Grammar in Early Twentieth-Century PhilosophyRichard Gaskin Routledge, 15.04.2013 - 272 Seiten This book is a systematic and historical exploration of the philosophical significance of grammar. In the first half of the twentieth century, and in particular in the writings of Frege, Husserl, Russell, Carnap and Wittgenstein, there was sustained philosophical reflection on the nature of grammar, and on the relevance of grammar to metaphysics, logic and science. |
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... true or false proposition, or can be counted as one, I call a term.... A man, a moment, a number, a class, a relation, a chimaera, or anything else that can be mentioned, is sure to be a term. (1903: 43) Russell's 1903 treatment of ...
... true or false proposition, or can be counted as one, I call a term.... A man, a moment, a number, a class, a relation, a chimaera, or anything else that can be mentioned, is sure to be a term. (1903: 43) Russell's 1903 treatment of ...
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... true propositions, 5 we will receive different answers depending on whether we adopt a Russellian or a Fregean position: a Russellian identifies facts with true Russellian propositions, which are denizens of the world, or at least ...
... true propositions, 5 we will receive different answers depending on whether we adopt a Russellian or a Fregean position: a Russellian identifies facts with true Russellian propositions, which are denizens of the world, or at least ...
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... true Thoughts – make up the world, the only world there is. McDowell reaches this position by starting from the truism that the sort of thing one can think (e.g. that Spring has begun) is the sort of thing that can be the case (1994: 27) ...
... true Thoughts – make up the world, the only world there is. McDowell reaches this position by starting from the truism that the sort of thing one can think (e.g. that Spring has begun) is the sort of thing that can be the case (1994: 27) ...
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... (true and false) – exclusively to the level of sense. Now in the context of a distinction between sense and reference for names and predicates, this feature of the neo-Fregean economy cannot be justified. If objects and properties can be ...
... (true and false) – exclusively to the level of sense. Now in the context of a distinction between sense and reference for names and predicates, this feature of the neo-Fregean economy cannot be justified. If objects and properties can be ...
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... former. Declarative sentences and purportedly co-referential names belonging to a different semantic category (e.g. 'the True', or 'that proposition') will fail to intersubstitute (salva congruitate, and so a fortiori salva veritate) for.
... former. Declarative sentences and purportedly co-referential names belonging to a different semantic category (e.g. 'the True', or 'that proposition') will fail to intersubstitute (salva congruitate, and so a fortiori salva veritate) for.
Inhalt
Frege and the grammar of truth | |
Husserls tactics of meaning | |
Logical form general sentences and Russells path to On Denoting | |
Grammar ontology and truth in Russell and Bradley | |
A few more remarks on logical form | |
Logical syntax in the Tractatus | |
Wittgenstein on grammar meaning and essence | |
Nonsense and necessity in Wittgensteins mature philosophy | |
Carnaps logical syntax | |
Heidegger and the grammar of being | |
Index | |
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Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
accept acquainted analysis analytic analytic philosophy argued argument arithmetical atomic sentences Begriffsschrift Bertrand Russell Bradley Cambridge Candlish Carnap Carnapian intension categorial grammar claim complex concept-word conceptual content constituents corresponding declarative sentence definite descriptions denoting concepts denoting phrases distinction Dummett entities essence example fact factual content false formal Frege Fregean Geach given Gödel’s grammatical form grammatical subject green Heidegger hence Husserl Hylton intersubstitutability language system level of reference linguistic logical form logical subject logical syntax meaning meaningful Meinong metaphysics Moorean Russell negation nonsense notion noun phrase objects ostensive definitions Oxford Philosophy predicate proper names propositional functions quantifier phrases question reality reject relation rules Russell holds Russell’s Russellian propositions semantic sense sense and reference singular term Socrates speak surface form symbol syntactic theory of denoting theory of descriptions Theory of Types things thought Tractatus transparency thesis true truth truth-value understanding University Press verb Wittgenstein words