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40

A Letter from a Hanoverian Office

the power of England. In like manner muft all additions to the wealth and power of this electorate be an increase of the power of that nation that envy us our poverty. What elfe can they envy us for? We have no trade, no manufactures, no fort of commerce that interferes with theirs; we rival them in nothing; we at tempt no rivalfhip; we pretend to none, but in the glory of arms, and in fteadinefs of loyalty and affection to our fovereign. In these, and in all acts of virtue, we confefs ourselves their rivals; and in thefe we will yield neither to them nor any other nation in the world.

All advices agree, that their jealoufy of foreigners, fo natural to that felfifh nation, is of late confined to us Hanoverians. Their rancour to the French holds at prefent but the second place. They pro pagate the invidious diftinction of Hano verians and Englishmen at home and abroad; and even all laft fummer in the camp, they were no lefs induftrious to fow the diftinction, than they are now to brand us with cowardice.

There was no union or harmony between them and us in the camp. They made it impoffible there should be any, tho' all that was poffible was done on our fide to cement a good understanding. All our officers, and ever. the common men, had orders to behave with caution towards their infular fellow-fubjects. They did fo; but what was the effects of good-nature and difcipline on our fide, was conftrued pufillanimity and flavishness by that haughty people..

The poor low prejudice was not confined to the common men, it was fpread to thofe of rank and diftinction; it was as visible in councils of war, as at common The Generals ordinaries and taverns. feemed as much infected as the subalterns: and the origin of that misunderstanding, which induced a great man to defire leave to retire, probably was no other than that ill-grounded prejudice which all his countrymen feem to have contracted of late. You may judge how deep rooted that unwarrantable prejudice was in his heart, when he could be influenced by it to fe his hr to his r -t in the midst of a campaign.

Jan. 1744.

I wonder what that arrogating people found their chimerical title to univerfal military prowess upon. They have been conquered by all the impotent nations that invaded them. The Saxons, the Danes, the Normans, all the conquerors of England, except the Romans, were weak and impotent, compared with the conquered. What victories they obtained formerly in France, they paid dearly for by fubfequent loffes. They have not much reafon to boast of their prowefs during K. William's reign; and furely they are not fo weak or vain, to arrogate to themselves the glory of the Prince of Savoy and the Duke of Marlborough's fucceffes against Lewis XIV. Those great Captains never attacked the French with lefs than 100,000 men, of which the English may have been about 10,000 at moft; one half at least of the corps which went under the denomination of English in that army, was compofed of Scots and Irish; and two thirds of their general officers were of these more hardy nations. So that the most they can say, as to the vi&tories in Q Anne's reign, is, that they have an equal title with other nations, whofe troops compofed the confederate army, to the glory of having humbled France. And are not Hanoverians intitled likewife to a proportion of that glory?

It is our happiness, and our comfort, that all the nations of Europe are not more fenfible of the injuftice of the charge brought against us, by our regal fellowfubjects, for the conduct of our troops in the field the laft campaign, than they are, that the troops of that nation, who inveigh most against us, have not behaved at Dettingen fo as might be expected arrogate all military from a people that virtues to themselves, without admitting others to an equality.

The operations of the laft campaign began by the march of the combined army from the Netherlands to the Rhine. And herein, tho' the English had the honour of the lead, I could fee no traces of English virtue of any kind more than of Hanoverian. We marched in as good order, obferved as good difcipline, and, I anfwer for it, would give as good account of an enemy, was there one in the way

to disturb the march. I won't say that our men or horfes were as high fed, and looked as fleek as thofe of the English corps; but I will anfwer, that our men and horfes were as well clothed and accoutred, made as fair an appearance, exercised better, and looked in all refpects more warlike than those who seek to ftrip them of all military fame. If we were not as fat and foggy, we were not lefs active and nimble; and, if our neighbours had greater pay, and fed and drank more and higher, we were not lefs ftrong of limbs, or lefs hearty and wholfome; and if, after we encamped together, our troops fared better, it was not owing, as is malicioufly fuggefted, to a partiality in affigning us better quarters, but to the industry of our men, who took more pains to provide, and to their frugality, who make a ftiver go as far as their fellow foldiers did two. This appeared evidently at Afchaffenburg, where there could be no choice of fituation. The English foon confumed their provifions, and were foon in want; whilft we, being better husbands, did not want fo much, nor fo early. This leads me to repeat what moft nations fay of the English, That, feed them high, and they will fight; but, forced to fhort allowance, they are lower in fpirits and courage than gallant men fhould be. Thofe nations who can bear cold and hunger beft, and longeft, are the fittest for war; and the English are not of those nations most famous for fatigue and abstinence. Their very cattle participate of the flimfy texture of their mafters; for, unless an English horse be fed high and often, he is the verieft jade in Europe, tho' as much or more highmettled and fpirited than that of any other country, when his craving is regularly supplied.

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The first operation of any confequence, fter the junction of the army, was crofg the Mayne; of which motion I could it fee the ufe or defign, tho' I did not protest against it; nor have I ever heard it juftified to my fatisfaction. To fay no more of it, it was a precipitate measure; for, had we waited eight hours longer to repass the river, we should have had a fuperior French army on our backs. But in this falutary retreat, our troops had the VOL. VI.

post of honour, that is, of hazard, affigned them. This was the rear, where there poffibly could be any danger. On this occafion, who dare fay, the Hanoverians betrayed either pufillanimity, or want of difcipline or conduct?

But these motions may be reckoned falutary, if compared to the march to Afchaffenburg, which was not undoubtedly of my projection. Before the arrival of our auguft chief, I might reafon, exprefs my diflike, and argue from experience; but I was heard, and that was all. But after our chief had narrowly examined the ftate of affairs, and found that I had no fhare in measures he could not approve of, the fcene was changed. And what wonder, that a prince fhould countenance those moft, whofe counfels are most falutary, and can best bear the test of wisdom and experience?

His Majefty had not been many days at Afchaffenburg before he perceived the imprudence of moving thither without fecuring the navigation of the river, by which alone the army could hope to be fupplied. Scarcity and danger hourly and equally increasing, it was natural for him, and for us all, to fhew fome refentment to the principal authors of the motion which caufed our diftrefs: and hence arose that referve on one fide, and that fullen haughtinefs on the other, which became afterwards too great and vifible to be concealed.

It being refolved to retreat from Afchaffenburg to Hanau, where a corps of Heffians, and another of our electoral troops, marching to join the army, were ordered to halt, the neceffary difpofitions were made. The English, as intitled to the poft of honour, had the lead of the army, the Auftrians followed, and the rear was the poft naturally and neceffarily af figned to us; which being thought of as great danger as the front, we were joined by fome of the English guards, horfe and foot: and had not M. de Noailles's fcheme been difconcerted by M.Grammont's rafhnefs, the rear had infallibly been the poft of moft danger and honour.

M. de Noailles forefaw, that we could not venture leaving a fufficient body of troops to guard the bridge and river at Afchaffenburg; he knew we could not F

weaken

weaken our small army by fuch a fepara- had been fatal, not only to that army,

tion, and therefore refolved that his moft powerful efforts fhould be from AfchaffenBurg on our rear. This difpofition on the fide of the French was natural; for the nature of the ground in the front was fuch, that at Dettingen 15,000 or 20,000 men were full enough to answer their purpose: fo that their defign was, that their main force fhould fall on our rear; which juftifies the precaution of ftrengthening this poft.

Belides this reafon for adding to, rather than diminishing the ftrength of the rear, there was another not lefs natural, for not permitting any of our cavalry to march from the rear to reinforce the front. The ground in the front between the mountain and the river, was fo narrow, that fcarce could the English, already there, and the Austrians, be drawn up upon it to advantage. Where then could the large body of Hanoverian cavalry, eagerly preffed to be drawn from the rear to ftrengthen the front, be placed?

I could heartily with this demand for our cavalry had been complied with, that the world might fee how little room there is for that arrogant fuperiority which a haughty nation claims over us in every thing, but particularly in point of valour and intrepidity. Then would it be seen who pushed faireft for conqueft and glory; then might it be feen, that Hanoverians were not more daunted, lefs fkilful or virtuous, than their infular fellow-fubjects. We were not, unhappily, where the action was warmeft, because it was judged it would be warmeft where we were; but we had our share of it, as may be known by the number of our killed and wounded; and our artillery was of infinite ufe to the English.

Tho' M. Grammont, by advancing upon the English, and quitting the ground his troops had been pofted upon, gave them all the advantage they could with for; yet fo very rude and furious was the attack of the French cavalry, that it put the whole English line into fuch confufion, that, had the French foot feconded the bravery of their horfe, and had not the Auftrians feasonably and courageoufly interpofed, it is thought the confequence

but the cause of liberty. The corps of French horfe that charged, were much inferior in number to thofe they attacked; yet fo paffively and diforderly were they received, that, for a while, it would feem as if there had been a total deprivation of both kill and courage. Nothing was feen but diforder and confufion; most of the regiments gave way; some absolutely turned the cruper upon the enemy, and could not be perfuaded to rally; and those who behaved beft when the panick was over, can't brag of their prowefs when they were first charged.

But the Auftrians received the enemy, not only without diforder or confufion, but repelled them; and by the repulfion, gave the English an opportunity of recovering their fenfes, and forming themfelves into fome order. Thus, from the conduct and valour of the Austrians, folely, was the fcale turned to the disadvantage of the French cavalry; who, being few in number, and unfupported, were commanded to retreat; which they did in better order than could be expected in the prefence of a fuperior force. But the truth is, thofe who inveigh moft bitterly against us for not being in the action, had fo little ftomach to a purfuit, that they wifhed the French had made a lefs orderly and more hafty retreat from them.

There yet remains a much bafer infinuation. They charge his My not only with being too indulgent and partial in regard to our corps, but with confulting his own perfonal fecurity along with ours. I would be glad to know where that inconfiftent people would have had his My to have placed himself. In the beginning, the rear was agreed of all hands, except a certain G-1, to be the post of moft rifk and danger; and after it became otherwife, by M. Grammont's temerity it was too late for his My to thir of changing his poft and yet, tho' th action was warmest in the front, the killed and wounded near his facred perfon are proofs of his not being out of danger.

What a pother do they likewife make about the colour of a fafh! as if it imported any thing to either that nation or the e--e, whether it was red or yellow.

From

From the moment of the junction, our troops were viewed, not only with a jea! lous, but a difdainful eye; but from the arrival of the Kat Afchaffenburg, from jealous and difdainful looks, the rooted prejudice grew up into indecent, offenfive expreffions, and a haughty infolence of behaviour. A gracious word or look from the K-, to any of our corps, was treafon in us, and probably thought a crime in him. Had any of us the honours of the Royal table, it was thought capital in the hofpitable hoft as well as the guest. If he feemed to relifh the reafoning of any of us in council, it bred fuch ill blood, as produced an obfervable fullennefs, even in the aged and experienced and if it happened, that he condefcended to confer with any of us in private, as it was often abfolutely neceffary he should, there were no bounds to the jealoufy, nor unpolite, unbecoming arrogance of fome, whofe duty, one would think, fhould have infpired them to behave more fuitably to his M―y's dignity, and their own rank and character. The jealoufy was of us only, there was none of the Auftrians. The K-might be as courteous as he pleased to them, no notice was taken of it but did he caft his eye on that part of the camp where we were, it was criminal. I am not fure but his very thoughts were interpreted to our difadvantage, and probably to his alfo. For my part, I could not help commiserating the condition of our moft gracious fn, who, as he could not but obferve the prejudice of one part of his people, and the mortifications of the other, muft neceffarily feel an uneafiness which no dutiful or loyal fubjects would willingly give him. But why should we expect a dutiful deference for our p―e, from a people famed, not only for disturbing the quiet, and refifting their K-s, but for dethroning, and even cutting off their facred heads witness their own annals.-And, in regard to their injurious treatment of their fns, there is one thing obfervable of them, which is not known of any other nation on earth; and that is, that they take pride and glory in the perjury and eminent wickedness of their forefathers. I have now in my hands many of their most celebrated works, wherein the

murder of K. Charles I. is juftified and applauded.

I remember, when firft you and I heard, that our late auguft fn hefitated to accept of that c-n on the foot of the act of fn, we were greatly alarmed and furprifed at his conduct. But experience and reading have fince convinced us of the wifdom of that fagacious prince. He knew the nation, was no ftranger to their behaviour to their K―s, knew their levity and unfteadinefs, their propensity to faction, to oppofition and corruption. And probably it was their biafs to corruption which alone determined him to comply with their requeft: he might think, that, by means of corruption, there would be a chance of governing a headstrong, untractable people.

And if we confider the men he employed upon his acceffion, and the measures he took, both then and all the reft of his reign, we can't but fuppofe, that he rested upon corruption only as the ftaff of his peace, and prop of his fafety.

To look back, we fhall fee that he chofe to rule by a party, and that the fmallest party, by far, of the people. According to the ordinary maxims of government, it was not politick to alienate thus the hearts of the majority of the people from him upon his first coming among them, as he muft fuppofe, from the noted partiality of his conduct. But upon his maxim of corruption, his conduct was wife and politick: by adopting a small party, the means of corruption could not well fail him. He might find places and penfions for a few, but could not poffibly for the whole: and could he rule the whole by means of the few, his purpose was anfwered as well as if he had had the affections of all the nation in general.

That great K- might have had a view alfo to the principles and nature of the party he chofe; for he was well read in the hiftory of that nation, and particularly well killed in the origin, nature and principles of their different parties. He might obferve in a multitude of inftances, but particularly the revolution, that the Tories, who were the majority of the people, bragged of found principles, and preached a doctrine grateful to princes, but never practifed either; and that the

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Whigs,

Whigs, whofe doctrine was refiftance, had however the good fenfe to be complying and obfequious when they were cherished and diftinguifhed. But whatever were that prince's motives, 'tis plain he chofe to rule by a party, which in no fenfe can be accounted for, but upon the maxim of corruption; which, in my opinion, was that alone which induced him to accept of the c-n on any terms.

'Tis certain he received the mighty gift with reluctancy: and, notwithstanding the humble and earnest intreaty of his favourites, Bernsdorf and Bothmar, if a greater favourite of another fex had not found means to conquer his prejudice, he had been happier, tho' lefs potent, and we infinitely happier, by having him conftantly among us. That prince, tho' of an even and eafy difpofition, was not fo happy and contented after as before the a-n. No more was K. William ; on whom, however, that inconfiftent people beltow the epithets, glorious, immortal, and deliverer. But from them fuch epithets mean no more than the addreffes from many of their counties and towns, wherein they offer their lives and fortunes to the reigning prince as words of course, without any meaning or intention of being in earneft. The addreffes to K. Charles I. whofe head was cut off, and to Oliver, who was the chief author of it; to K. James II. who was fent a-begging, and to the deliverer, to whom they were fo much obliged: Ifay, the words of fome of their addreffes to thofe feveral governors, run in pretty near the fame ftile; and in all of them, there is an ample and plain tender made of their lives and fortunes. But if there be any truth in the report of K. William's own countrymen, he repented him more than once of having quitted his dikes and marshes, and probably would have abdicated, had he lived much longer. How true this may be, I can't fay; but I will, that our late f- -n had often upbraided a certain fair, lately deceafed, with having perfuaded him out of his peace and content. As to what is alledged, That the Prince of Heffe would have raised the fiege, and probably faved Landau in 1703, if the corps of Hanoverians in his army had not refufed to join in the undertaking; which

refufal is magnified and improved intc cowardice by our malicious enemies: Tho I was in that army, I never heard of any fuch refufal. But fuppofing our Comman der in Chief had refused to march to the Upper Rhine, was he not warranted by the convention with Q. Anne in 1702 By the 5th article of that treaty, our troops were not to be commanded to any great distance from the Lower Rhine; and it is probable that orders were given to obferve it punctually.

It is likewife faid, That England was involved in a Swedish war, to fcreen the purchase of Bremen and Verden; a purchafe made too with English money.

But it is plain, that war was in vindication of the honour, and to protect the commerce of England; not to fecure the purchafe of Bremen and Verden, or any ways to ferve the interefts of Hanover; as appears by a memorial prefented by Mr Jackfon, British Refident at Stockholm, on the 15th of August 1716.

The war between Sweden and Denmark, which occafioned the lofs of Bremen and Verden, was declared in 1709. The King of Denmark poffeffed himself of Stade and the duchy of Bremen in 1712. The Elector our fovereign employed all that time his most friendly endeavours to pacify the troubles in the North, and to preferve to Sweden all her territories in the empire, firft by promoting and joining in the treaty concerted by the members of the grand alliance, for procuring a perfect neutrality for those provinces, and for joining an army of 15,000 men to the Swedish troops under Gen. Craffau, for repelling any invafion of them; which treaty was agreed to by the regency of Sweden, but rejected in the molt haughty manner by their headstrong King.

Our fovereign, in the next place, obtained of the King of Pruffia, for that of Sweden, in October 1713, a treaty of fequeftration for Pomerania; which was agreed to by Sweden, but foon after violated by that crown. And, in the laft place, his late Majefty procured a congrefs of all the powers concerned, to be opened at Brunfwick in 1714, for pacifying the troubles of the North.

But his Swedish Majefty, by an unaccountable

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