sudden emergency arose, how was it to armoured ships had been built and conbe met by a flying squadron, which verted-namely, seven frigates and corwould, probably, be everywhere when it vettes, nine sloops, and seven gun-vessels was not wanted, and no where when it and gunboats. But that was a very was? The advantage of having a few imperfect representation of the state of ships to spare on the several stations things in 1866, because his right hon. was strikingly illustrated in the case of Friend knew very well what the condiAbyssinia. We had no reserve of ships tion of the remaining unarmoured steam at home, but we were fortunately able vessels was, and that a large number of to reinforce the East India squadron by them were so unsound that they never four ships from other stations. One of could be again put into commission. In these was commanded by the late la- addition to the 139 steamers removed mented Captain Edye, and it was not between 1860 and 1866, no less than too much to say that it was more than fifty-five steam vessels, exclusive of linedoubtful whether the war could have of-battle ships-which he excluded as been finished in one campaign, if it had they were considered obsolete were not been for the skill and the energy also removed up to last Christmas, displayed by him in the landing of troops when the late Government resignedand stores, and obtaining a supply of namely, ten frigates and corvettes, seven water. Millions may thus have been sloops, and thirty-eight gun-vessels and saved. Again, the moral effect of a fly-gunboats. But that was not the whole ing squadron would be absolutely worth- story, because before he left Office he less; and the sight of a single pendant, flying, in a port where British honour had been insulted, or British interests endangered, even from a gunboat, would be more efficacious than a fleet of armourclads, to be found Heaven knew where. He wished therefore to know what the intentions of the Government were with respect to the flying squadron, and what was to be the composition of that squadron ? He would now turn to another point, although one which was intimately connected with the maintenance of our squadrons abroad. The late Government had been much blamed, during the Recess, for building unarmoured vessels, but the present Government ought to be much obliged to their predecessors for what they have done; because, without it, the reduction in the present Estimates could not possibly have been made. He would give a few figures which would vindicate the policy of his right hon. Friend the Member for Droit-ment, that would give a total of 121 unwich (Sir John Pakington) and show that it would be absolutely impossible to maintain even such squadrons as the right hon. Gentleman opposite proposed but for what had been done by his right hon. Friend when at the head of the Board of Admiralty. He found that in seven years, from 1860 to 1866, there were either sold or broken up 244 unarmoured ships, of which 139 were steamersnamely, seventeen steam frigates and corvettes, thirty steam sloops, and ninetytwo gun-vessels and gunboats. During the same period only twenty three un called for an account of the number of effective unarmoured vessels we had on the list, with the number estimated to be worth repairing, again, exclusive of line-of-battle ships, and he was informed by the Controller's department that of the older steam vessels of all classes, built before 1860, there were seventynine above the rank of gun-vesselsnamely, thirty-one frigates, twenty-one corvettes, and twenty-seven sloops, but of these only one-half, or, say, forty were repairable; of twenty-five gun-vessels, only one-third were likely to be repaired; and of seventy-three gunboats only ten were in a state to be again commissioned. Therefore, exclusive of line-ofbattle ships, only fifty-eight of the old unarmoured vessels remained in a state fit to be re-commissioned. If to these were added the twenty-three built between 1860 and 1866, and the forty ordered to be built by the late Govern armoured vessels fit for service in two or three years from the present time. Now, as his right hon. Friend opposite proposed to maintain sixty-four in commission, exclusive of the two largest stationsthat of the Mediterranean and that of North America-and as no more than one-third could be in commission at the same time, because the rest would be either going out as reliefs, or would be under repair or fitting for service, he would like to know how his right hon. Friend could maintain his squadrons had it not been for the policy of the right China station now, including harbour ships, was twenty-five. Whatever he might then thought enough for Japan, we certainly now proposed to keep there more than two ships. On the whole station there would be twenty-five ships, with from 2,700 to 2,800 men, as contrasted with the 4,000 men which was the programme of his right hon. Friend last year. Then his right hon. Friend said that he did not understand how the Foreign Office agreed with the Admiralty in that proposal. He was not responsible for the late Foreign Office, but he could speak for the present Foreign Office, and say that the arrangements were entirely in accordance with their views, and that he and Sir Sydney Dacres had taken great care in concert with the Foreign Office, to determine the exact force for the China station. He thought his right hon. Friend was entirely in error as to the force kept in Asiatic waters by foreign nations, for it appeared, from the latest Report of the American Secretary to the Navy that the United States had on the Asiatic station at the present moment eight ships and one store-ship, nine in all, as compared with the twenty-five which we kept there. hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich? was seventeen or eighteen, and the That was a most complete vindication number they proposed to keep on the of his right hon. Friend's policy, because, if he had not built those forty unarmoured ships, it would be absolutely impossible for his right hon. Friend opposite to maintain his squadrons even at the reduced standard which he proposed to maintain them. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Halifax (Mr. Stansfeld), had said that the unarmoured vessels built by his right hon. Friend the Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington) were small, weak, slow, ill-armed, worthless. It was true many of them were small, but if they had not been small they would have been worthless for their purpose, as they could not have gone up the rivers in China where their services would be required; and so far from being weak and ill- armed, they were very powerful vessels and carried 63-ton guns, that is to say the heaviest guns carried by corvettes of the largest classes. He thought, therefore, that the policy of his right hon. Friend, instead of deserving the uncourteous remarks that had fallen from right hon. Gentlemen opposite, should have met with much better treatment, and that his right hon. Friend, himself, and the late Government were entitled to the thanks of the First Lord of the Admiralty for having enabled him, by their policy, to effect a reduction in the amount of the Navy Estimates, which no minister could other-gether nine vessels on what was called wise have ventured to propose. MR. CORRY: I said that the American Government had five vessels in Japan. MR. CHILDERS said, they had alto the Asiatic station, whereas we had twenty-five, or taking all in Asiatic waters, thirty-one. Then his right hon. Friend came to the flying squadron, and asked for information about it. First of all his right hon. Friend said he assumed it would consist of some of the finest ships in the fleet, which was the case, but then he asked how was the Admiralty to know where the squadron was, supposing it was wanted on any occasion. His right hon. Friend must be aware that before any such squadron was sent off, very careful arrangements would be MR. CHILDERS said, that if his right hon. Friend had been good enough to give notice that he was going to discuss this subject, which was hardly germane to the present Vote, he should be in a much better position to answer the questions he had put; but he should try off-hand, with the Papers he happened to have with him, to give the best explanations in his power. His right hon. Friend spoke of the China station, and complained, that two years ago, he (Mr. Childers) proposed to keep only two ships in Japan; and having made that assump-made with the aid of the Hydrographer tion he compared that small force with the squadrons kept there by other countries at this time. He was speaking now from memory, but he thought the number of ships he and his right hon. Colleague (Mr. Stansfeld) proposed, without any official knowledge whatever, but only tentatively, and with much caution, two years ago for the whole China station, of the Navy, by which it would be known to the Admiralty at what point the squadron ought to be at certain dates; and it could be communicated with accordingly. His right hon. Friend doubted whether flying squadrons were good for the Navy, and was of opinion that both vessels and men would be better trained if they were kept on foreign stations, as they were now. But there were but few naval offi- MR. LIDDELL said, before the Vote was agreed to, he trusted the Government would afford them some information respecting their relations with China. He wanted to know whether it was necessary to keep twenty-five ships and 2,000 men in China waters? Eng China and carried on a large and valu- SIR JOHN PAKINGTON said, he would not have risen but for the remarks of the First Lord of the Admiralty on the policy of the last Board, in 1866-7, which he had characterized as vacillating. MR. CHILDERS said, that in using the word vacillation he had alluded to the period between October, 1867, and June, 1868, when the dockyards were first increased by 2,000 and then reduced by 5,000 men. cers who shared in that opinion. The almost universal opinion of naval men, especially those in command at present, was that to keep our fleet, as it was now kept, in foreign harbours, might, as his right hon Friend said, make our officers good diplomatists-possibly land had entered into treaties with a little too good, but would not make them good sailors. He had said in opening the Estimates that one of the faults he was bound to find with the present state of our Navy was, that while our officers were most gallant and zealous -there were none better in the worldthey stood in need exactly of that kind of training which a flying squadron would give them. His right hon. Friend had also referred to speeches made in the Recess, and had remarked with reference to them that some want of courtesy had been shown to the right hon. Member for Droitwitch, a remark which he would probably have withheld had he reflected. Speaking for himself, he was unconscious of having alluded to the right hon. Baronet in any but the most respectful terms. It was true he had once or twice had occasion to comment upon the policy of the late Boards of Admiralty; and in doing so he had expressed the opinion, which he did not hesitate to repeat, that it was a mistake in 1866-7 suddenly to build a very large number of unarmoured ships when part of that money would have been much better appropriated to building armoured ships. It was a mistake, also, suddenly to discontinue building unarmoured ships and to commence building a large number of armoured ships, spending much more money in a few months than Parliament had voted, and then suddenly to discontinue that work also. All this work should have been spread over several years, and that would have prevented suddenly taking on 2,000 men and afterwards discharging 5,000, a proceeding which had produced a great deal of the existing dockyard distress. It was these sudden fits of building and stopping which had caused all the mischief. He had objected to this policy in 1867, and again in 1868, and he had only renewed his objection during the Recess. Such vacillating policy had largely contributed to the discharge of numbers of men in the early part of last year, and to the consequent distress so often lamented in the House. SIR JOHN PAKINGTON said, he understood, then, that the charge of vacillation was preferred against his right hon. Friend (Mr. Corry), but, as he had taken part in the preparation of the Estimates, he did not shrink from sharing the responsibility of the policy then adopted-on the contrary, he thought it a sound and wholesome policy. Without bringing any charge against the Admiralty that was in power before 1866, he must remind the Committee that soon after taking Office he had felt bound to state that our fleet had been much neglected, that the Admiralty had not the means of sending out proper reliefs; and he contended that, in the event of war with a maritime Power, nothing would prove more serviceable than the fast-sailing fully-armed wooden ships the late Admiralty had provided for defending our own commerce and assaulting that of an enemy. Possibly the remarks of the right hon. Gentleman had fallen from him in the heat of electioneering time, when perhaps they were not always as nice or cautious as they should be; he had, however, some re collection of having been charged with extravagance both by the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Prime Minister, but his best answer to that was the admission made recently, when the Estimates were brought forward, that onehalf of the saving shown by the present Estimate was owing to the economical arrangements he had made. MR. CHILDERS said, that the observations of the right hon. Gentlemen fully justified what he (Mr. Childers) had said. If, instead of, in a panic, building a large number of wooden ships, and then a large number of iron ships, and if, instead of increasing the dockyard men by 2,000, and then suddenly reducing them by 5,000, these operations had been distributed over two or three years, they would have had quite as efficient a fleet and a not less economical administration of the dockyards without the distress which was now deplored on both sides of the House. MR. CORRY said, as the charge of vacillation was made against him, he begged to say that his policy had uniformly consisted in applying every energy of his mind and every halfpenny he could scrape together for the purpose of developing the power of our armour-clad SIR JAMES ELPHINSTONE said, Navy, to which he had added seven ves- the discussion had taken a turn which sels, in addition to three ordered by his raised the whole question-Have we yet right hon. Friend (Sir John Pakington), an efficient fleet? There had been laid and to rescue the reserves of ships from on the table a most able Report by his the deplorable condition in which they gallant friend Admiral Warden; and had been left by the preceding Govern- any one who studied that Report would ment. The reason why he had taken be of a very different opinion from the on 2,000 men in 1867 was because he First Lord of the Admiralty as to our had found that the whole of the reserve having such a fleet. We had ships that left him by the Government that had would neither sail nor steer, and he bepreceded him in Office was a single fri-lieved the Admiralty did not know what gate, which was the only ship he could have commissioned if a war had suddenly broken out with France or America, and the salvation of the country had depended on it. He immediately set about bringing the reserves up to something like a respectable condition-for he belonged to the old school, having served at the Admiralty with Sir George Cockburn, who could not have slept in his bed if he had not a reserve of thirty line-of-battle ships, some ready, and others in an advanced state of preparation for being commissioned, if the safety of the country should require it. Having obtained the permission of the Treasury, he had at once set to work to bring forward armour-clads for commission, and had put on men to hasten the equipment of the reserves, so that by the time he had left Office he had ready for any service, instead of one frigate, four armour-clads, four heavy frigates, three or four corvettes, and seven or eight gunvessels, and this reserve would have been materially increased, as respects armourclads, if he had continued in Office. He could not understand how giving employment, although temporary, to a body of workmen, could have added to their distress. If his policy had been a vacillating policy, it was one which he hoped the present Government would imitate. kind of ships they were going to construct. The gist of Admiral Warden's Report was that the ships of the Achilles type were the best ships we had; that we had only four good ships, but they were too large, and that it was reduced copies of this Achilles or Minotaur we ought to build now. Now, however, we were going to build ships without masts, although we knew nothing whatever about such ships. He could only hope and trust that they would soon have a discussion of Admiral Warden's most able Report, and that they would come to some decision as to what kind of ship was to be built in the future. If the fleet were now ordered out to Madeira and back, he believed there would be a week between the return of some vessels and that of the others. [A laugh.] Hon. Members might laugh, but such a difference in the speed of vessels as would lead to that result was a most serious thing. However, let hon. Members read Admiral Warden's Report, and they would see what a position we were in. The Hercules and the Bellerophon were, perhaps, the best ships we had, and they were a little handier than others because they were shorter; but they were moved at much greater expense than ships of finer lines, and, therefore, Admiral Warden recommended the building of reduced copies of the Mino- he feared, to suppose that the Chinese taur. But were we building ships of Government could control the hordes of that kind? It had been remarked that pirates who infested the 3,000 miles of the sum voted for experiments had been Chinese coasts and resorted to the adreduced from £12,000 to £2,000; and jacent islands. They were ferocious and that was not a prudent measure, because skilful; they preyed not only on Chinese there were points in reference to which vessels, but on vessels carrying the we ought to be continually making ex- British and every other flag, and it was periments, until we had arrived at some- our own trade which we protected as thing like a final and satisfactory con- well as the Chinese trade. At the same clusion. Among other things we had time, it was clear that if the Chinese to devise some means of keeping the Government was not able to protect its bottoms of ships clear of barnacles. own coasts, it ought to pay a large Then, the consumption of smoke had subsidy to the Power which provided been too much neglected in the Navy. the necessary defence. Again, we had to develop the hydraulic turbine principle, which must in a few years supersede the screw. The principle had been tried with perhaps the worst and the most unseaworthy ship in the Navy-the Waterwitch-belonging to a class the two or three other members of which had been smuggled out of the country, had never been heard of since, and probably never would be, because no one would go to sea in them; but this trial-touching the greatest question of the day in regard to motive power had been no experiment at all. It was well known that vessels had been worked up to ten knots an hour upon the hydraulic principle, and the most eminent engineers of the day declared there was no reason why a greater speed should not be obtained with the turbine than had been obtained by the screw. With the turbine you got rid of the immense swag of the screw and of the fouling of the screw, and the vessel was perfectly handy, and if you made sail the motive power obtained went to increase the speed; whereas, if you made sail with the screw, you had to get up to the horse-power of the screw before the sails were any good to you. These were matters upon which experiments ought to be made until conclusive results were arrived at. Again, there was the question of liquid fuel and of the economy that would be effected by the use of oils obtained from petroleum. We could not use the oils at present, because they were inflammable at certain temperatures; but he had the greatest possible confidence that it was in the power of chemistry to discover some means of making them available, and the application of such oils to the production of steam power would be an enormous benefit to navigation. It was a mistake, ADMIRAL ERSKINE said, that without following his gallant Friend through the discussion of the hydraulic principle, and of the best form of ship, he believed all the points involved were as yet in the experimental stage; and the misfortune was that success or failure on one point threw no light on the principle of another. He thought the discussion showed that he was not wrong on Friday night when he abstained from giving a personal opinion on those points. In spite of the strong observations made by the hon. Baronet the Member for Portsmouth (Sir James Elphinstone) he voted on Friday night for the building of the two iron-clads, and that fact seemed to suggest the question whether we were to be guided in building our Navy by minute details relating to ships, or by other considerations such as might have induced the hon. Baronet to vote as he did. It was to be presumed he desired to see a ship built at Portsmouth [Sir JAMES ELPHINSTONE: Hear, hear!]; but if we were to adopt a particular class of ship, let the Committee consider the reasons which had been advanced for and against particular classes, and let us abstain from these experiments which were loading the Navy with vessels that would certainly become obsolete, and involving us in expense of which we could not see the end. MR. GRAVES said, he wished to correct the statement that he had said the twin screw had failed. He carefully guarded himself against expressing such an opinion; but what he said was, he had received an opinion from one of the highest practical authorities upon the twin screw, and that opinion was highly unfavourable to it in a vessel with a large draught of water; and not a single word had fallen from any Member |