3

certainty belonging to the deductions of Moral Philosophy,' and the conclusions of Mathematics; and to speculate upon the causes of this difference. Metaphysics, of course, claimed his regard; but he was led to believe, that as yet the very threshold of the science had not been passed. An examination of the different philosophical systems, and particularly of the jejune Dogmatism of Wolf, led him to question whether, antecedently to any attempt at Dogmatic philosophy, it might not be necessary to investigate the possibility of philosophical knowledge, and he concluded that to this end an inquiry into the different sources of information,2 and a critical examination of their origin and employment, were necessary; in which respect he proposed to complete the task undertaken by Locke. He laid down, in the first place, that Moral Philosophy and Mathematics are, in their origin, intellectual sciences. Intellectual knowledge is distinguished from experimental by its qualities of necessity and universality. On the possibility of intellectual knowledge depends that of the philosophical sciences. These are either synthetic or analytic; the latter of which methods is dependent on the first.5 What then is the principle of synthetical a priori knowledge in contradistinction to experimental; which is founded on observation? The existence of a priori knowledge is deducible from the mathematics, as well as from the testimony of common sense ;6 and it is with such knowledge that metaphysics are chiefly conversant. A science, therefore, which may investigate with strictness the possibility of such knowledge, and the principles of its employment and application, is necessary for the direction of the human mind, and of the highest practical utility. Kant pursued this course of inquiry, tracing a broad line of dis tinction between the provinces of Moral Philosophy and the Mathematics, and investigating more completely than had yet been done, the faculty of

1 "Moral Philosophy;" Philosophie. Thrice in this §.

.6

2 "Information;" Erkenntnisse. The version is incorrect; even Knowledge does not adequately express the original, both because it is not also plural, and because it is of a less emphatically subjective signification. Cognitions would be the best translation, could we venture also on the verb cognize as a version of Erkennen.

3 “Intellectual sciences;” rationale oder Vernunft-Wissenchaften. Intellectus or Intellekt is, in the language of German philosophers, synonymous with Verstand, Understanding. The translator, therefore, here renders, as he usually does, one term of the antithesis by the other. The same capital error is repeated in the two following

sentences.

4 "Philosophical sciences;"-philosophische Erkenntnisse, philosophic knowledges or cognitions. This and the following errors would have been avoided by an acquaintance with the first elements of the critical philosophy.

.

5"The latter of which methods is dependent on the first." These few words contain two great mistakes. In the first place, there is no reference in the original to any synthetic and analytic methods, but to Kant's thrice celebrated distinction of synthetic and analytic cognitions or judgments, a distinction from which the critical philosophy departs. In the second, there is nothing to excuse the error that analytic cognitions are founded on synthetic. Analytic cognitions are said by Tennemann to rest on the primary law of thought, i. e. on the principle of contradiction. (See Critik d. r. V. p. 189, ets.)—The present is an example of the absurdity of translating this work without an explanatory amplification. The distinction of analytic and synthetic judgments is to the common reader wholly unintelligible from the context.

6 "Common sense." Kant was not the philosopher to appeal to common sense. Die gemeine Erkenntniss is common knowledge, in opposition to mathematical. (See Crit. d. r. V. Einl. § 5.)

2

knowledge.1 He remarked that synthetical a priori knowledge imparts a formal character to knowledge in general, and can only be grounded in laws affecting the Individual, and in the consciousness which he has of the harmony and unison of his faculties. He then proceeds to analyze the particulars of our knowledge, and discriminates between its elementary parts so often confounded in practice, with a view to ascertain the true nature of each species: the characteristics of necessity and universality which belong to a priori knowledge being his leading principles.

rr

Literal Translation, § 381.—“ Awakened by the skepticism of Hume, Kant directed his attention on the striking difference in the result of meditation in Mathematics and in Philosophy, and upon the causes of this difference. Metaphysic justly attracted his consideration, but he was convinced that its threshold had yet been hardly touched. Reflection, and a scrutiny of the various philosophical systems, especially of the shallow dogmatism of the Wolfian school, suggested to him the thought, that, previous to all dogmatical procedure in philosophy, it was necessary, first to investigate the possibility of a philosophical knowledge; and that to this end, an inquiry into the different sources of our knowledge-into its origin-and its employment (in other words, Criticism), was necessary. Thus did he propose to accomplish the work which had been commenced by Locke. Philosophy and mathematics, he presupposed to be, in respect of their origin, rational sciences, or sciences of reason. Rational knowledge is distinguished from empirical by its character of necessity and universality. With its possibility stands or falls the possibility of philosophical knowledge, which is of two kinds-synthetic and analytic. The latter rests on the fundamental law of thought; but what is the principle of synthetic knowledge a priori, as contrasted with empirical, of which perception is the source? That such knowledge exists, is guaranteed by the truth of mathematical, and even of common knowledge, and the effort of reason in metaphysic is mainly directed to its realization. There is therefore a science of the highest necessity and importance, which investigates, on principles, the possibility, the foundation, and the employment of such knowledge. Kant opened to himself the way to this inquiry, by taking a strict line of demarkation between philosophy and mathematics, and by a more profound research into the cognitive faculties than had hitherto been brought to bear; while his sagacity enabled him to divine, that synthetic knowledge a priori coincides with the form of our knowl edge, and can only be grounded in the laws of the several faculties which co-operate in the cognitive act. Then, in order fully to discover these forms of knowledge, according to the guiding principles of universality and necessity, he undertook a dissection of knowledge, and distinguished [in reflection] what in reality is only presented combined, for the behoof of scientific knowledge."

Johnson's Version, § 375.-. "The laws of ethics are superior to the empirical and determinable free-will which we enjoy in matters of practice, and assume an imperative character, occupying the chief place in practi

1 This sentence is inaccurately rendered, and not duly connected with the next.

2 This sentence is incomprehensible to all; but its absurdity can be duly appreciated only by those who know something of the Kantian philosophy.

3 The same observation is true of this sentence and of the following section, which we leave without note or comment.

cal philosophy. This categorical principle becomes an absolute law of universal obligation, giving to our conduct an ultimate end and spring of action; which is not to be considered as a passion or affection, but as a moral sense of respect for law."

Literal Translation, § 383.—. . . “The Moral Law, as opposed to an empirically determined volition, appears under the character of a Categorical Imperative, (absolute Ought [unconditional duty],) and takes its place at the very summit of practical philosophy. This imperative, as the universal rule of every rational will, prescribes with rigorous necessity an universal conformity to the law [of duty]; and thereby establishes the supreme absolute end and motive of conduct, which is not a pathological feeling [blind and mechanical], but a reverence for the law [of duty, rational and free]."

....

That Mr. Johnson makes no scruple of violating the good faith of a translator, is a serious accusation-but one unfortunately true. This, indeed, is principally shown, in the history of those philosophers whose speculations are unfavorable to revealed religion.-Speaking of Hume, Tennemann says:-"On the empirical principles of Locke, he investigated with a profoundly penetrating genius the nature of man as a thinking, and as an active being. This led him through a train of consequent reasoning to the skeptical result that, &c. . . . . . And in these investigations of Hume, philosophical skepticism appeared with a terrific force, profundity (Grundlichkeit), and logical consequence, such as had never previously been witnessed, and at the same time in a form of greater precision, perspicuity, and elegance." Thus rendered by Mr. Johnson:-"Taking the experimental principles of Locke as the foundation of his system, he deduced from them many acute but specious conclusions respecting the nature and condition of man, as a reasonable agent. He was led on by arguments, the fallacy of which is lost in their ingenuity, to the inference that, &c. The investigations of Hume were recommended, not only by a great appearance of logical argumentation, but by an elegance and propriety of diction, and by all those graces of style which he possessed in so eminent a degree, and which made his skepticism more dangerous than it deserved to be."-The same tampering with the text we noticed in the articles on Hobbes and Lord Herbert of Cherbury.-We hardly attribute to intention what Mr. Johnson says of Krug, that "he appears to add little to Kant, except a superior degree of obscurity." Krug is known to those versed in German philosophy, not only as a very acute, but as a very lucid writer. In his autobiography, we recollect, he enumerates perspicuity as the first of his three great errors as

an author; reverence for common sense, and contempt of cant, being the other two. Tennemann attributes to him "uncommon

clearness."

As a specimen of our translator's contemptuous vituperation of some illustrious thinkers, we shall quote his notes on Fichte and Schelling, of whose systems, it is almost needless to say, his translation proves him to have understood nothing.

After reversing in the text what Tennemann asserts of Fichte's unmerited persecution, we have the following note:-"It is painful to be the instrument of putting on record so much of nonsense and so much of blasphemy as is contained in the pretended philosophy of Fichte; the statement, however, will not be without its good, if the reader be led to reflect on the monstrous absurdities which men will believe at the suggestion of their own fancies, who have rejected the plain evidences of Christianity." [Fichte was, for his country and generation, an almost singularly pious Christian. He was even attacked by the theologians-for his orthodoxy.]-On Schelling's merits we have the following dignified decision:- "The grave remarks of the author on this absurd theory, might perhaps have been worthily replaced by the pithy criticism of Mr. Burchell, apud the Vicar of Wakefield, as applied to other absurdities, videlicet-Fudge-Fudge-Fudge."

But enough!—We now take our leave of Mr. Johnson, recommending to him a meditation on the excellent motto he has prefixed to his translation:-"Difficile est in philosophia pauca esse ei nota, cui non sint aut pleraque aut omnia."

IV.—LOGIC.

IN REFERENCE TO THE RECENT ENGLISH TREATISES ON THAT SCIENCE.1

(APRIL, 1833.)

1. Artis Logica Rudimenta, with Illustrative Observations on each Section. Fourth edition, with Additions. 12mo. Oxford: 1828.

2. Elements of Logic. By RICHARD WHATELY, D.D., Principal of St. Alban's Hall, and late Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. Third edition. 8vo. London: 1829.

3. Introduction to Logic, from Dr. Whately's Elements of Logic. By the Rev. SAMUEL HINDS, M.A., of Queen's College, and Vice-Principal of St. Alban's Hall, Oxford. 12mo. Oxford: 1827.

4. Outline of a New System of Logic, with a Critical Examination of Dr. Whately's "Elements of Logic," by GEORGE BENTHAM, Esq. 8vo. London: 1827.

5. An Examination of some Passages in Dr. Whately's Elements of Logic. By GEORGE CORNEWALL LEWIS, Esq., Student of Christ Church. 8vo. Oxford: 1829.

6. A Treatise on Logic on the Basis of Aldrich, with Illustrative Notes by the Rev. JOHN HUYSHE, M.A., Brazen-nose College, Oxford. 12mo. Second edition. Oxford: 1833. 7. Questions on Aldrich's Logic, with References to the most Popular Treatises. 12mo. Oxford: 1829.

8. Key to Questions on Aldrich's Logic. 12mo. Oxford: 1829. 9. Introduction to Logic. 12mo. Oxford: 1830. 10. Aristotle's Philosophy. (An article in Vol. iii. of the Seventh Edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica, now publishing.) By the Rev. RENN DICKSON HAMPDEN, M.A., late Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. 4to. Edinburgh: 1832.

1 [In French by M. Peisse; in Italian by S. Lo Gatto; in Cross's Selections.]