On this fundamental principle of thought being conditioned, Hamilton endeavors to generalize the cognizable; with what success our readers must judge for themselves. For it is in the application of some comprehensive principle like this that the greatest diversity of opinion is likely to prevail. It is here also that error is most liable to intervene.

We confess to an honest doubt respecting the application of the principle to the solution of what seems to be an infallible and authoritative conviction of the human mind, namely that of cause, or what may be termed perhaps with greater propriety, productive power. This idea or conviction is resolved by our author into the incompetence of the human mind. This appears to us inadequate; for we are as conscious, each of us, of being a productive cause, as we are of possessing existence, or a distinct, self-contained personality. That is, we are conscious, in every voluntary mental, and even physical act, of being a productive will. This conviction is simple, original, necessary, universal, and inalienable. It is given as a primary datum in consciousness. Hamilton indeed contends that it can not possess this character, because it is given only in specific acts; but so also is every other spontaneous conviction. We remember the past-therefore past knowledge, though given in consciousness, when remembered, is for this reason, mediate and representative. It is not the source of our conviction of our personal existence, which is given only in specific, mental states or acts. Properly speaking, we are not conscious of continuous existence, but only of present existence. We infer our past existence from memory; were that lost, our knowledge of personal identity in its relation to the past, would be lost also. So that conscious existence is given us in specific and instantaneous acts. The conviction or consciousness of being a cause, or a productive Will, is given to each of us in the same way, and brings with it equal authority.

But can we transfer that idea to what we call external causes, of which we have no consciousness; and can we claim on this ground to know any thing satisfactorily of real causes in nature? By analogy we should seem justified in doing so; and yet we must always feel that there is something in natural causes beyond our grasp; for one cause implies another, and another, and so on, till we recognize a great first Cause or Productive Will, of which man is the image. Here we reach the infinite, and how that is related to the finite, we do not and we can not know. Here then comes in the incompetence of human thought, and the great law of our philosopher. We know only "in part." Still we are satisfied, on the ground of consciousness, that we ourselves are productive causes, and by analogy, we infer that there must be a great Productive Cause of the Universe. The inference is almost as instantaneous and perfect as the act of consciousness. It seems equally infallible; so much so, that many have maintained that it is not an inference, but an original conviction given in conciousness.

It would seem, however, that in their last analysis, all finite causes, and even our own individual productive wills may be resolved, at least in thought, into the one infinite and eternal Cause or Will, where we lose ourselves. Here, therefore, we are saved, and so restored to ourselves and to God, by acknowledging our mental incompetence. The matter is "too high," we can not "attain unto it."

It is possible that the defect which we feel in the application of Sir W. Hamilton's principle to the primary conviction of cause, may arise from our imperfect conception of his views, or from his own inadequate, per haps imperfect statement of it. For we would respectfully inquire, whether the particular position which he takes for its defense and elucidation may not fairly and logically be run into pantheism. (See Discussions pp. 575–583.) It is true indeed that something can never come from nothing; for that would contradict our very idea of cause. Ultimately God must be conceived of as Cause of all that exists; so that when he creates, he does not create out of nothing, but out of himself That is to say, for the language must not be understood grossly and figuratively, he creates by his essential productive power. How, we know not, and can not know.

By what means then do we save ourselves from pantheism? By falling back upon our personal consciousness-and so recognizing the fundamental conviction of personal causality, as well as the distinction between subject and object, the me and the not me, which Sir William Hamilton has demonstrated. In our consciousness, we are free Productive Wills, all reasoning to the contrary notwithstanding; and God himself must be a free Productive Will; as Sir W. Hamilton, in his very explanation of this matter, frankly acknowledges. So that if there is any difficulty here, we shall cite Sir W. Hamilton against himself. For on the ground of "mental incompetence," or the impossibility of conceiving two contradictories, he asserts that “there is no ground for inferring a certain fact to be impossible, merely from our inability to conceive it possible." So that, he adds, "if the causal judgment be not an express affirmation of the mind, the unconditional testimony of consciousness, that we are, though we know not how, the true and responsible authors of our actions"-(conscious then of being productive wills, or causes)-"not merely the worthless links in an adamantine series of effects and causes. "1

Thus, on the same ground, though we find it impossible to conceive how matter can spring from spirit; or how the universe of finite minds, or finite forms, can be created by Jehovah, we feel assured, that as we are free Productive Wills, he too must be a free Productive Will. If we

1 And again, "How, therefore, I repeat, moral liberty is possible in man or God, we are utterly unable, speculatively to understand. But practically, the fact that we are free is given to us in the consciousness of an uncompromising law of duty, in the consciousness of our moral accountability." Appendix A, p. 587.

are separated, by our personality, from the not me, or the finite world without us, he too by his personality (that is, his free causative will), is separated from the finite universe which he has made. He may be in it, as a presence or a power, but he is above it, as a free creative spirit, who controls it with the supreme and eternal dominion of Proprietor and Lord. If we say, that potentially the sum of being or existence is not increased by the creation; or rather if we say, that we are incompetent to conceive how the sum of being is increased; no matter; the incompetence is the same in both cases. We exist―we are free-we are conscious personalities; that is enough. And so it is enough to say, that God exists-is free-is an infinite yet conscious personality, who creates all things "by the word of his power," or, which is the same thing, by his inherent creative energy. “God said, Let there be light, and there was light !"

Here then we reverently unite with our author, in adoring, with profound humility, the ineffable Jehovah, the father of our spirits, who is "above all, through all, and in all." In conclusion also, we commend to thoughtful minds the cultivation of a philosophy so humble and trustful, and yet so profound and comprehensive. "For I may indeed say," is the testimony of our author, "with Chrysostom, The foundation of our philosophy is humility. (Homil. de Perf. Evang.) For it is professedly a demonstration of the impossibility of that wisdom in high matters, which the apostle prohibits us even to attempt; and it proposes, from the limitation of the human powers, from our impotence to comprehend, what however we must admit, to show articulately why the secret things of God can not but be to man past finding out.' Humility thus becomes the cardinal virtue, not only of revelation, but of reason.” 1

1 The whole passage is worthy of careful study as indicating the true relations of reason and faith, of philosophy and theology. See Appendix A, p. 588.

HARTFORD, CONN., May, 1853.

PHILOSOPHY.

I-PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONDITIONED.

IN REFERENCE TO COUSIN'S DOCTRINE

OF THE INFINITO-ABSOLUTE.1

(OCTOBER, 1829.)

Cours de Philosophie. Par M. VICTOR COUSIN, Professeur de Philosophie à la Faculté des Lettres de Paris.-Introduction à l'Histoire de la Philosophie. 8vo. Paris, 1828.

THE delivery of these Lectures excited an unparalleled sensa tion in Paris. Condemned to silence during the reign of Jesuit ascendency, M. Cousin, after eight years of honorable retirement, not exempt from persecution, had again ascended the Chair of

1 [Translated into French, by M. Peisse; into Italian, by S. Lo Gatto: also in Cross's Selections from the Edinburgh Review.

This article did not originate with myself. I was requested to write it by my friend, the late accomplished Editor of the Review, Professor Napier. Personally, I felt averse from the task. I was not unaware, that a discussion of the leading doctrine of the book would prove unintelligible, not only to "the general reader," but, with few exceptions, to our British metaphysicians at large. But, moreover, I was still farther disinclined to the undertaking, because it would behove me to come for ward in overt opposition to a certain theory, which, however powerfully advocated, I felt altogether unable to admit: while its author, M. Cousin, was a philosopher for whose genius and character I already had the warmest admiration-an admiration which every succeeding year has only augmented, justified, and confirmed. Nor, in saying this, need I make any reservation. For I admire, even where I dissent; and were M. Cousin's speculations on the Absolute utterly abolished, to him would still remain the honor, of doing more himself, and of contributing more to what has been done by others, in the furtherance of an enlightened philosophy, than any other living individual in France-I might say in Europe. Mr. Napier, however, was resolute; it was the first number of the Review under his direction; and the criticism was hastily written. In this country the reasonings were of course not understood, and naturally, for a season, declared incomprehensible. Abroad, in France, Germany, Italy, and latterly in America, the article has been rated higher than it deserves. The illustrious thinker, against one of whose doctrines its argument is directed, was the first to A *

Philosophy; and the splendor with which he recommenced his academical career, more than justified the expectation which his recent celebrity as a writer, and the memory of his earlier prelections, had inspired. Two thousand auditors listened, all with admiration, many with enthusiasm, to the eloquent exposition of doctrines intelligible only to the few; and the oral discussion of philosophy awakened in Paris, and in France, an interest unexampled since the days of Abelard. The daily journals found it necessary to gratify, by their earlier summaries, the impatient curiosity of the public; and the lectures themselves, taken in short-hand, and corrected by the Professor, propagated weekly the influence of his instruction to the remotest provinces of the kingdom.

Nor are the pretensions of this doctrine disproportioned to the attention which it has engaged. It professes nothing less than to be the complement and conciliation of all philosophical opinion; and its author claims the glory of placing the key-stone in the arch of science, by the discovery of elements hitherto unobserved. among the facts of consciousness.

Before proceeding to consider the claims of M. Cousin to originality, and of his doctrine to truth, it is necessary to say a few words touching the state and relations of philosophy in France.

After the philosophy of Descartes and Malebranche had sunk into oblivion, and from the time that Condillac, exaggerating the too partial principles of Locke, had analyzed all knowledge into sensation, Sensualism (or more correctly, Sensuism), as a psychological theory of the origin of our cognitions, became, in France, not only the dominant, but almost the one exclusive opinion. It was believed that reality and truth were limited to experience, and experience was limited to the sphere of sense; while the very highest faculties of mind were deemed adequately explained when recalled to perceptions, elaborated, purified, sublimated, and transspeak of it in terms which, though I feel their generosity, I am ashamed to quote. I may, however, state, that maintaining always his opinion, M. Cousin (what is rare, especially in metaphysical discussions), declared, that it was neither unfairly combated nor imperfectly understood.-In connection with this criticism, the reader should compare what M. Cousin has subsequently stated in defense and illustration of his system, in his Preface to the new edition of the Introduction à l'Histoire de la Philosophie, and Appendix to the fifth lecture (Œuvres, Serie II. Tome i. pp. vii., ix., and pp. 112– 129);—in his Preface to the second edition, and his Advertisement to the third edition of the Fragments Philosophiques (Œuvres, S. III. T. iv.)—and in his Prefatory Notice to the Pensées de Pascal (Œuvres, S. IV. T. i.)—On the other hand, M. Peisse has ably advocated the counterview, in his Preface and Appendix to the Fragments de Philosophie, &c.]