and annuls criminal responsibility, there has been much discussion, nor are there any general principles as yet established on the subject.

We know from experience that, notwithstanding the serious derangement of the reasoning power which a person must have experienced, who entertains the strange fancies that sometimes find their way into the mind, it may be exercised on all other subjects, so far as we can see, with no diminution of its natural soundness. To deprive such a person of the management of his affairs, or to invalidate his contracts, would be to inflict a certain and serious injury. The principle which our author would inculcate on this point is, "that monomania invalidates only when such act comes within the circle of the diseased operations of the mind." This principle would certainly be of easy application, if the insane delusion never varied; for then all we should have to do, would be to ascertain what the delusion is, and then determine whether the act in question comes within its influence. But unfortunately for the adequacy of this rule, the delusion is frequently chang. ing, in which case it is not only difficult to determine how far it may have been connected with any particular act, but the mind, in respect to other operations, has lost its original soundness, to such an extent that it cannot be trusted in the management of important concerns. All we can do then, is, in doubtful instances, to be governed by the circumstances of the case, a course which seems far more rational than the practice of universal disqualification.

The author mentions one case, to which he thinks that his principles will not apply, and that is in determining the validity of a marriage contracted in a state of partial insanity. Here, he says, it is not sufficient to consider merely the connexion of the ballucination with the idea of being married, nor should he form any conclusion in favor of the capacity of the deranged party, from the propriety with which he conducts himself during the ceremony. In other contracts, all the conditions and circumstances may be definite and brought into view at once, and the capacity of the mind to comprehend them determined with comparative facility; whilst, on the contrary, in the contract of marriage, nothing is definite, the obligations which it imposes are of an abstract kind, and constantly varying. With respect to the principles that should regulate the legal relations of the partially insane, our author lays it down that, "whilst they should be left in possession of every civil right, that they are not clearly incapable of exercising, they should be subjected to the performance of no duties involving the interests or comfort of individuals, which may be equally well discharged by others." For this principle he states what we conceive a very sound reason, viz. that in the former instance we continue the enjoyment of a right that has never been abused; while in the latter, we refrain from imposing duties on persons not qualified to perform them.

In criminal, as well as in civil cases, it is important to consider the operation of the predominant idea, and its influence on the act in question, as there is no good reason why a person should be held responsible for a criminal act that springs from a delusion which would be sufficient to invalidate any civil act to which it might give rise, as a monomaniac's sense of the fitness of things is not different when he signs a ruinous contract, from what it is when he commits a criminal act. It is still a disputed point, whether partial mania should have the full legal effect of insanity, in crimi

nal cases. Some writers will have it that the same principle which determines the effect of mania in civil, should also determine its effect in criminal cases; that is, that criminal responsibility should be annulled only when the act comes within the range of the diseased operations of the mind. In favor of this view, it may be urged that the connexion of the morbid delusion with the criminal act is generally very direct. Against this view it may be objected, that it is not always easy to trace the connexion between the predominant idea and the criminal act. The links which connect the thoughts that rise in succession in the sound mind, defy all our penetration, and the few laws we have established are totally inapplicable to the associations of the insane mind. Another objection to this view is, that the predominant idea is sometimes frequently changing, and at other times concealed by the patient.

Hoffbauer not only limits the exculpatory effects of partial insanity, to the acts which clearly come within its influence, but has laid down the principle, that in the criminal jurisprudence of this state, the predominant idea should be considered as true; that is, that the acts of the patient should be judged as if he had really been in the circumstances he imagined himself to be when they were committed. This is obviously based on the common, but erroneous maxim, that madmen reason correctly, but from wrong premises; we know, however, that there are numerous instances wherein the premises and conclusions are all equally erroneous. In the courts of justice in this country, there has been a great diversity of practice on this subject. Under the influence of Lord Hale's doctrines, partial insanity has seldom been considered as sufficient per se, to annul responsibility for crime; and when it has, it is generally in cases where the principal delusions were of a religious nature. We find that our analysis of this work has run out to so great a length that we must close it here; not, however, without expressing our decided approbation of the book. We recommend a careful perusal of it both to our medical and legal friends. The latter class of readers will see that there are certain points, even in the judicial discussions on insanity, where they would do well to consult something more defined than mere common sense.

THE DISCOVERY OF THE VITAL PRINCIPLE; OR THE PHYSIOLOGY OF MAN. 8vo. pp. 566. London, 1838.

THE present century will certainly be distinguished in the annals of the human mind. Every science and every art has received in it an impulsion which is rapidly hurrying it forward-the elements of political and social life have been analysed, and are in process of recombination-and, finally, the vital principle, the grand secret, is discovered.

Genius is proverbially modest. If a man invents a new tooth-powder, nay, if he gives only a new designation to an old one, he sets his name to the thing forthwith, and affects to consider immortality certain. But the discoverer of the vital principle is nameless. We see him not in the titlepage, we seek him in vain in the preface, and we abandon in despair the

search for his whereabouts. The discovery, however, will itself be a reward, more substantial and more glorious than the beggarly fame that waits on the breath of the million-a fame that is prostituted for the panders to their pleasures, or the destroyers of their kind.

It would be a waste of time to dwell on the importance of a knowledge of the Vital Principle. Common sense proclaims it. But it seems that that knowledge is peculiarly necessary now. Horrors are hanging over us, and there is something awfully significant in these hints:

"The period, however, has arrived in which this truth must be developed! Real knowledge always progresses with necessity, and the elucidation of the vital principle has now become essential to the wants of mankind; for, while we continue, unacquainted with the origin of life, what effectual step can be taken to prevent the incursions of disease and death, so unusually prevalent in the present day? On the explanation of the vital phenomena, and general diffusion of physiological knowledge, will be found to depend the preservation of the entire human species." Pref. vi.

If this does not awaken attention we know not what will rouse people. We have been sleeping on a volcano. How grateful we should be to the gentleman before us. Would that we could call him by his name.

Perhaps there are few terms more used in medicine than "vital principle," "vital action," "vital laws." If there is a difficulty, they give us the solution-if a thing is incomprehensible, the laws of vitality explain it. The vital principle is, like Cerberus, "three gentlemen at once," and does all sorts of work for all sorts of people.

It may be doing a service to medicine, to lay before the profession a few of the leading notions on the nature of vitality. Those who make liberal use of the term, would be puzzled, perhaps, were they put in a corner, and asked to state exactly what they meant. Before, then, we announce the discovery of the genuine vital principle, the real Simon Pure, we will introduce a few of the sham ones.

1. John Hunter's idea of Life.—It is generally supposed that Hunter's vital principle is, like the "delicate Ariel," something very spiritual indeed. There cannot be a greater mistake, as the following passage from his work on the blood, which supplies us with his views in detail, will show.

"This living principle in the blood, which I have endeavoured to show to be similar in its effects to the living principle in the solids, owes its existence to the same matter which belongs to the other, and is the materia vitæ diffusa, of which every part of an animal has its portion:* it is, as it were, diffused through the whole solids and fluids, making a necessary constituent part of them, and forming with them a perfect whole; giving to both the power of preservation, and the susceptibility of impression, and, from their construction, giving them consequent reciprocal action. This is the matter which principally composes

* "I consider that something similar to the materials of the brain is diffused through the body, and even contained in the blood; between this and the brain a communication is kept up by the nerves. I have, therefore, adopted terms explanatory of this theory; calling the brain the materia vitæ coacervata; the nerves the chorda internuncia; and that diffused through the body, the materia

vitæ diffusa."

the brain; and where there is a brain there must necessarily be parts to connect it with the rest of the body, which are the nerves; and as the use of the nerves is to continue, and therefore convey, the impression or action of the one to the other, these parts of communication must necessarily be of the same matter; for any other matter could not continue the same action.

From this it may be understood that nothing material is conveyed from the brain by the nerves, nor, vice versa, from the body to the brain; for if that was exactly the case, it would not be necessary for the nerves to be of the same materials with the brain: but as we find the nerves of the same materials, it is a presumptive proof that they only continue the same action which they receive at either end.

The blood has as much the materia vitæ as the solids, which keeps up that harmony between them; and as every part endued with this principle has a sympathetic affection upon simple contact, so as to affect each other, (which I have called contiguous sympathy,) so the blood and the body are capable of affecting and being affected by each other; which accounts for that reciprocal influence which each has on the other. The blood being evidently composed of the same materials with the body, being endued with the same living powers, but from its unsettled state having no communication with the brain, is one of the strongest proofs of the materia vitæ making part of the composition of the body, independently of the nerves, and is similar in this respect to those inferior orders of animals that have no nerves, where every other principle of the animal is diffused through the whole. This opinion cannot be proved by experiment; but I think daily experience shows us that the living principle in the body acts exactly upon the same principle with the brain. Every part of the body is susceptible of impression, and the materia vitæ of every part is thrown into action, which, if continued to the brain, produces sensation; but it (the materia vitæ) may only be such as to throw the part impressed into such actions as it is capable of, according to the kind of impression; so does the brain or mind. The body loses impression by habit, so does the brain; it continues action from habit, so does the brain. The body, or parts of the body, have a recollection of former impressions when impressed anew; so has the brain but they have not spontaneous memory as the brain has, because the brain is a complete whole of itself, and therefore its actions are complete in themselves. The materia vitæ of the body being diffused, makes part of the body in which it exists, and acts for this part, and probably for this part alone. The whole, taken together, hardly makes a whole, so as to constitute what might be called an organ, the action of which is always for some other purpose than itself: but this is not the case with the brain. The brain is a mass of this matter, not diffused through anything for the purpose of that thing, but constituting an organ in itself, the actions of which are for other purposes, viz. receiving by means of the nerves, the vast variety of actions in the diffused materia vitæ which arise from impression and habit, combining these, and distinguishing from what part they come The whole of these actions form the mind, and, according to the result, react so as to impress more or less of the materia vitæ of the body in return, producing in such parts consequent actions. The brain, then depends upon the body for its impression, which is sensation, and the consequent action is that of the mind; and the body depends upon the consequence of this intelligence, or effect of this mind, called the will, to impress it to action; but such (sensation and action) are not spent upon itself, but are for other purposes, and called voluntary."

John Bell sarcastically remarked that "a mouthful of nonsense in latin" sounds infinitely better, than in the mother tongue. The "diffused matter of life" of John Hunter, looks awkward in English. But what shall we say when we are told that it is something like brain? We may imitate Polonius' No. LX.

Ни

polite acquiescence with Hamlet, when the prince told him that the cloud was like a camel"—" It is backed like a camel."

We should perhaps admire Hunter's notions more, if they possessed the merit of intelligibility. As they stand they seem, to vulgar eyes, to be inconsistent where comprehensible, and rather rhapsodical where incomprehensible, that is, in about four-fifths of their extent.

Hunter, for example, says that the living principle "principally composes the brain," and that the nerves are necessarily of the same matter. But as the blood has the living principle, that is a strong proof that the materia vitæ makes part of the composition of the body, independently of the brain and nerves. This appears very odd on the part of the living principle, for, if the brain and nerves are principally composed of it, there seems no necessity for its additional dissemination. Mr. Hunter, too, informs us that the living principle in the body acts on exactly the same principle as the brain. So, here is a principle which makes a great part of a particular organ, and which seems identified, in Hunter's idea, both with the composition and the action of that organ, operating just like another principle, universally diffused yet in no other place associated with such visible organization. This is undoubtedly very beautiful, but rather mysterious. The account of the diffusion of the materia vitæ is a fine piece of chiaro-scuro. Few exceed Hunter in this sort of thing. The passage is like the speech in Don Juan :"A good sample, on the whole,

Of rhetoric, by the learn'd call'd rigmarole."

Our poor faculties are left, we confess, at a humble distance, in this excursion of Hunter's genius. We are ashamed to say, that his meaning and his logic are equally beyond us.

Yet one thing does seem clear. If words go for any thing, Hunter tells us that the materia vitæ diffusa is the matter which principally composes the brain." The whole gist of his argument, if argument such a rhapsody can be termed, goes to prove the analogy between the living principle and the brain. If this is not materialism, what is? Fortunately the bane is rapidly succeeded by the antidote, and the very next paragraph knocks the materia vitæ on the head.

"But mere composition of matter does not give life; for the dead body has all the composition it ever had. Life is a property we do not understand; we can only see the necessary leading steps towards it."

It is a pity that Mr. Hunter did not start with this. Had he only placed it before his theory of the materia vitæ, instead of after it, much trouble would have been spared to himself and to his readers. It contradicts point blank all that went before it. This mode of reasoning, though convenient in some respects, is open to some objection. It is difficult to know exactly what the author means, when he makes two assertions opposed to one another; and when he first explains a thing and then says it is inexplicable, we are tempted to inquire why he went to the pains of explaining it.

Mr. Hunter, however, has not done yet. The last paragraph left him asserting positively that mere composition of matter does not give life. In another place he goes even farther than this:-" Organization and life," he says, do not depend the least on each other." This is pretty well