science, but remain equally affected to them all, as they may all afford their assistance in promoting philosophy. But in the present state of men and things, some subtile capacities pursue the minute differences of their subject, and make no end of splitting and dividing, as in anatomy, &c. till the mechanical structure, or organization of the parts, is lost; and others, on the contrary, consider only the wholes, without examining the parts. Some fondly admire the ancients, as Aristotle, Plato, &c. and others some favourite modern philosopher. But unless the mind be thoroughly convinced of the folly and absurdity of such a procedure, and be brought, by art and habit, to a quite contrary temper, true philosophy cannot be effectually promoted; for the sciences formed by distempered minds will partake of the distempers, and accordingly appear trifling, gross, partial, half-faced, distorted, fantastical, &c.

(3.) The third way wherein the mind becomes perverted, is by the abuse or improper use of words, for the philosophical words, in all languages, are commonly false or inadequate marks or signs of things, and by no means convey just and perfect notions. So that men are continually imposed upon, even against their wills, by a wrong imposition of words, which are generally coined by the vulgar; or if by philosophers, it is

without taking the requisite pains and care to form notions duly from things, and then give suitable names to those notions. And hence the reasonings, the discourses, and even the writings of men, are often strangely confused, or but seldom perfectly intelligible, and propagate imperfect notions, which men take by consent, without enquiring whether they are just, or how they were formed. But, in order to improve philosophy, it is of great importance to have words suitably adapted, and kept invariably to denote perfect notions, so as to express or convey such notions without delusion or imposition. But no language of this kind can be made, till a set of such notions shall be duly formed from things, which depends upon the use of induction. And as this language, and these notions, are hitherto in great measure wanting, the mind thus remains unprovided of one very great help for the improvement of philosophy.

(4.) The mind is, again, strangely perverted by fabulous theories, and romantic philosophies, which are extremely numerous, and still continue to increase. The third section divides them into three general kinds, viz. sophistical, empirical, and superstitious. Sophistical philosophies are those formed upon common, or hasty observations and experiments, by a subsequent operation of the mind. Thus Aristotle's philosophy

was formed upon common observations, wrought up by his logic, so as to become sophistical and corrupted for common observations, and obvious experiments, are not of themselves fit to build a serviceable philosophy upon, as they by no means shew all the secret motions of nature, and the laws by which things are governed. Nor is the common logic an engine at all suited to deal with experiments, observations, and nature.

Empirical philosophies are those formed upon only a few experiments, though made with great exactness, as Dr. Gilbert's philosophy is formed upon his magnetical experiments, and the philosophy of the chemists upon a few repeated experiments of the furnace, &c. But to form a general philosophy upon a few experiments, must needs. appear a childish attempt, to those who consider the variety and extent of nature, and the treacherous, faulty, or rash propensity of the mind, in reasoning from them.

Superstitious philosophies are those where matters of faith and religion are worked up with those of reason and sense, which makes fantastical philosophies and heretical religions. Thus the philosophy of Pythagoras was clogged with gross superstition, and that of Plato with one more dangerous; and thus, of later date, a variety of theories have been given of the earth, from the first book of Genesis, which has had the

VOL. II.

fate to be differentlys explained,uandaworked up into opposite systems, according to the different fancies of men, or the prevailing philosophies of the times. And thus it appears, that scarce any one has had thoughts of deriving a pure and perfect philosophy from nature, that should be a true model of the world, without any more mixture of logic, mathematics, chemistry, magnetics, &c. than may be found in nature.

In the next place are shewn some particular ways which the mind has of abusing itself, by forming wrong notions of the things that are seen and considered. Thus upon seeing the changes wrought in bodies by the mechanic arts, in the way of combination and resolution, men are apt to imagine that nature makes use of the same expedients in compounding and separating bodies, whence seem to have sprung the delusory and imperfect notions of the four common elements, as if all bodies were compounded of, and resolved into these; hence those called the che mical principles, &c. And thus from seeing mechanics work with the ruler and compass, seems to have arisen the crude and imperfect notion that nature operates geometrically, &c. But these, and the like notions, being superficial and erroneous, cannot be admitted into philosophy, without corrupting it. The same is to be understood of logical, mathematical, and metaphysical

notions, rashly introduced and mixed with such as are physical. pribicons, „a moto

But

to Again, the mind is apt to run into two contrary extremes, so as either to be very positive and dogmatical, or else extremely loose and sceptical in philosophy. Thus Aristotle deter mining to cut off all future occasion of doubting, called up questions, and resolved them, to shew that all was now settled and determined. Pyrrho and his followers doubted of every thing. And in this manner men commonly either stop short too soon, and fancy that enough is known already, or continue fluctuating in uncertainties, or else turn aside to amusement, instead of endeavouring to procure an active and serviceable philosophy. And unless these perverse habits be corrected, no pure philosophy can be obtained.

-But instead of endeavouring to correct these ill habits of the mind, men have the talent to confirm and strengthen them, by corrupt and perverted kinds of proofs and demonstrations, which are generally used instead of the true. For logical demonstrations wrest the works of nature, to make them square with the thoughts of men, whereas the thoughts of men ought to be submitted and formed according to the works of nature, so that logical demonstrations, applied to