69 CHAPTER VIII. NOUNS. 72. A noun is the name of anything. The word noun is derived from the Latin nomen, which means 'a name.' No sentence can be formed without a noun, or something equivalent to a noun, expressed or implied, and a verb, also expressed or implied. 'Birds fly,' 'Politicians wrangled,' are examples of the simplest form of sentence. Each contains a noun which indicates the thing about which the statement is made, and a verb by means of which we make the statement. The word verb is derived from the Latin verbum, 'a word,'—the word without which the sentence would collapse. But to discuss whether noun or verb is the more essential to a sentence seems as useless as it would be to inquire which of the two blades in a pair of scissors does more of the cutting. Sometimes, no doubt, it looks as if we could have a sentence without a noun or without a verb. When I say 'Go,' the sense is clear. But the noun, or rather its substitute the pronoun, is understood, and in giving an analysis of the sentence we should supply it and say that the subject is You and the predicate go. And in older English it was often so supplied, and people said 'Go thou.' Again, if I ask 'Who told you this?' and you answer 'Jones,' the verb is understood, and the full expression would be 'Jones told me this,' or 'Jones did.' Thus these forms of expression are only apparently exceptions to the statement that every sentence contains noun and verb. They are elliptical expressions; a word is omitted which is required to complete the grammatical structure of the sentence, but though omitted it is understood. 73. The definition of a noun suggests a few remarks. I. Guard against the not uncommon blunder of confusing the noun and the thing. The noun is the name of the thing. The paper on which this book is printed is a thing, not a noun: the word paper is a noun. 2. Bear in mind that the word 'thing' is here used to denote all objects of thought, whether these objects of thought be things with life or without it, material or immaterial, real or imaginary. In the language of our definition, every object that we can think about, whether it have an existence or not, is a thing, and the name of such a thing is a noun. Charles, negro, Rome, city, angel, ghost, dragon, point, zero, infinity, nothing, are nouns, for they are names of objects of thought, i.e. of things about which we can think. 3. The objection may be raised,--Are not some of the pronouns names of things too? If so, why should we place them in a separatė class? If Brown says 'I broke the window,' is not I the name of the thing about which the assertion is made, just as much as Brown or the boy is, when we say 'Brown broke the window,' or 'The boy broke the window'? And in this criticism there is some force. But these pronouns differ in so important a characteristic from the words which are commonly called nouns, that they deserve to rank as a separate part of speech, although, as their name implies, they are used instead of nouns. For when we say 'The boy broke the window,' the term boy brings up to our minds a certain uniform conception; we know what we mean by a 'boy.' But if Brown says 'I broke the window,' and Brown's companion Smith says 'I jogged his elbow,' and the master says 'I shall make you pay for it between you,' I changes its meaning in the mouth of each speaker. When Brown and Smith are talking together, Brown calls himself I and Smith you, while Smith calls Brown you and himself I. But Brown and Smith are always boys, and the master is always a master, no matter who it is that uses the words. 4. This further criticism may be made on the definition, that adjectives are, at any rate sometimes, names of things; that black is the name of all black objects,—horses, ink, marble, etc.—round the name of all round objects,—the moon, a cricket-ball, a wheel, a watch-glass, etc., so that when I say 'The moon is round,' round is a name of the moon. To this objection the answer may be given that in such cases the a round adjective qualifies a noun which is understood. When I say 'The moon is round,' I mean 'The moon is a round moon' or thing.' Moreover it is only when the adjective is used as a part of the predicate that this ellipsis of the noun is possible. As the subject of a sentence the adjective cannot stand alone. I cannot say 'Round rotates on its axis,' but must say 'A round object rotates on its axis.' In any case it is the noun which is the name of the thing: the adjective marks merely a quality of the thing. 74. Proper. Different classes of nouns.-Common and Compare the words river and Henry. What important difference is there between them? Not this, as is sometimes said, that river can be applied to an indefinite number of objects and Henry to only one, for Henry can be applied to an indefinite number of objects also: eight Henrys sat on the throne of England. The difference lies in the fact that, when we use the word river, it has for us a certain uniform sense. The word suggests to our minds the conception of flowing water, banks, source, outfall, and so forth. If we found a piece of water in a park and were inclined at first sight to call it a river, but afterwards discovered that it contained neither inlet nor outlet and that we could walk all round it, we should say 'This is not a river; this is a lake.' The word river has a meaning, and its meaning does not suit a stagnant sheet of water. But a person called 'Henry' might equally well have been called 'John,' for the name 'Henry' has no meaning. We say that the Thames is a 'river,' because it has certain qualities which the word river suggests to our minds. But 'Henry' is merely a mark, arbitrarily set upon a person to distinguish him from other people. Any other mark would have done just as well. And for one reason or another such marks or names are often changed. Thus, Sir Robert Walpole became Earl of Orford. During the greater part of his life he was known by the mark Walpole: for the last few years he was known by the mark Orford. Walpole and Orford are names without meaning, so if we once know to whom they are to be attached as marks, it makes no difference which name we choose for the purpose. If a football club changes its colours, the team is indicated by a new mark. When Walpole became Orford he was indicated by a new mark. But if we called a river an 'elephant' or a 'bedstead,' we should talk nonsense, because these words are not merely marks but contain meanings, and their meanings in no wise correspond with the qualities presented by a river. Once upon a time, no doubt, people's names had a meaning and were bestowed upon them because people possessed certain qualities. The original Redhead may have got his name from the colour of his hair, the original Tomson from the circumstance that he was the son of Tom. But Redhead's posterity perpetuate the name, though they may be black-haired boys or baldheaded men, and a Tomson of to-day may have taken the name to enable him to receive a legacy, though his name was formerly Robinson. This important distinction is expressed in grammar by the words Common and Proper. A common noun is applied to a number of things because they are alike, or possess some quality in common, whereas a proper noun, though it may be applied to several objects, is not applied to these objects because they are alike or possess any quality in common. There are some nouns which contain a meaning but are applicable to only one thing. Such nouns we call Singular. In the mouth of a Christian or of a Jew, the name God is a Singular noun, for Christians and Jews recognise only one God. Whiteness is a Singular name, for although the quality which we call 'whiteness' is found in many objects, the quality is one and the same. Several nouns present the peculiarity of being sometimes Singular and sometimes Common. If I say 'Space is infinite,' 'Time flies,' the nouns are Singular: if I say 'This space is larger than that,' 'I have seen him several times,' they are Common. The reader will perceive on reflexion that Proper names are really a special class of Singular names. When we make use of a Proper name, we apply it to some particular individual only. But Singular nouns with a meaning are few and hard to find in any language, whilst meaningless Singular nouns are many, and they meet us at every turn. Hence it is that, in a classification of Nouns for the purposes of Grammar, we usually distinguish between Common and Proper nouns, and not between Common and Singular nouns, of which latter kind Proper nouns are a sub-class. We may define these three classes of nouns thus: A Common Noun is one which can be applied to an indefinite number of things in the same sense. A Singular Noun is one which cannot be applied to more than one thing in the same sense. A Proper Noun is a singular name assigned to an individual as a mere distinguishing mark. 75. We may notice that (1) Proper Nouns are sometimes used as Common Nouns, and (2) Common nouns are sometimes used as Singular nouns, that is, as names possessing a meaning, but applicable to only one individual. (1) Proper nouns become common in two ways: (a) When they indicate a class resembling the individual denoted by the proper name. 'A village Hampden' means a village patriot: of an ill-tempered woman we may say 'She is a regular Xanthippe:' we may speak of promising young cricketers as 'youthful Graces.' When parsing words thus employed, describe them as proper nouns used as if common. Note however that when |