(B.) PHILOSOPHICAL TESTIMONIES TO THE LIMITATION OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, FROM THE LIMITATION OF OUR FACULTIES. THESE, which might be indefinitely multiplied, I shall arrange under three heads. I omit the Skeptics, adducing only specimens from the others. I. Testimonies to the general fact, that the highest knowledge is a consciousness of ignorance. There are two sorts of ignorance: we philosophize to escape ignorance, and the consummation of our philosophy is ignorance; we start from the one, we repose in the other; they are the goals from which, and to which, we tend: and the pursuit of knowledge is but a course between two ignorances, as human life is itself only a traveling from grave to grave. «Τίς βίος ; Εκ τύμβοιο θορών, επί τύμβον ὁδεύω.” The highest reach of human science is the scientific recognition of human ignorance; "Qui nescit ignorare, ignorat scire." This "learned ignorance" is the rational conviction by the human mind of its inability to transcend certain limits; it is the knowledge of ourselves-the science of man. This is accomplished by a demonstration of the disproportion between what is to be known, and our faculties of knowing-the disproportion, to wit, between the infinite and the finite. In fact, the recognition of human ignorance, is not only the one highest, but the one true, knowl edge; and its first fruit, as has been said, is humility. Simple nescience is not proud; consummated science is positively humble For this knowledge it is not, which "puffeth up;" but its oppc site, the conceit of false knowledge-the conceit, in truth, as the Apostle notices, of an ignorance of the very nature of knowledge. "Nam nesciens quid scire sit, Te scire cuncta jactitas." But as our knowledge stands to Ignorance, so stands it also to Doubt. Doubt is the beginning and the end of our efforts to know; for as it is true-"Alte dubitat qui altius credit," so it is likewise true-"Quo magis quærimus magis dubitamus." The grand result of human wisdom is thus only a consciousness that what we know is as nothing to what we know not ar ("Quantum est quod nescimus !")—an articulate confession, in fact, by our natural reason, of the truth declared in revelationthat "now we see through a glass, darkly." 1.—DEMOCRITUS (as reported by Aristotle, Cicero, Sextus Empiricus, &c.) :—" We know nothing in its cause [or on a conjectural reading-in truth]; for truth lies hid from us in depth and distance. 2.-SOCRATES (as we learn from Plato, Xenophon, Cicero, &c.), was declared by the Delphic oracle the wisest of the Greeks; and why? Because he taught that all human knowledge is but a qualified ignorance. 3.-ARISTOTLE. (Metaphysica, L. ii. c. 1).-"A theory of Truth, is partly easy, partly difficult. This is shown by the fact that no one has been wholly successful, and no one wholly unsuccessful, in its acquisition; but, while each has had some report to make concerning nature, though the contributions, severally considered, are of little or no avail, the whole together make up a considerable amount. And if so it be, we may apply the proverb—' Ŵho can miss the gate?' In this respect, a theory of Truth is easy. But our inability to compass some Whole and Part [or, to c. W. and P.] may evince the difficulty of the inquiry; (Tò d' ỗλov тi (or T') ἔχειν καὶ μέρος μὴ δύνασθαι, δηλοῖ τὸ χαλεπὸν αὐτῆς). As difficulty, however, arises in two ways; [in this case] its cause may lie, not in things [as the objects known], but in us [as the subjects knowing]. For as the eye of the bat holds to the light of day, so the intellect [vous, which is, as it were (Eth. Nic. i. 7) the eye] of our soul, holds to what in nature are of all most manifest."1 both 4.-PLINY. (Historia Naturalis, L. ii. c. 32.)—“ Omnia incerta ratione, et in naturæ majestate abdita." 5.—TERTULLIAN. (Adversus Hæreticos, N. iv.)—" Cedat curiositas fidei, cedat gloria saluti. Certe, aut non obstrepant, aut quiescant adversus regulam-Nihil scire omnia scire est."-(De Anima, c. 1.)-" Quis revelabit quod Deus texit? Unde scitandum? Quare ignorare tutissimum est. Præstat enim per Deum nescire quia non revelaverit, quam per hominem scire quia ipse præsumpserit." 66 1 In now translating this passage for a more general purpose, I am strongly impressed with the opinion, that Aristotle had in view the special doctrine of the Conditioned. For it is not easy to see what he could mean by saying, that we are unable to have [compass, realize the notions of] Whole and Part," or of “ some Whole and Part;" except to say, that we are unable to conceive (of space, or time, or degree) a whole, however large, which is not conceivable as the part of a still greater whole, or a part, however small, which we may not always conceive as a whole, divisible into parts. But this would be implicitly the enouncement of a full doctrine of the Conditioned. Be this however as it may, Aristotle's commentators have been wholly unable to reach, even by a probable conjecture, his meaning in the text. Alexander gives six or seven possible interpretations, but all nothing to the point; while the other expositors whom I have had patience to look into (as Averroes, Javellus, Fonseca, Suarez, Sonerus), either avoid the sentence altogether, or show that they, and the authorities whom they quote, had no glimpse of a satisfactory interpretation. I have been unable to find (on a hurried search) in the able and truly learned “Essay on the Metaphysics of Aristotle" by M. Ravaisson, a consideration of the passage. 6. ARNOBIUS. (Contra Gentes, L. ii.)-"Quæ nequeunt sciri, nescire nos confiteamur; neque ea vestigare curemus, quæ non posse comprehendi liquidissimum est." 7.-ST. AUGUSTIN. (Sermo xxvii. Benedictine Edition, vol. v.)— "Quæris tu rationem, ego expavesco altitudinem. ('O altitudo divitiarum sapientiæ et scientiæ Dei!) Tu ratiocinare, ego mirer; tu disputa, ego credam; altitudinem video, ad profundum non pervenio. Ille dicit, 'Inscrutabilia sunt judicia ejus:' et tu scrutari venisti? Ille dicit—' Ininvestigabiles sunt viæ ejus et tu investigare venisti? Si inscrutabilia scrutari venisti, et ininvestigabilia investigare venisti; crede jam peristi."-(Sermo xciii.)—" Quid inter nos agebatur? Tu dicebas, Intelligam, ut credam; ego dicebam, Ut intelligas, crede. Nata est controversia, veniamus ad judicem, judicet Propheta, immo vero Deus judicet per Prophetam. Ambo taceamus. Quid ambo dixerimus, auditum est. Intelligam, inquis, ut credam; Crede, inquam, ut intelligas. Respondeat Propheta: Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis.' [Isaiah vii. 9, according to the Seventy.]-(Sermo cxvii.)—" De Deo loquimur, quid mirum, si non comprehendis? Si enim comprehendis, non est Deus. Sit pia confessio ignorantiæ magis quam temeraria professio scientia. Adtingere aliquantum mente Deum, magna beatitudo est; comprehendere autem, omniño impossibile."1—(Sermo clxv.)—“ Ideo multi de isto profundo quærentes reddere rationem, in fabulas vanitatis abierunt." [Compare Sermo cxxvi. c. i.]—(Sermo cccii.)-" Confessio ignorantiæ, gradus est scientiæ."-(Epistola cxc. vol. ii.)" Quæ nullo sensu carnis explorari possunt, et a nostra experientia longe remota sunt, atque in abditissimis naturæ finibus latent, non erubescendum est homini confiteri se nescire quod nescit, ne dum se scire mentitur, nunquam scire mereatur."-(Epistola cxcvii.)" Magis eligo cautam ignorantiam confiteri, quam falsam scientiam profiteri." 8.-ST. CHRYSOSTOM. Nothing is wiser than ignorance in those matters, where they who proclaim that they know nothing, proclaim their paramount wisdom; while those who busy themselves therein, are the most senseless of mankind." 9.—THEODORET. (Therapeutica, &c., Curative of Greek Affections, Sermon 1.)—“The beginning of science is the science of nescience;" or "The principle of knowledge is the knowledge of ignorance." 10.-ST. PETER CHRYSOLOgue. summa scientiæ est." (Sermo li.)-"Nolle omnia scire, 11.—“THE ARABIAN SAGE" (I translate this and the two following from Drusius and Gale) :-" A man is wise while in pursuit of wisdom; a fool, when he thinks it to be mastered." 12.-A RABBI :- "The wiser a man, the more ignorant does he feel; as the Preacher has it [i. 18]—'To add science is to add sorrow.' 1 A century before Augustin, St. Cyprian had said :-"We can only justly conceive God in recognizing Him to be inconceivable." I can not, however, at the moment, refer to the passage except from memory. PP 13.-A RABBI :· "Who knows nothing, and thinks that he knows something, his ignorance is twofold."1 14.-PETRARCH. (De Contemptu Mundi, Dial. ii.)—" Excute pectus tuum acriter; invenies cuncta quæ nosti, si ad ignorata referantur, eam proportionem obtinere, quam, collatus oceano, rivulus æstivis siccandus ardoribus quamquam vel multa nosse, quid revelat ?” 15-CARDINAL DE CUSA. (Opera ed. 1565; De Docta Ignorantia, L. i. c. 3, p. 3.)—“ Quidditas ergo rerum, quæ est entium veritas, in suâ puritate inattingibilis est; et per omnes Philosophos investigata, sed per neminem, uti est, reperta; et quanto in hac ignorantia profundius docti fuerimus, tanto magis ad ipsam accedemus veritatem."—(Ib. c. 17, p. 13.) "Sublata igitur ab omnibus entibus participatione, remanet ipsa simplicissima entitas, quæ est essentia omnium entium, et non conspicimus ipsam talem entitatem, nisi in doctissima ignorantia, quoniam cum omnia participantia entitatem ab animo removeo, nihil remanere videtur. Et propterea magnus Dionysius [Areopagita] dicit, intellectum Dei, magis accedere ad nihil, quam ad aliquid. Sacra autem ignorantia me instruit, hoc quod intellectui nihil videtur, esse maximum incomprehensibile."-(Apologia Doctæ Ignorantiæ, p. 67.)-" Augustinus ait:- Deum potius ignorantia. quam scientia attingi.' Ignorantia enim abjicit, intelligentia colligit; docta vero ignorantia omnes modos quibus accedi ad veritatem potest, unit. Ita eleganter dixit Algazel in sua Metaphysica, de Deo: Quod quisque scit per probationem necessariam, impossibilitatem suam apprehendendi eum. Ipse sui est cognitor, et apprehensor; quoniam apprehendit, scire ipsum a nullo posse comprehendi. Quisquis autem non potest apprehendere, et nescit necessario esse impossibile eum apprehendere, per probationem prædictam, est ignorans Deum et tales sunt omnes homines, exceptis dignis, et prophetis et sapientibus, qui sunt profundi in sapientia.' Hæc ille."-See also: De Beryllo, c. 36, p. 281; De Venatione Sapientiæ, c. 12, p. 306; De Deo Abscondito, p. 338; &c. &c.2 1 Literally: "Te, tenebris jactum, ligat ignorantia duplex; Or, with reference to our German evolvers of the Nothing into the Everything; and avoiding the positio debilis : "Te, sophia insanum, terit insipientia triplex ; Nil sapis, et nil non te sapuisse doces !" 2 So far, Cusa's doctrine coincides with what I consider to be the true precept of a "Learned Ignorance." But he goes farther and we find his profession of negative ignorance converted into an assumption of positive knowledge; his Nothing, presto, becoming every thing; and contradictions, instead of standing an insuperable barrier to all intellectual cognition, employed in laying its foundation. In fact, I make no doubt that his speculations have originated the whole modern philosophy of the Absolute. For Giordano Bruno, as I can show, was well acquainted with Cusa's writings; from these he borrowed his own celebrated theory, repeating even the language in which its doctrines were originally expressed. To Cusa, we can indeed, articulately trace, word and thing, the recent philosophy of the Absolute. The term Absolute (Absolutum), in its precise and peculiar signification, he every where employs. The Intellectual Intuition (Intuitio Intellectualis) he describes and names; nay, we find in him, even the process of Hegel's Dialectic. His works are, indeed, instead of the neglect to which they have been doomed, well deserving of attentive study in many relations In Astronomy, before Copernicus, he had promulgated the true theory of 16.—ÆNEAS SYLVIUS. (Piccolomini, Pope Pius II. Rhet. L. ii )—“ Cui plura nosse datum est, eum majora dubia sequuntur." 17.-PALINGENIUS. (Zodiacus Vitæ, Virgo v. 181, sq.) "Tunc mea Dux tandem pulcro sic incipit ore :— ullie 18.-"Multa tegit sacro involucro natura, neque ("Full many a secret in her sacred vail Hath Nature folded. She vouchsafes to knowledge Not every mystery, reserving much, Let us not, therefore, seek what God conceals; the heavenly revolutions, with the corollary of a plurality of worlds; and in the science of Politics, he was the first perhaps to enounce the principles on which a representative constitution should be based. The Germans have, however, done no justice to their countryman. For Cusa's speculations have been most perfunctorily noticed by German historians of philosophy; and it is through Bruno that he seems to have exerted an influence on the Absolutist theories of the Empire. 1 The comparison of man as an ape to God, is from Plato, who, while he repeatedly exhibits human beings as the jest of the immortals, somewhere says "The wisest man, if compared with God, will appear an ape." Pope, who was well read in the modern Latin poets, especially of Italy, and even published from them a selection in two volumes, abounds in manifest imitations of their thoughts, wholly unknown to his commentators. In his line "And shew'd a Newton as we shew an ape," —he had probably this passage of Palingenius in his eye, and not Plato. Warburton and his other scholiasts are aware of no suggestion. 2 I know not the author of these verses. I find them first quoted by Fernelius, in his book "De Abditis Rerum Causis?? (L. ii. c. 18), which appeared before the year 1551. They may be his own. They are afterward given by Sennertus, in his Hypomnemata, but without an attribution of authorship. By him, indeed, they are undoubtedly taken from Fernelius. Finally, they are adduced by the learned Morhof, in his Polyhistor, who very unlearnedly, however, assigns them to Lucretius. They are not by Palingenius, nor Palearius,, nor Hospitalius, all of whose versification they resemble; for the last, indeed, they are almost too early. |