fion. Sympathy invites a communication of joys and forrows, hopes and fears: fuch exercise, foothing and fatisfactory in itself, is neceffarily productive of mutual good-will and affection.

One other advantage of rational criticism is reserved to the laft place, being of all the most important; which is, that it is a great fupport to morality. I infift on it with entire fatisfaction, that no occupation attaches a man more to his duty, than that of cultivating a taste in the fine arts: a just relish of what is beautiful, proper, elegant, and ornamental, in writing or painting, in architecture or gardening, is a fine preparation for the fame juft relish of these qualities in character and behaviour. To the man who has acquired a tafte fo acute and accomplished, every action wrong or improper must be highly disgustful: if, in any instance, the overbearing power of paffion fway him from his duty, he returns to it with redoubled resolution never to be swayed a fecond time: he has now an additional motive to virtue, a conviction derived from experience, that happiness depends. on regularity and order, and that difregard to justice or propriety never fails to be punished with fhame and remorfe *.

Rude

Genius is allied to a warm and inflammable conftitution, delicacy of tafte to calmness and fedatenefs. Hence it is common to find genius in one who is a prey to every paffion; but feldom delicacy of tafte. Upon a man pof

felfed

Rude ages exhibit the triumph of authority over reason: Philofophers anciently were divided into fects, being Epicureans, Platonists, Stoics, Pythagoreans, or Sceptics: the fpeculative relied no farther on their own judgement but to chuse a leader, whom they implicitly followed. In later times, happily, reafon hath obtained the afcendant men now affert their native privilege of thinking for themselves; and difdain to be ranked in any fect, whatever be the science. I am forced to except criticifm, which, by what fatality I know not, continues to be no less flavish in its principles, nor less fubmiffive to authority, than it was originally. Boffu, a celebrated French critic, gives many rules; but can difcover no better foundation for any of them, than the practice merely of Homer and Virgil, fupported by the authority of Ariftotle: Strange! that in fo long a work, he fhould never once have ftumbled upon the queftion, Whether, and how far, do these rules agree with human naA ture. It could not surely be his opinion, that these poets, however eminent for genius, were entitled to give law to mankind; and that nothing now remains, but blind obedience to their arbitrary will if in writing they followed no

fessed of that bleffing, the moral duties, no less than the fine arts, make a deep impreffion, and counterbalance every irregular defire: at the fame time, a temper calm and fedate is not eafily moved, even by a strong tempta.

tion.

rule,

rule, why should they be imitated? If they studied nature, and were obfequious to rational principles, why fhould these be concealed from us?

With refpect to the prefent undertaking, it is not the author's intention to compose a regular treatise upon each of the fine arts; but only, in general, to exhibit their fundamental principles, drawn from human nature, the true fource of criticism. The fine arts are intended to entertain us, by making pleafant impreffions; and, by that circumstance, are distinguished from the ufeful arts: but, in order to make pleasant impreffions, we ought, as above hinted, to know what objects are naturally agreeable, and what naturally difagreeable. That fubject is here attempted, as far as neceffary for unfolding the genuine principles of the fine arts; and the author affumes no merit from his performance, but that of evincing, perhaps more distinctly than hitherto has been done, that these principles, as well as every just rule of criticifm, are founded upon the fenfitive part of our nature. What the author hath discovered or collected upon that fubject, he chooses to impart in the gay and agreeable form of criticifm; imagining that this form will be more relifhed, and perhaps be no less instructive, than a regular and laboured difquifition. His plan is, to afcend gradually to principles, from facts and experiments; instead of beginning with the former, handled abftractedly,

and

and defcending to the latter. But, though criticifm is thus his only declared aim, he will not difown, that all along it has been his view, to explain the nature of man, confidered as a fenfitive being capable of pleasure and pain and, though he flatters himself with having made fome progress in that important science, he is, however, too fenfible of its extent and difficulty, to undertake it profeffedly, or to avow it as the chief purpose of the prefent work.

To cenfure works, not men, is the just prerogative of criticism; and accordingly all personal cenfure is here avoided, unlefs where neceffary to illustrate some general propofition. No praise is claimed on that account; becaufe cenfuring with a view merely to find fault, cannot be entertaining to any perfon of humanity. Writers, one should imagine, ought, above all others, to be reserved on that article, when they lie fo open to retaliation. The author of this treatise, far from being confident of meriting no censure, entertains not even the flighteft hope of fuch perfection. Amusement was at first the fole aim of his inquiries: proceeding from one particular to another, the fubject grew under his hand; and he was far advanced before the thought ftruck him, that his private meditations might be publicly useful. In public, however, he would not appear in a flovenly drefs; and therefore he pretends not otherwife to apologise for

his

his errors, than by obferving, that in a new fubject, no lefs nice than extensive, errors are in fome measure unavoidable. Neither pretends he to justify his tafte in every particular that point must be extremely clear, which admits not variety of opinion; and in fome matters susceptible of great refinement, time is perhaps the only infallible touchstone of taste to that he appeals, and to that he chearfully fubmits.

N. B. THE ELEMENTS OF CRITICISM, meaning the whole, is a title too affuming for this work. A number of thefe elements or principles are here unfolded: but, as the author is far from imagining that he has completed the list, a more humble title is proper, fuch as may exprefs any number of parts lefs than the whole. This he thinks is fignified by the title he has chofen, viz. ELEMENTS OF CRITICISM.

ELEMENTS