Grammar in Early Twentieth-Century PhilosophyRichard Gaskin Routledge, 15.04.2013 - 272 Seiten This book is a systematic and historical exploration of the philosophical significance of grammar. In the first half of the twentieth century, and in particular in the writings of Frege, Husserl, Russell, Carnap and Wittgenstein, there was sustained philosophical reflection on the nature of grammar, and on the relevance of grammar to metaphysics, logic and science. |
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... theory of meaning for the language in question will specify as what an understander needs to think of, and what it suffices for him to think of, in order to count as understanding the expression (or, to put it ... concept-word (Begriffswort)
... theory of meaning for the language in question will specify as what an understander needs to think of, and what it suffices for him to think of, in order to count as understanding the expression (or, to put it ... concept-word (Begriffswort)
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... concept-word ↓ referent of concept-word, i.e. object21 falling concept (Begriff)→ under the concept I have already remarked that Frege's reason for taking truth-values to be the referents of declarative sentences is inconclusive: as ...
... concept-word ↓ referent of concept-word, i.e. object21 falling concept (Begriff)→ under the concept I have already remarked that Frege's reason for taking truth-values to be the referents of declarative sentences is inconclusive: as ...
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... conceptwords with their so-called Carnapian intensions, i.e. with functions from possible worlds and times to sets of objects, 25 such that the function keyed to a given concept-word maps each world/time pair to the set of objects ...
... conceptwords with their so-called Carnapian intensions, i.e. with functions from possible worlds and times to sets of objects, 25 such that the function keyed to a given concept-word maps each world/time pair to the set of objects ...
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... concept-word has no referent at all: it does not show that, where concept-words are satisfied by one or more objects, those objects cannot be the referent of the relevant words. We might satisfy Frege's demand that scientifically useful ...
... concept-word has no referent at all: it does not show that, where concept-words are satisfied by one or more objects, those objects cannot be the referent of the relevant words. We might satisfy Frege's demand that scientifically useful ...
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... concept-word with just the objects which satisfy it, we identify that referent with the set of such objects. The move from the concrete (at least in the case of objects satisfying concept-words like 'green') to the abstract obviates the ...
... concept-word with just the objects which satisfy it, we identify that referent with the set of such objects. The move from the concrete (at least in the case of objects satisfying concept-words like 'green') to the abstract obviates the ...
Inhalt
Frege and the grammar of truth | |
Husserls tactics of meaning | |
Logical form general sentences and Russells path to On Denoting | |
Grammar ontology and truth in Russell and Bradley | |
A few more remarks on logical form | |
Logical syntax in the Tractatus | |
Wittgenstein on grammar meaning and essence | |
Nonsense and necessity in Wittgensteins mature philosophy | |
Carnaps logical syntax | |
Heidegger and the grammar of being | |
Index | |
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Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
accept acquainted analysis analytic analytic philosophy argued argument arithmetical atomic sentences Begriffsschrift Bertrand Russell Bradley Cambridge Candlish Carnap Carnapian intension categorial grammar claim complex concept-word conceptual content constituents corresponding declarative sentence definite descriptions denoting concepts denoting phrases distinction Dummett entities essence example fact factual content false formal Frege Fregean Geach given Gödel’s grammatical form grammatical subject green Heidegger hence Husserl Hylton intersubstitutability language system level of reference linguistic logical form logical subject logical syntax meaning meaningful Meinong metaphysics Moorean Russell negation nonsense notion noun phrase objects ostensive definitions Oxford Philosophy predicate proper names propositional functions quantifier phrases question reality reject relation rules Russell holds Russell’s Russellian propositions semantic sense sense and reference singular term Socrates speak surface form symbol syntactic theory of denoting theory of descriptions Theory of Types things thought Tractatus transparency thesis true truth truth-value understanding University Press verb Wittgenstein words