France and Prussia-might have been sound if this country had been in the position of a Continental Power, with frontiers conterminous with those of other Powers. But when his argument comes to be applied to this island of ours, providentially separated and protected by a great natural defence from any attack from abroad- and not only protected by a great natural defence, but supported by a force in which now, as at all other times, we hold ourselves to be superior to all other nations in the world-the reasoning and the comparison fail-and the position which we occupy is one which renders it unnecessary for us to arm the whole population of the country, as other nations have, un fortunately, been almost obliged to arm their whole population, in consequence of the mutual armaments of their neighbours. My Lords, to resume - After settling and laying down the main principles of our defensive force, my right hon. Friend appointed a sub-Committee, which is now considering what military divisions should be made in this country, and what Staff organization should be established in those divisions for the sake of bringing all the forces of the country together. Now, my Lords, that organization appears to be perfectly indispensable in order that the forces of the country should be put upon a proper footing. At the same time your Lordships will be glad to hear that it is far from improbable that very great improvements in the organization of the Reserve forces may be made, and that there is also room for effecting no little economy when that improved organization is carried out. The noble Earl on the crosss-Benches (Earl Grey), who has often addressed your Lordships with great weight upon questions relating to Army organization and the Reserve forces, has called attention several times to the expense occasioned by maintaining, in connection with the Reserve forces, a permanent Staff for the whole year, who necessarily are employed but for a very short time. Now, the cost of the permanent Staff of the Reserve forces, which I have on this paper, I will venture to read. There are no fewer than 717 officers and 6,391 noncommissioned officers, and the cost of pay and allowances for the Staff is, including clothing, no less than £491,000 per annum. THE DUKE OF NORTHUMBERLAND thought there must be some mistake. LORD NORTHBROOK: The noble Duke expresses some apprehension that I have fallen into a mistake; but I will give the particulars. There are 15 officers engaged in the inspection of the Reserve forces, at a cost of £8,425 per annum. In the Militia there are 290 officers and 4,776 non-commissioned officers, costing in pay, allowances, and clothing £287,250 per annum. In the Yeomanry there are 35 officers and 328 non-commissioned officers, and their cost is £19,191; and in the Volunteer force there are 291 officers and 1,163 noncommissioned officers, the annual cost being £154,950. Then the cost of the Staff of the Pensioners is about £21,200 per annum, so that the Staff of the Reserve forces alone costs, as I have stated, £491,016 per annum. But that is not all; for, independent of this Staff we have recruiting districts, and the pay, allowances, and clothing of those connected with them amounts to £26,934 per annum. Independently of that again, we have the Staff of the depôt battalions, who are, to a great extent, employed in similar duties, and their cost for pay, allowances, and clothing_amounts to £36,030. Therefore, my Lords, if you add to the cost of the Staff of the Reserve forces that of the Recruiting Staff and of the Staff of the depôt battalions, which might be diminished by a different organization, the total cost per annum is no less than £553,980. I am not, my Lords, at this time going to propose any plan by which this Staff may be consolidated and economy enforced; all that I say is — that, with such figures before us, it certainly appears that, while greater efficiency might be secured, a considerable degree of economy may also be effected. will now say a few words with respect to the observations which my noble Friend has made in regard to the Volunteers. My Lords, I think there is no officer of Volunteers who would assume, as my noble Friend appears to think they do, that the Volunteers ought to be regarded as part of the standing Army. From all that I have seen and heard among Volunteer officers and from my own feeling as a Volunteer officer of humble position, I do not think that the Volunteers ever supposed that they were part of the standing Army of this country. I We are quite content with the position | increase of the grant. I need hardly which my noble Friend has given us of remind your Lordships that the money being valuable auxiliaries in time of in- paid to the Volunteer force in one year vasion. The consideration of the posi- is for services rendered in the year betion of the Volunteers was forced upon fore; and, therefore, that, before the Esmy right hon. Friend shortly after he timates for next year are laid before Parassumed the Seals of Secretary of State. liament, there will be ample time to maIt will be in the recollection of some, at ture any measures which may be necesleast, of your Lordships that Sir John sary for the improvement of the force. Pakington, when Secretary of State, re- It appears to the Secretary of State that ceived a deputation of Volunteer officers, it might be exceedingly desirable, if any and communicated to them the decision increase is given to the Volunteers, to of the late Government against an in- devote it more to enabling them to unite crease of the capitation rate to Volunteers. with the Militia and the Line, in order My right hon. Friend shortly after he to train them practically to their duties, came to the War Office received a depu- in smaller bodies than those which have tation of the Volunteer officers, by whom been collected together at the great rethe same request was made, and to whom views. I have already said, my Lords, the same reply was given. My right that I cannot accept the position which hon. Friend said that the view he took my noble Friend (Lord Monck) has of the question was that it would not be taken in the course of his able speech in right to give broadcast an increase of instituting comparisons between the posithe capitation rate to the Volunteers; tion of this country, and such countries but if an increase was to be given out as France, Prussia, Austria, or Russia of the public taxes, such increase must stand with respect to defence. I must be coupled with a comprehensive review refer, however, for a few moments, to of the whole position of the force; that the comparison which my noble Friend it would be necessary in the first place made as regards the cost per man of that no more separate corps should the Army and Volunteers of France exist than could be usefully established and Prussia, as compared with that of in any particular locality; that officers the Army and Volunteers of this counand non-commissioned officers should try. When I was in the other House be appointed, not from social or other of Parliament, when the Estimates similar considerations, but because they were being discussed, I have constantly were able to command men with effi- heard comparisons made between the ciency; and, lastly, that some better cost of the French and English Armies ; test of efficiency should be afforded than but I never found any possible point the number of drills which were required, of agreement in which two people who as the force was now constituted, to took opposite views could meet. entitle a Volunteer to the capitation is utterly impossible, unless you have grant; and that more would be neces- every particular detail, and work the sary than the small increase which was calculation out from top to bottom, proposed by the Volunteer deputation to institute any sound comparison beas a kind of ultimatum. Now, this tween the Estimates of the two countries. question of the Volunteers is inti- We are told that one English soldier mately connected with that of the or- costs £100 per annum; but in that £100 ganization of the whole of the Reserve is included pensions of all kinds, the cost forces; and, therefore, my right hon. of fortifications, and of military experiFriend proposes after the Committee ments of all sorts, and many other matwhich is now considering the general ters which may or may not be included organization of the Reserve forces has in calculations based upon the French proceeded somewhat further towards the Budget, but which require to be carecompletion of that part of its work, and fully considered before such a compaat the time of the Wimbledon meeting, rison can be accepted as fair. when many of the Volunteer officers will fact is, we see our own defects, and our come to London-to invite some of them own expenditure is brought especially to assist him in taking a comprehensive home to us; but when we come to disview of the position of the Volunteer cuss the expenditure of other nations force, which appears absolutely essential there may be things which we do not before Parliament is asked to vote an know, but which they do; and therefore It The I altogether take exception to the comparison which my noble Friend has instituted. But I will take him to one point which will show that he has been hardly fair to this country in his comparison of the cost of the French and English soldier. In making his comparison he calls the Garde Mobile soldiers, but excludes the English Volunteers. LORD MONCK: I beg my noble Friend's pardon. I included the Volunteers, the Militia, and every other force. LORD NORTHBROOK: If my noble Friend included them I am utterly at a loss to know how to make his calculations tally with the Army Estimates; because if all are included we should have 436,000 men-namely, 400,000 at home and 36,000 in the colonies, who also fall on the Army Estimates. But if you divide the Army Estimates, which, I believe, are £10,834,000, for the Effective Services, by that number it does not produce anything like the sum mentioned by my noble Friend. The calculation produces something like £25, instead of the sum the noble Lord mentioned. I cannot profess to go into the details of the calculations which he has made with respect to foreign Armies; but if they are made at all in the same way as his calculations respecting our Army, they may not be so unfavourable to our administration as at first sight they appear. Of course, my Lords, it is self-evident that if you have conscription, you can have a cheaper Army than you can get on the voluntary system. I was sorry to hear my noble Friend shadow forth a system similar to the Prussian. Conscription always bears most hardly on the working classes. As long, therefore, as we can get soldiers by the voluntary system, we should be doing a foolish and unjust thing to throw the burden of our military defence on our poorer fellow-countrymen. If you have a voluntary system the average rate of pay must be equal to the pay of artizans and labourers, and the Army cannot consequently be cheap. Besides this, everything in this country is dearer than on the Continent. I confess I was unable to follow my noble Friend completely; but, as far as I understand it, I must say that any system such as he proposes, which would establish a different system of enlistment for the service at home and service abroad, would involve great, if not insuperable difficulties. His system contains a fault common to many of the systems which have been designed of late with a view to reform our Army organization. One Paper, read by Mr. Cole, which gave rise to a very interesting discussion at the Society of Arts, was based upon the proposal to leave India entirely out of the question; and some other schemes have been designed in forgetfulness of the fact that we have to provide an Army for India. I trust, by the way, that whatever scheme may be adopted for the organization of the English Army, we shall not revert to the system of having a local European Army in India. When the local Army existed, I was strongly against it, and now that it has been abolished, I deprecate any change which would restore it. I believe it to be an unsound system for the maintenance of the British supremacy in the East. My noble Friend has more than once referred to the views recently expressed by Sir John Burgoyne. But the name of Sir John Burgoyne brings me back to the time when a celebrated letter was written by him, at a period when there was some anxiety, as there is at present, respecting our home defence. It will be some satisfaction to your Lordships to compare the state of those defences then with their condition at present. In 1851, the regular forces numbered some 67,500; of Militia there was only a small permanent Staff of 700 men, and there were 15,500 Pensioners, &c. We had altogether 84,000 of those forces, besides a Yeomanry force of 14,600 men, but no Volunteers. In 1869, we have 92,000 Regular Army, 83,000 Militia, actually trained, independent of those who will be called out for training this year, and 24,000 Pensioners, &c. ; giving a total of 200,000 as against 84,000 in1851. you take the Infantry of the Line, you will find that we had only 43 battalions in 1851 at home; now we have 61: in 1851, we had only 5,000 Artillery; this year we have 18,000: in Volunteers we had only the Yeomanry against 170,000 "efficient" Volunteers. Therefore if we stood alone on the comparison of the Regular and Reserve forces in 1851 and at the present time, we have the satisfaction of knowing that we are in a far superior position to that in which we then were. But, in 1851, as was pointed out by Sir John Burgoyne, we had no system of fortifications. At this time, we have If perhaps the most admirable system | Monck), to take this opportunity of going in the world rapidly advancing to completion. We have also a means of defence which did not exist in 1851 I refer to the floating mines or torpedoes. This species of defence has attracted great attention, and there is no doubt that torpedoes will form a powerful auxiliary for the defence of harbours in the future. Look how the system developed during the progress of the American War. In 1862, there was only one vessel destroyed by them; in 1863, there were two; in 1864, ten; and in 1865, twelve. Twenty-five Federal vessels altogether were destroyed, and nine injured by torpedoes during that war. My Lords, the introduction of steam, so far from being a weakness, has been a great addition of strength to this country; improvements in artillery have been a strength to us; and torpedoes will give additional strength to the defence. The policy of the Secretary of State and the Government is to concentrate the forces in this country; as far as possible to establish such a system of Reserve as to enable the battalions of Infantry to be raised at once in case of necessity to war strength; and, at the same time, to organize such a system of military administration throughout the country as will unite, as far as possible under one command, for purposes of organization and control, all the different forces which now have no connection one with the other, and enable them to be used with the greatest advantage whenever necessity shall arise. I feel sure that my noble Friend will give credit to the Government for having taken up this question, not in a perfunctory spirit, but with the determination to go to the bottom of every portion of our military system, and not to be satisfied until those defects which now exist in certain portions of that system are remedied, and that such an organization is adopted as will enable us to recruit our Army with promptitude when it is desired, and to have all the defensive forces of this country in the most efficient state if, unfortunately, we should be called upon to demand their services. THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE: My Lords, it is not my intention, after the able speeches we have heard from the Under Secretary for War and my noble Friend who introduced the subject (Lord into the details of a question of such importance and breadth, as there will, no doubt, be other opportunities of discussing it. It will, however, be right for me to say a few words and to warn your Lordships and the country that this grave question is one that ought not to be disposed of hastily, but which ought to be decided after the most serious consideration, after the fullest investigation, and after you have exhausted all the information it is possible to obtain. From the observations made by my noble Friend who introduced this question, I thought he was going to conclude with a proposal for the introduction of conscription into this country-for all his arguments and views were in the direction of conscription; but I do not believe that either your Lordships or the country are at all prepared for such a proposition, and I am certainly the last man who, from a military point of view, would urge the resort to conscription in this country. At the same time I admit that conscription is, of all measures, that which makes military organization most simple and easy. I agree very much with what fell from the noble Lord the Under Secretary with respect to the unintelligible character of the figures of the noble Lord who introduced the question. I did not understand the noble Lord's figures; but, supposing they are correct, I contend that the whole question is one of conscription, and that the question of expenditure rests entirely upon conscription. If you have conscription, you can force a man to serve you for nothing. What is the question with us? It is entirely one of the labour market. You must go into the labour market and make it worth a man's while to serve you as a soldier in preference to following any trade or profession. This is a matter of pounds, shillings, and pence; and men cannot be got without expense. A man will not come into the Army merely for the pleasure of serving you; he comes for the advantage it is to him. The greater the advantage in money and money's worth, the more easily will you get recruits. This is a question of finance and of comparative expenditure, and on every one of these points it is an absurdity to compare our Army with any other Army which is a conscript Army. The only Army you can compare ours with is one formed like the American Army, only a small portion of which is a standing Army. We must be prepared, under any circumstances, for a considerable outlay, and we must not compare our outlay in these respects with the outlay upon the Armies of France, Russia, or Prussia. Ours is not a conscript Army, and that is really at the bottom of the whole question in that respect; and the same as regards enlistment. If my noble Friend can assure me that we can get men to serve without a pension, I shall be glad to hear it; but, so far as my convictions go at present, they are very strong in the direction that the pension is a great inducement to men to enter the Service. No arrangement you may make is of any use if it will not produce the men; if you can produce the men, that is what is required; but if you cannot produce the men, the ground is cut away from under your feet. Recollect this is a voluntary service, and if you adopt a system which will not bring the men, you are checkmated. Therefore, whatever we do, we must obtain the men, and any change introduced must be introduced in such a manner that we shall be sure of the result before the change is made. I am under the impression that there may be an attempt made to introduce enlistment for short periods; but I do hope, at all events, that there is no intention of giving up the present system of enlistment before you are sure of the result of any new experiment. I would say let short enlistment be tried pari passú with the present system; and if you adopt that course you will lose no men. Another important point is that of enlistment for India and for colonial garrisons. I cannot conceive of any system of enlistment answering which makes a difference between enlistment for foreign and enlistment for home service. Such distinctions lead to endless confusion and inconvenience, and involve injustice even to the men themselves. Following up what has been said by the noble Lord the Under Secretary, I can only assure the noble Lord (Lord Monck) that Her Majesty's Government are perfectly alive to the necessity of having this subject most exhaustively inquired into, and that every endeavour is being made to see how the Reserve forces can be brought into relation with the regular Army. If any arrangement can be made and I have no doubt it can-by which that desirable end can be attained, I am sure that not only Her Majesty's Government, but all military authorities, will see with great satisfaction any such proposal judiciously carried out to the fullest extent. As to Reserve forces, to which reference has been made, I quite agree that if you could get Reserve forces that are not connected with the Militia, or any other body, it would be a great advantage; but the question is, how to get them? Can you get them? My impression is you cannot. If we can get them, by all means let us do so; let us try a system of raising the Reserve forces without its having anything to do with the Militia, and let us also continue to try the scheme of a Militia Reserve introduced by General Peel. I believe if that measure were systematically carried out it would work well, that there would be no difficulty in getting the Reserve men from the Militia, and in filling up the Militia regiments which supply men for the Reserve, and that the working of the measure need involve no disorganization of the Militia force. I entreat your Lordships to reflect, and not to be hurried into making any organic change in the recruitment of the Army-an Army which I think all your Lordships will admit has, under all circumstances and on all occasions, proved itself worthy of the country, and which has done its duty in a manner which ought at least to be borne in mind when you propose to make a grave and serious change in its organization. EARL DE LA WARR said, it would be early enough to express an opinion on the various schemes which had been propounded when any of them had taken the shape of a Bill. It was satisfactory to observe that the Government was at last entering boldly and earnestly on the path of military reform, and that it was prepared to give more attention to questions of military organization than its predecessors were supposed to have done. He did not agree with the proposal to curtail the period of enlistment in the regular service, and he believed that to dispense with the lengthened service which those who now entered the Army gave freely and voluntarily, would deprive the Army of strength, power, and stability, which it would be impossible to replace. If our battalions were composed of men of two years' instead of seven or eight years' service, we should |