member who wishes to be again elected, must look principally to a few great families; if he oppose them in going with the body of his constituents, he is pretty sure to lose his seat. In the second place, from the expense, the power of the lower classes, and the principle on which the lat ter vote touching the "Third Man," the member for open boroughs and cities can feel no confidence that he will be elected a second time for the same place. He knows that, whether his conduct be meritorious or the contrary, popular prejudice, or the Third Man," will almost certainly cause his rejection if he again offer himself. He, therefore, as soon as he is elected, regards his connexion with his constituents to be ended, and pays no farther attention to them touching public affairs. It is his interest to oppose them, and make himself the tool of the Ministry or Opposition, if he wish to get again into Parliament at the least cost. In the third place, if a member desire to cultivate the good opinion of his constituents, he must look chiefly to the lower orders, and their favour is not to be gained by the due discharge of duty. Provided he make them presents and use similar means, he may dispose of his vote in the most corrupt manner, without forfeiting such favour. In the fourth place, no matter how profligately a man may act as the member for one place, it will not prejudice his election for another. While a member can scarcely hope to be again returned for the one he represents, he knows that, in offering himself for a different one, his past votes and conduct will not be looked at by the great body of the electors. In addition to what we have said touching the "Third Man," we may state, that in open boroughs and cities there is a corporation or other interest, and the lower orders generally support any candidate who will oppose it, no matter who, or what, he may be. Let us now speak of remedy. If members knew that zealous, upright discharge of duty, and attention to the sentiments of their constituents, would ensure their re-election, while opposite conduct would ensure their exclusion from Parliament, this would form one of great efficacy. How could such a remedy be created? By placing the command of the majority in the hands of intelligent, patriotic electors, and producing a sufficiency of candidates in the way we have mentioned. A member, on his election, solemnly pledges himself to a particular creed, or to vote in a specified manner on certain vital state questions; and it is of the first importance that he should faithfully adhere to his engagements. If he be suffered to violate them at pleasure, it destroys effective representation, and renders the constitution and public liberties defenceless. At the very least, his abandonment of his pledges ought to deprive him of his seat; he ought not to be suffered to vote in opposition to them without being first sent back to his constituents for their sanction. A member forfeits his. seat by accepting office; he must resign it, if in representing a close borough he change his side without the consent of his patron; and similar compulsion to be faithful and consistent ought to be imposed by law on the whole House. If this were done, it would cut off one great source of ministerial corruption, and exclude many profligates from Parliament who obtain seats at every election by hypocrisy and falsehood. In turning to the close boroughs, we will look first at the independent ones which are free from aristocratic influence. These seats are sold to the best bidder by the electors, without the least reference to creed and character. The sale is practicable, because the electors are so few in number. Where possible, the number of electors ought to be duly enlarged; and where not, the seats ought to be transferred to some other place. We demur to the doctrine, that to transfer seats in this manner, is to take a right from the electors of the place which loses them. The franchise is not a right, but a trust which the State bestows for its own benefit, and has a clear right to recall. We think it erroneous to say, that if the State grant a trust to a certain number of men, on no claim, and solely for its own good, it has no right to take back the trust when its exercise produces public evil, And now let us glance at the aristocratic boroughs. If at all times they were about equally divided between the Ministry and Opposition, and the two latter followed different creeds, we believe that the opening of them would produce little benefit: we are not sure that it would not prove a source of much evil. If there were not a single close borough, Parliament would be divided into two great parties, the Ministerial and Opposition ones; and the community would divide itself between them. What the case has been in this respect, it always will be, no matter what scheme of reform may be adopted. This, then, is the question to be considered-is it beneficial to the empire, or the contrary, for each of the great constitutional parties to command a certain number of seats? Under the present system, these parties practically elect and govern the close borough members. In many cases the borough-owner suffers his party to nominate his members; in others, he will only elect men who profess its faith, and are of good character; and in all, his members are guided in their conduct and votes by it, and not by himself. In effect, the Whigs, in and out of Parliament, as a party, elect and rule the members for the Whig boroughs, and the case is similar with the Ministerialists. These consequences follow. The most able men that can be met with, are placed in the House of Commons to act as its leaders-each side of the House and the community is provided with the most efficient advocates and champions--both the great parties possess a sufficient number of votes to give due effect to their efforts and the leading part of Parliament is composed of men who are in a large degree independent of the different interests of the empire, and who, therefore, can discuss public affairs with sufficient impartiality, so far as these interests are concerned. Let these boroughs be liberated from aristocratic influence, and thrown completely open, and what will follow? Their members will still be in general party men. ridiculous to argue that members are independent of party, because they are independent of the borough It is owners; why, many of those who represent places wholly free from aristocratic influence, vote as servilely with the Ministry, or Opposition, as any of the close borough ones. Taking for granted that the members, in such a case, would be as much party men as they now are, there would be this difference: Men of talent and knowledge would be in a great measure excluded from Parliament, particularly on the Opposition side the heads would be of inferior capacity, and would be controlled by the interests they would owe their election to-both the great political parties of Parliament and the country would have inefficient advocates, and public interests would be managed on the ruinous principle of making every thing subservient to trading, cupidity, and popular delusion. We of course think that a change would yield any thing rather than benefit. The utility of the close boroughs in bringing men of talent and intelligence into Parliament, is so forcibly felt, that the better part of the reformers are willing to spare a certain number of them for the purpose. Any change which should exclude such men would be a public evil of the first magnitude, and we do not know what, beside these boroughs, would ensure their constant return. While it is necessary that they should be sent to Parliament, we hold it to be equally necessary that they should always command a sufficient number of votes to give due effect to their exertions. This number can only be given them by the close boroughs. We do not say that none of the latter ought to be abolished; all we say is, that there ought to be as many as will, not only bring the first men into Parliament, but enable them to be beneficial when they are in it. All experience proves that individual efforts in it are of no avail; and that in cases of public emergency, nothing but a party can be proof against the seductions of men in power. Our decided conviction is, that the present system in regard to these boroughs yields the greatest benefit to the popular side-that it forms a bulwark of the first worth to public rights and liberties. If it be abolished, the advantages will be chiefly enjoyed by the Ministry, and there will be an end of efficient and beneficial opposition. The Opposition will be no longer bound from the bribes of men in power, it will be destitute of character and ability, and it will be an impotent party, or a destructive faction; it will be annihilated for purposes of good. It must be remembered that so long as it and the Ministry are divided and hostile, neither can carry any thing by its borough votes; they neutralize each other on these votes, and the majority is as much under the control of the independent part of the Parliament as it would be if the boroughs were wholly abolished. It must also be remembered that although the borough owners nominally command the votes of their members, the latter to a great extent govern them; they do not lead, but are led by, their respective parties. Of universal suffrage, election by ballot, and annual parliaments, we need not speak; for no honest man of understanding will support them. They would give a practical monopoly of the elective franchise to the lower orders, and, of course, accord ing to the notions of the latter the empire would be governed. The middle classes would have infinitely less influence at elections than they now have. If the lower ones were perfectly pure and knowing, they would still form the only interest represented in Parliament; but whatever may be the case with the aristocracy, they far surpass it as electors in corruption, ignorance, selfishness, and profligacy. That minion of a hierarchy, Mr O'Connell, for very obvious reasons, speaks in utter contempt of all history of the benefits to be drawn from democratic government; his scheme would exclude from all share in the government, a vast part, and all the best part, of the democracy; he would substitute a mob oligarchy for the one he rails against. It will be prudent in this Irish demagogue to confine himself to Irish matters; England will not have him for a lawgiver. The great manufacturing towns ought to have members to attend to their local interests, and if twelve or twenty were added to the House of Commons on account of this, we cannot see that it would make any difference to the general interests of the country. But we dissent wholly from the doctrine, that the manufacturing interests have not sufficient influence in Parliament. The agricultural members, from their connexion with the aristocracy, and the connexion of the latter with the great political parties, are divided, and by their division they, to a great extent, neutralize each other. This is the case on agricultural questions; and, in consequence, agriculture, in regard to influence, can only be said to have the number of votes which one side of them possesses more than the other. The manufacturing and trading members, are always unanimous in their votes against agriculture. The latter is now, as experience proves, overpowered by manufactures and commerce; and it will be rendered, by the course of nature, still more weak against them. It will be seen from what we have said, that many of the misdeeds and deficiencies of the House of Commons, do not arise from the mode by which it is chosen, and that a radical change of this mode would not remedy them. We will now briefly state what ought to be done independently of such change. Let a powerful independent party be formed in the House, to hold the balance between the Ministry and Opposition. This party must not seek office or originate measures, it must act as a cautious and impartial judge. Let the Old Tories, if they wish for a change of measures, bring their creed fully before the country, and stand forward as the legitimate Opposition. Let them abandon their absurd and frivolous differences of opinion, separate themselves from the foolish party clamour touching -taxes, and propose sound, comprehensive, statesmanlike plans of relief. And let them reinforce themselves with talent. By this they will drive the Whigs into the ranks of the Ministry, or degrade them into a minor party. It would create in the House a legitimate and beneficial Opposition. The landowners, who severally have not more than five thousand per annum, are far more numerous, and possess infinitely more property, than the whole of the cotton and woollen manufacturers. They are on the brink of ruin; if they do not make proper efforts, they will in a very few years be stripped of almost every shilling. Let them act independently of the Peers, and send their own members to Parliament. This will give to agriculture an undivided, zealous, and efficient party. Let the unhallowed and destructive connexion between trading rapacity and politics be dissolved; let the accursed system of fighting the funded interest against the landed one, and the manufacturers against the agriculturists, be cast to the winds. Let party creeds be based on the principle of assisting and benefiting ALL without partiality, and keeping the great interests of the empire in harmony. Let perfidy and apostacy in public men be unsparingly punished; without this, the House of Commons must always be a national scourge. To the Reformers of all grades and creeds, we say-Reform yourselves, and this will have no small effect in reforming the House of Commons! You pule, whine, vituperate, and petition, while the guilt is really your [April, own; if the House be incapable and incapable and corrupt. When you corrupt, it is mainly because you are franchise, you wholly disregard quaare called on to exercise the elective lification-you are swayed by persell your votes to any bidder who sonal and party interests-you basely will give the most for them. Provided it will gratify your madness, or simpleton or demagogue, to the reserve your avarice, you vote for any jection of the highly endowed candidate. By such heinous wickedness you form a House like the present blame on the borough owners; to one, and then you charge all the your shame we record it-the latter, however selfish and profligate they selves. Cast from you then, like homay be, are far less so than yournest and spirited Englishmen, the criminality, and set these borough owners a proper example; give your and wisely according to desert, and votes at the next election uprightly after making this mighty reform, debe necessary! cide cautiously as to what more may Noctes Ambrosianae. No. XLVIII. ΧΡΗ ΔΕΝ ΣΥΜΠΟΣΙΩ ΚΥΛΙΚΩΝ ΠΕΡΙΝΙΣΣΟΜΕΝΑΩΝ Σ. PHOC. ap Ath. [This is a distich by wise old Phocylides, An ancient who wrote crabbed Greek in no silly days; C. N. ap. Ambr. SCENE-The Saloon, illuminated by the grand Gas Orrery. TIME-First of April-Six o' clock. PRESENT-NORTH, the ENGLISH OPIUM-EATER, the SHEPHERD, TICKLER, in Court Dresses.-The three celebrated young Scottish LEANDERS, with their horns, in the hanging gallery. AIR," Brose and Brochan and a'." An' that's an Orrery! The infinitude o' the starry heavens reduced saa as to suit the ceilin' o' the Saloon!-Whare's Virgo? TICKLER. Yonder she is, James-smiling in the shade of SHEPHERD. I see her just aboon the cocky-leeky. Weel, sic anither contrivance! Some o' the stars and planets-moons and suns lichter than ithers, I jalouse, by lettin' in upon them a greater power o' coal-gas; and ithers again, just by moderatin' the pipe-conductors, faint and far awa' in the system, sae that ye scarcely ken whether they are lichted wi' the gawzeous vapour ava', or only a sort o' fine, tender, delicate porcelain, radiant in its ain transparent nature, and though thin, yet stronger than the storms. NORTH. The first astronomers were shepherds |