article which defines the casus fœderis to be ag'gression against Persia, limit the effect of the whole treaty, and the aim of the sixth article, which promises our media'tion? Are we bound even to mediate in a cause in which 'Persia was the aggressor ?'*

Sir John Malcolm's comments on this are worth giving:

'Mr. Canning (he wrote to the Duke of Wellington) appears to me, from all I have heard or seen of his opinions, most anxious to shake off Persia. In point of policy, I believe him to be wrong; but supposing him to be right, he must take care that he does not, by injuring our reputation for good faith (no matter how or wherefore this faith was pledged), destroy that strength on which we must trust for every stand we may hereafter have to make, from the banks of the Araxes to those of the Ganges, against the encroachment of Russia. And, with respect to all questions of faith, as connected with Asiatic states, we must decide them according to their understanding of them when the obligation was contracted. Better for our character to break a treaty at once than to fritter it away with nice distinctions drawn from Puffendorff, Grotius, and Vattel, familiar to our diplomatists but unintelligible to courts like those of Teheran. Such a proceeding would add to the belief of our bad faith an impression of our art and meanness.' (Kaye's Life of Sir John Malcolm, vol. ii. pp. 454, 455.)

We have dwelt upon this particular chapter of our diplomatic history, because, as regards Persia, the epoch was a most important one in itself; and because it may be regarded as a turning point, from which Great Britain may date her declining influence at the Court of Teheran. It must, we fear, be acknowledged that Persia had too much reason to look upon Great Britain as an ally from whom little assistance was ever to be expected in the hour of need. We desired Persia to regard Great Britain as a friend, but we shrunk from the performance of the offices of friendship. When we were ourselves in any difficulty, or apprehensive of any danger, we were fain to run to Persia to assist us: but when the time came for us to render assistance to our ally, we took to diplomatic hairsplittings, and practically ignored our obligations. We cannot be surprised, therefore, that ever since the conclusion of

*The whole treaty,' added Mr. Canning, is a most unlucky 'effort of negotiation; and to add to the difficulties of it, it has never 'been laid before Parliament.'

the treaty of Toorkamanchai, Great Britain has been regarded by the Persian Court with little favour and much suspicion. Russia has made herself feared in Persia; but England has been neither trusted nor feared.

In 1826 the Persian Mission was again placed under the Government of India. In some respects this might have been a change for the better; but assuredly little good was likely to arise from the measure, carried out in such a spirit as that which seems to have imbued the measures of Mr. Canning. Sir John Malcolm always insisted upon the expediency of placing the control of our diplomatic relations with Persia in the hands of the Governor-general of India; but he urged, at the same time, the necessity of raising the dignity of the Mission by giving it credentials also from the Crown. To this proposal the Foreign Minister was not inclined to listen. He contended that, if the direction of our Persian diplomacy were transferred to the Governor-general, the Imperial Government ought to have nothing whatever to do with the business. It was manifestly his object to get rid of Persia; and so far he succeeded. For some years England was little troubled by the intrusion of the affairs of Iran. A secondrate Mission was maintained at the Persian Court. If the respectability of the gentlemen composing it could have given it weight and influence, it would have sufficiently possessed these attributes. But lacking all external splendour, and without the prestige of royalty, it was little likely to make any impression on the Persian mind. It simply existed, as a fact of small moment. Little importance was attached to it by our own Government; and it was not reasonably to be expected that Persia should go beyond our own estimate of its worth. We had not taught the Shah to be afraid of us; but others had taught him to be suspicious of our designs. It is not improbable, that the fact of the British Mission being controlled by the Company's government increased the suspicions of the Persian Court. The very name of Commerce in the mouths of our agents seemed to alarm them. Russia had been planting consular establishments in Persia and Armenia; but the government of the Shah was jealous in the extreme of any similar movement on the part of his English allies, and could not be persuaded that our consulates might counteract the danger arising from the Russian establishments. Sir John Campbell pleaded in vain. Doubtless, there were those intent keeping prominently before the eyes of Persian statesmen the significant fact, that English commerce had made India an English province.

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