physical matters, are only the play of words, or at best deceitful and incompatible. For the unassisted senses are incompetent, notions are ill formed from their reports, the principles of the sciences can never be justly inferred from a number of instances produced only on one side; and the present method of arguing from principles, is erroneous and inconclusive.

The best method of demonstration is shewn to be the demonstration by experience, provided we do not rashly endeavour to judge of other things from it, but proceed therein with great circumspection, and rigorous exactness; which method having been little observed, no wonder if true philosophy be but little advanced.

The fourth section proceeds to shew by what signs or marks false theories and philosophies may be discovered, so as to prevent the mind from being imposed upon. And here it is made appear, that the philosophy in vogue over Europe, is principally the superficial, professorial, disputatious, and sophistical philosophy of the Greeks, and chiefly of Aristotle, a philosophy which, however it may have spread, is little more than logical or verbal, that does not convey such directions as may enable us to perform any thing considerable for the advantage and accommodation of life. And again, it is shewn

that the Greeks were masters of little knowledge, especially with regard to the basis and matter of all other knowledge, natural philosophy.

And here the surest sign whereby to judge of any philosophy, is shewn to be by its fruits or usefulness, in supplying the necessities of mankind, and improving the practical arts whereon the accommodations of life principally depend. But the Greek philosophy having yielded none of these fruits, it is to be accounted barren. And the same judgment is to be made of the chemical and magical philosophies, neither of which have enlarged the human power, in any tolerable proportion to their high pretensions. We are not, therefore, to form a judgment of any philosophy from its show and appearance; the greatness of its authors; the antiquity of its origin; the multitude of its admirers; the reputation it has gained among learned men; nor even from general consent itself; but principally from its use, or the tendency it has to improve the mind, enlarge the human powers, and give us a command over nature.

The fifth section is designed to shew the reasons why the philosophers of all ages have fallen into errors, and made so little real improvement in the business of philosophy. These reasons amount to this, (1.) That when a true estimate is made, there has, through the several ages of

the world, been very little time well suited to the cultivation of natural philosophy, which, as must be well remembered is the foundation of all philosophical knowledge, or the true matter whereof the sciences should be formed: (2.) that during the times best suited to the study of natural philosophy, little labour has been bestowed thereon; the men of genius and learning having chiefly applied themselves to morality, civil policy, and religion: (3.) that scarce any single person ever applied himself entirely to the study of natural philosophy, which having been al ways looked upon as a kind of secondary thing, was only consulted occasionally, and, in a perverted manner, made subservient to physic, mathematics, &c. (4.) That the true end of philosophy has been entirely mistaken, which is to enrich and ennoble human life with useful inventions, new arts, and new powers; whereas philosophers, as they are called, have had views to the raising of sects, aggrandizing their own names, gaining a dominion over men's minds, or some such inferior and pernicious ends. (5.) That wrong ways have been chose for advancing philosophy; and argument used instead of experiment; reasoning and speculation, instead of close observation and genuine induction and the true method of raising fruitful axioms, and discovering works worthy of mankind, entirely

neglected. (6.) That a few ancient philosophers have been obstinately and perversely admired, or almost adored, as men of supernatural abilities, to the shameful neglect of improving the human power: whereas the ancients, living in the younger days of the world, were in many points of experience and knowledge inferior to the moderns. (7.) That a false imagination, as if men were possessed of many excellent arts and perfect sciences, has fatally hindered the improvement of philosophy; whereas the arts and sciences, at present in use, are, in reality, but few and weak, in comparison of what may be discovered by the light of axioms. (8.) That much craft and a kind of imposture has been generally used, to make the sciences appear more perfect and compleat than they are; whereby many have been deluded. (9.) That much vanity has been shewn by some modern authors, in boasting themselves, and making great promises of delivering extraordinary things for the advantage of mankind; but shamefully failing in the performance, sober men have hence taken a distaste, and too obstinately believed other practicable things, to be of the same stamp. (9.) That men have generally neglected to propose themselves noble and suitable tasks for the improvement of philosophy; and instead thereof, have indolently determined many sober and ra

tional things to be mere impossibilities, sorber yond the reach of art; at the same time greatlyover-valuing slender performances. (10.) That religious zeal, bigotry, and superstition, and the school divinity, have, through several ages, been yery unfavourable to the improvement of natural philosophy, and checked its progress. (11.) That the common schools, universities, colleges, and societies of learned men, have also generally opposed all new and considerable improvements in knowledge. (12.) That no sufficient rewards have heen allowed for inventors and improvers. And, lastly, that sedate and sober men have indulged an untimely despair, or entertained a belief that no farther Improvements can be made in philosophy. So that under all these obstacles and discouragements, it is no wonder if very little true philosophy has appeared in the world.

The sixth section, of the first part of the Novum Organum, tends to raise the mind from the languor it may have been thrown into, by the melancholy prospect of the former section, and sets before us in a native light, what solid reasons there are to expect, that, notwithstanding the obstacles and discouragements above enumerated, a genuine philosophy may be set on foot; and, if men will not remain wanting to themselves, be brought to perfection, and afford