Grammar in Early Twentieth-Century PhilosophyRichard Gaskin Routledge, 15.04.2013 - 272 Seiten This book is a systematic and historical exploration of the philosophical significance of grammar. In the first half of the twentieth century, and in particular in the writings of Frege, Husserl, Russell, Carnap and Wittgenstein, there was sustained philosophical reflection on the nature of grammar, and on the relevance of grammar to metaphysics, logic and science. |
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... Carnapian intension of 'green' – that is, acquainted with the mapping from possible worlds and times to sets of objects – but ignorant of the meaning of 'green', in the sense that he would have no inkling of what all these objects had ...
... Carnapian intension of 'green' – that is, acquainted with the mapping from possible worlds and times to sets of objects – but ignorant of the meaning of 'green', in the sense that he would have no inkling of what all these objects had ...
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... Carnapian intension of 'green' is constituted by knowledge of the membership condition of this intension (which is a set, comprising ordered pairs of world/time pairs and objects), an achievement which, as I argued in the last paragraph ...
... Carnapian intension of 'green' is constituted by knowledge of the membership condition of this intension (which is a set, comprising ordered pairs of world/time pairs and objects), an achievement which, as I argued in the last paragraph ...
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... Carnapian intension in different ways (e.g. 'groundhog' and 'woodchuck'). The sentences 'Groundhogs are F' and 'Woodchucks are F' express the same propositions at the level of reference (are correlated with the same Carnapian intension) ...
... Carnapian intension in different ways (e.g. 'groundhog' and 'woodchuck'). The sentences 'Groundhogs are F' and 'Woodchucks are F' express the same propositions at the level of reference (are correlated with the same Carnapian intension) ...
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... (Carnapian intensions): though they are materially equivalent in the actual world, they are not so in other possible worlds. 25. Cf. Lewis 1983: §III. Lewis employs a more general notion of Carnapian intension than I do, as comprising ...
... (Carnapian intensions): though they are materially equivalent in the actual world, they are not so in other possible worlds. 25. Cf. Lewis 1983: §III. Lewis employs a more general notion of Carnapian intension than I do, as comprising ...
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... intension'. For me these phrase markers are linguistic representations of meanings (Russellian propositions) and not ... Carnap 1998: §159. 33. With the proviso noted above (n. 20). 34. According to a well-known argument, deriving from ...
... intension'. For me these phrase markers are linguistic representations of meanings (Russellian propositions) and not ... Carnap 1998: §159. 33. With the proviso noted above (n. 20). 34. According to a well-known argument, deriving from ...
Inhalt
Frege and the grammar of truth | |
Husserls tactics of meaning | |
Logical form general sentences and Russells path to On Denoting | |
Grammar ontology and truth in Russell and Bradley | |
A few more remarks on logical form | |
Logical syntax in the Tractatus | |
Wittgenstein on grammar meaning and essence | |
Nonsense and necessity in Wittgensteins mature philosophy | |
Carnaps logical syntax | |
Heidegger and the grammar of being | |
Index | |
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Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
accept acquainted analysis analytic analytic philosophy argued argument arithmetical atomic sentences Begriffsschrift Bertrand Russell Bradley Cambridge Candlish Carnap Carnapian intension categorial grammar claim complex concept-word conceptual content constituents corresponding declarative sentence definite descriptions denoting concepts denoting phrases distinction Dummett entities essence example fact factual content false formal Frege Fregean Geach given Gödel’s grammatical form grammatical subject green Heidegger hence Husserl Hylton intersubstitutability language system level of reference linguistic logical form logical subject logical syntax meaning meaningful Meinong metaphysics Moorean Russell negation nonsense notion noun phrase objects ostensive definitions Oxford Philosophy predicate proper names propositional functions quantifier phrases question reality reject relation rules Russell holds Russell’s Russellian propositions semantic sense sense and reference singular term Socrates speak surface form symbol syntactic theory of denoting theory of descriptions Theory of Types things thought Tractatus transparency thesis true truth truth-value understanding University Press verb Wittgenstein words