CHAP.
IV.

SECTION V.

Of the Purposes to which the Powers of Abstraction and
Generalifation are fubfervient.

IT

T has been already fhewn, that, without the use of figns, all our knowledge muft neceffarily have been limited to individuals, and that we should have been perfectly incapable both of claffification and general reasoning. Some authors have maintained, that without the power of generalisation, (which I have endeavoured to fhew, means nothing more than the capacity of employing general terms,) it would have been impoffible for us to have carried on any fpecies of reasoning whatever. But I cannot help thinking that this opinion is erroneous; or, at leaft, that it is very imperfectly ftated. The truth is, it appears to me to be just in one sense of the word reafoning, but false in another; and I even fufpect it is falfe in that fense of the word in which it is moft commonly employed. Before, therefore, it is laid down as a general proposition, the meaning we are to annex to this very vague and ambiguous term, fhould be afcertained with precision.

Ir has been remarked by feveral writers, that the expectation which we feel of the continuance of the laws of nature, is not founded upon reasoning; and different theories have of late been proposed to account for its origin. Mr. Hume resolves it into the affociation of ideas. Dr. Reid, on the other hand, maintains, that it is an original principle of our conftitution, which does not admit of any explanation; and which, therefore, is to be ranked among thofe general and ultimate facts, beyond which philosophy is unable to proceed *. Without

* In inquiries of this nature, fo far removed from the common course of literary pursuits, it always gives me pleasure to remark a coincidence of opinion among different philofophers; particularly among men of original genius, and who have been educated in different philofophical fyftems. The following paffage, in which M. de Condorcet gives an account of fome of the metaphyfical opinions of the late Mr. Turgot, approaches very nearly to Dr. Reid's doctrines.

"La mémoire de nos fenfations, et la faculté que nous avons de réfléchir "fur ces fenfations paffées et de les combiner, font le feul principe de nos con"noiffances. La fuppofition qu'il exifte des loix conftantes auxquelles tous les "phénomenes obfervés font affujettis de maniere à reparoitre dans tous les temps, "dans toutes les circonftances, tels qu'ils font déterminés par ces loix, eft le "feul fondement de la certitude de ces connoiffances.

"Nous avons la confcience d'avoir obfervé cette conftance, et un fentiment "involontaire nous force de croire qu'elle continuera de fubfifter. La probabi"lité qui en refulte, quelque grande qu'elle foit, n'eft pas une certitude. "Aucune relation néceffaire ne lie pour nous le paffé à l'avenir, ni la conftance "de ce que j'ai vu à celle de ce que j'aurois continué d'obferver fi j'etois resté "dans des circonftances femblables; mais l' impreffion qui me porte à regarder "comme exiftant, comme réel ce qui m'a préfenté ce caractere de conftance, "eft irrésistible.". Vie de TURGOT, partie ii. p. 56.

"Quand un François et un Anglois penfent de même, (fays Voltaire,) il "faut bien qu'ils aient raifon."

IV.

this principle of expectation, it would be impoffible for us to CHA P. accommodate our conduct to the established course of nature; and, accordingly, we find that it is a principle coëval with our very existence; and, in fome measure, common to man with the lower animals.

It is an obvious confequence of this doctrine, that, although philofophers be accuftomed to ftate what are commonly called the laws of nature, in the form of general propofitions, it is by no means neceffary for the practical purposes of life, that we should express them in this manner; or even that we should express them in words at all. The philofopher, for example, may state it as a law of Nature, that "fire fcorches;" or that "heavy bodies, when unfupported, fall downwards:" but, long before the use of artificial figns, and even before the dawn of reason, a child learns to act upon both of these fuppofitions. In doing fo, it is influenced merely by the instinctive principle which has now been mentioned, directed in its operation (as is the cafe with many other inftincts) by the experience of the individual. If man, therefore, had been deftined for no other purposes, than to acquire fuch an acquaintance with the course of nature, as is neceffary for the preservation of his animal existence ; he might have fulfilled all the ends of his being without the ufe of language.

As we are enabled, by our instinctive anticipation of physical events, to accommodate our conduct to what we forefee is to happen, fo we are enabled, in many cafes, to increase our

С НА

CHA P. power, by employing physical caufes as inftruments for the

IV.

We

accomplishment of our purposes; nay, we can employ a feries
of fuch causes, fo as to accomplish very remote effects.
can employ the agency of air, to increase the heat of a furnace;
the furnace, to render iron malleable; and the iron to all the
various purposes of the mechanical arts. Now, it appears to me,
that all this may be conceived and done without the aid of lan-
guage and yet, affuredly, to difcover a feries of means fub-
fervient to a particular end; or, in other words, an effort of
mechanical invention; implies, according to the common doc-
trines of philofophers, the exercife of our reasoning powers. In
this fenfe, therefore, of the word reafoning, I am inclined to
think, that it is not effentially connected with the faculty of
generalisation, or with the use of signs.

It is fome confirmation of this conclufion, that favages, whose minds are almoft wholly occupied with particulars, and who have neither inclination nor capacity for general fpeculations, are yet occafionally obferved to employ a long train of means for accomplishing a particular purpofe. Even fomething of this kind, but in a very inferior degree, may, I think, be remarked in the other animals; and that they do not carry it farther, is probably not the effect of their want of generalifation, but of the imperfection of fome of those faculties which are common to them with our fpecies; particularly of their powers of attention and recollection. The inftances which are commonly produced, to prove that they are not deftitute of the power of reasoning, are all examples of that fpecies of contrivance which has been mentioned; and are perfectly distinct from those intellectual

tellectual proceffes to which the use of figns is effentially fub- CHAP. fervient*.

WHETHER that particular species of mechanical contrivance which has now been mentioned, and which consists merely in employing a series of phyfical causes to accomplish an effect

* One of the best attefted inftances which I have met with, of fagacity in the lower animals, is mentioned by M. Bailly, in his Lettre fur les Animaux, addreffed to M. Le Roy.

"Un de mes amis, homme d'efprit et digne de confiance, m'a raconté deux ❝ faits dont il a été témoin. Il avoit un finge très intelligent; il s'amusoit à "lui donner des noix dont l' animal étoit très friand; mais il les plaçoit affez "loin, pour que retenu par fa chaîne, le finge ne pût pas les atteindre: après "bien des efforts inutiles qui ne fervent qu'à préparer l'invention, le finge, voyant paffer un domeftique portant une serviette fous le bras, fe faifit de cette "ferviette, et s'en fervit pour atteindre à la noix et l'amener jufqu' à lui. La "maniere de caffer la noix exigea une nouvelle invention; il en vint à bout, "en plaçant la noix à terre, en y faifant tomber de haut une pierre ou un "caillou pour la brifer. Vous voyez, Monfieur, que fans avoir connu, comme "Galilée, les loix de la chûte des corps, le finge avoit bien remarqué la force que "ces corps acquierent par la chûte. Ce moyen cependant fe trouva en défaut. “Un jour qu'il avoit plu, la terre étoit molle, la noix enfonçoit, et la pierre "n'avoit plus d'action pour la brifer. Que fit le finge? I alla chercher un ❝ tuileau, plaça la noix deffus, et en laiffant tomber la pierre il brifa la noix "qui n'enfonçoit plus."- -Difcours et Memoires par l'Auteur de l'Hiftoire de Aftronomie. A Paris, 1790, tome ii. p. 126.

Admitting these facts to be accurately ftated, they ftill leave an effential dif tinction between man and brutes; for in none of the contrivances here mentioned, is there any thing analogous to those intellectual proceffes which lead the mind to general conclufions, and which (according to the foregoing doctrine); imply the use of general terms. Those powers, therefore, which enable us to claffify objects, and to employ figns as an inftrument of thought, are, as far as we can judge, peculiar to the human fpecies.

IV.