far has been nothing else but an attempt to illustrate those separate aspects of moral action of which we for the most part think when we speak of conscience.

Avoiding this kind of way of looking at the subject for the present, we must be careful, in respect of this imperative 'Thou shalt,' to avoid an exaggeration. We must not be understood to assert that it is always and everywhere and in every man felt to have equal force. It may often be a very insignificant phenomenon, may so far as our judgment of moral content goes even be an unmoral something by which, however, even in the abandoned, or in those still very imperfect, there dawns a presentiment of the majesty of the moral law in distinction from those other powers-even that of custom-which bind him the most strongly. There can, on the other hand, be a highly developed social custom of wide prevalence without the single individuals on whom it has influence experiencing the absolute demand which the 'good' makes on them. It is plain that "Thou shalt cannot with like ease connect itself with any content; absolute law in the strictest sense can only be that which is of universal application for individuals under all circumstances of life, and still more for collective mankind. would be easy to work out the idea that between the two main lines of the moral life, that is to say of self-discipline and benevolence, and the form of absolute law an inner affinity subsists; that with progress in respect to that content this form of the moral law comes into continually clearer consciousness; but that it is only in union with the highest content that 'Thou shalt' becomes perfectly intelligible, or, in terms of Christianity, that it is in conversion that it is truly realised.

It

All those main points of view of moral good, from which its nature is plain, have been treated as simply as possible, and perhaps become still plainer when attention is drawn to the fact that these aspects are often not at all explicitly distinguished. And the reason of this is that, as a matter of fact, they stand partly in an inner relationship to each other. Prominence has already been given to the statement that 'norms and even motives' in respect of their ascertained content can easily be deduced from ends.' The norm, however,

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so far as there is bound up with it the sense of obligation, stands in closer relation to the command, Thou shalt'; and it cannot be gainsaid that personal subjection to an absolute law is the highest moral spring of action. Other questions having more immediate reference to motives may for the time being be set aside-such as that whether motives become active through special emotions, or by realisation of ideas of value, and in particular how both these springs of action may be interconnected; and again how far motives must be, or rather can be, both impulse to, and power for, moral action. But while these internal relations between the various chief points of view and their closer definition have justice done to them in the course of our examination, it is a source of endless confusion when they are not, so far as practicable, plainly distinguished at the outset as we have above attempted to do. In particular, it is only possible when these are thus presented to test each ethical view as a whole, and to see whether and how far it does justice to those points of view which are determining factors in our knowledge of ethics. For if these have not all a like claim to consideration, at any rate reasons ought to be given for leaving them out of account. Instead of this, "new outlines of a morality of the future" are appearing which plainly show that their authors have no suspicion of the fulness of these at least possible points of view.

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All so far established has reference to the fundamental concepts which throw light on the nature of ethics. We add to our notice of this raw material of concepts just for the sake of completion the following, with a view to later necessary discussion. The much-used expressions, empirical,' 'intuitive' (idealistic) ethics, relate to the origin of morals. The first of these seeks that origin in the experience of the individual, and especially in that of nations; the second does not necessarily deny the value of experience, but lays stress on the view that, in the last resort, we must assume the existence of an original moral faculty in men. Two other terms, autonomous' and 'heteronomous' ethics, relate to the basis on which the validity of ethics rests. The first affirms that this basis is in the human will itself; the second, that it is in something external, whether

in God, or in some other authority in life, such as the Family, the State, the Church, or the like. For the present it is enough to ask whether this antithesis is not comprehended in a higher unity. The Christian conception of morals plainly points to this. Of course, the view taken of origin and validity depends on that of the nature of ethics. Finally, there are those who speak of the principle of ethics, and by this is meant that which is the decisive thought in any intuition of the Goodthe Christian idea, for instance, or the Buddhist. But it is not for the most part made clear by some under which of the abovenamed points of view this decisive thought is contemplated, whether, i.e., under that of the highest end, motive, rule, or under that of the imperative 'ought,' or, as the subject really requires, under all these points of view. This want of perspicuity veils the weak spot in any particular form of ethics, and silence is maintained on it-for instance, on such a point as to the motives of good action. For, as Schopenhauer says, "how does any assertion about the Good help us if we cannot show how it becomes operative?'

We may conclude our discussion of fundamental concepts by an appeal to actual life. These notions gain colour if we grasp the moral process in an event in which this process presents itself to us most immediately and personally, such as the effect on our own personality of morally exalted persons. What is it that we experience when we come into contact with a will ruling over its natural impulses and strong enough to dominate us? which ministers to us of its goodness and serves the world and time because devoted to the service of the Eternal? We are at once in a special manner humbled and exalted as we stand face to face even with a stranger in whom we seem yet to get a glimpse of our true nature, and are confronted with the question whether we ourselves are now willing what and how we ought to will. This experience, which makes the life of the poorest rich, and without which the richest are poor, we have attempted in these formulæ to bring in a preliminary way to the simplest possible expression.

Still, one net gain of these general explanations must be insisted on. However much they still consistently stand in

need of closer definition, they have certainly advanced us further than that conception of moral action according to which it is merely reasonable action, the action of reason on nature, which is Schleiermacher's view. In fact, this does not mark out the sphere of morals but of civilisation, the conquest of nature whether for the ends of practical life or in the intellectual region of science and art. We who live to-day have been more urgently compelled than earlier generations to recognise that the advance of civilisation is far from being coterminous with the progress of the Good in the world; nay, that very much indeed that has the most incontrovertible claim to the great name of the Good can only maintain itself in antagonism to an immorally shaped civilisation-one of the hardest tasks of Christian ethics. Civilisation and morals must be sharply differentiated at the outset—and this quite apart from the fact that in such an idea of ethics it cannot be made at all clear in what respect moral action differs from other mental activities. With this conviction another closely coheres: that, if we are to be content to consider the will as a peculiar faculty which arises in the self-development of our life, and not closely investigate the meaning of the obligation Thou shalt,' ethics cannot attain its proper dignity.

CHAPTER II.

OPPONENTS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

We started with the thought that it is indispensably necessary to compare critically and contrast the systems of our opponents. In order to become acquainted with them all accurately we should be obliged to take into consideration the whole of those fundamental concepts noted in giving some provisional account of ethics. We should be obliged to ask our opponents to define End, Motive, Rule, as well as how they understand the moral imperative 'ought,' whether they assign it any value, and to what extent. We must likewise hear what their opinion is of the origin and value of morals. Such a procedure would bring to light the immense variety of answers given to the question: What is the Good? The knowledge which would in this way be elicited whether these fundamental concepts are closely connected with each other, and in what way, would be particularly instructive. Irrespective of the minuteness of this procedure, it would, however, not clearly bring out the positions of the most important of the opponents. Still, from which of the many once more mentioned points of view are we to commence our short review? The moral imperative 'ought' seems the most natural starting-point. But opponents often boast of their advantage in being able to state the goal of Christian action with more clearness than Christian ethics. Besides, on the question of norms or rules-on that which 'ought' to be done-there is less dispute; for at any rate all alike consider benevolence towards others and the conquest of