Introduction.

IN fuch a state of fociety as that in which we live, the prejudices of a moral, a political, and a religious nature, which we imbibe in early life, are fo various, and at the fame time. fo intimately blended with the belief we entertain of the most facred and important truths, that a great part of the life of a philofopher muft neceffarily be devoted, not fo much to the acquisition of new knowledge, as to unlearn the errors to which he had been taught to give an implicit affent, before the dawn of reafon and reflexion. And unless he submit in this manner to bring all his opinions to the test of a fevere examination, his ingenuity, and his learning, inftead of enlightening the world, will only enable him to give an additional currency, and an additional authority, to established errors. To attempt fuch a ftruggle against early prejudices, is, indeed, the professed aim of all philofophers; but how few are to be found, who have force of mind fufficient for accomplishing their object; and who, in freeing themselves from one set of errors, do not allow themselves to be carried away with another? To fucceed in it completely, Lord Bacon feems to have thought, (in one of the most remarkable paffages of his writings,) to be more than can well be expected from human frailty. "Nemo adhuc tanta "mentis conftantia inventus eft, ut decreverit, et fibi im"pofuerit, theorias et notiones communes penitus abolere, et "intellectum abrafum et æquum ad particularia, de integro, "applicare. Itaque illa ratio humana, quam habemus, ex multa fide, et multo etiam cafu, nec non ex puerilibus, quas primo haufimus, notionibus farrago quædam eft, et congeries. Quod fiquis, ætate matura, et fenfibus integris, et mente repurgata, "fe ad experientiam, et ad particularia de integro applicet, "de eo melius fperandum eft."

NOR

NOR is it merely in order to free the mind from the influence Introduction. of error, that it is useful to examine the foundation of established opinions. It is fuch an examination alone, that, in an inquisitive age like the present, can secure a philofopher from the danger of unlimited fcepticism. To this extreme, indeed, the complexion of the times is more likely to give him a tendency, than to implicit credulity. In the former ages of ignorance and fuperftition, the intimate affociation which had been formed, in the prevailing systems of education, between truth and error, had given to the latter an afcendant over the minds of men, which it could never have acquired, if divested of fuch an alliance. The cafe has, of late years, been most remarkably reversed: the common sense of mankind, in confequence of the growth of a more liberal spirit of inquiry, has revolted against many of those abfurdities, which had so long held human reafon in captivity; and it was, perhaps, more than could reasonably have been expected, that, in the first moments of their emancipation, philofophers fhould have ftopped short, at the precise boundary, which cooler reflection, and more moderate views, would have prescribed. The fact is, that they have paffed far beyond it; and that, in their zeal to eradicate prejudices, they have attempted to tear up by the roots, many of the beft and happiest and most effential principles of our nature. Having remarked the wonderful influence of education over the mind, they have concluded, that man is wholly a factitious being; not recollecting, that this very susceptibility of education presupposes certain original principles which are common to the whole fpecies; and that, as error can only take a permanent hold of a candid mind by

The

Introduction. being grafted on truths, which it is unwilling or unable to eradicate; even the influence, which falfe and abfurd opinions occafionally acquire over the belief, instead of being an argument for univerfal fcepticifm, is the moft decifive argument against it; inasmuch as it fhews, that there are fome truths fo incorporated and identified with our nature, that they can reconcile us even to the abfurdities and contradictions with which we suppose them to be infeparably connected. fceptical philofophers, for example, of the present age, have frequently attempted to hold up to ridicule, those contemptible and puerile fuperftitions, which have difgraced the creeds of some of the most enlightened nations; and which have not only commanded the affent, but the reverence, of men of the moft accomplished understandings. But thefe hiftories of human imbecility are, in truth, the ftrongest teftimonies which can be produced, to prove, how wonderful is the influence of the fundamental principles of morality over the belief; when they are able to fanctify, in the apprehenfions of mankind, every extravagant opinion, and every unmeaning ceremony, which early education has taught us to affociate with them.

THAT implicit credulity is a mark of a feeble mind, will not be difputed; but it may not perhaps be as generally acknowledged, that the cafe is the fame with unlimited fcepticism: on the contrary, we are fometimes apt to ascribe this difpofition to a more than ordinary vigour of intellect. Such a prejudice was by no means unnatural at that period in the history of modern Europe, when reafon first began to throw off the yoke of authority; and when it unquestionably required a fupe

riority

riority of understanding, as well as of intrepidity, for an Introduction. individual to refift the contagion of prevailing fuperftition. But in the present age, in which the tendency of fashionable opinions is directly opposite to those of the vulgar; the philofophical creed, or the philofophical scepticism of by far the greater number of those who value themselves on an emancipation from popular errors, arifes from the very fame weakness with the credulity of the multitude: nor is it going too far to fay, with Rouffeau, that " He, who, in the end of the

eighteenth century, has brought himself to abandon all his "early principles without discrimination, would probably have "been a bigot in the days of the League." In the midst of these contrary impulfes, of fashionable and of vulgar prejudices, he alone evinces the fuperiority and the ftrength of his mind, who is able to disentangle truth from error; and to oppose the clear conclufions of his own unbiaffed faculties, to the united clamours of fuperftition, and of false philosophy.-Such are the men, whom nature marks out to be the lights of the world; to fix the wavering opinions of the multitude, and to impress their own characters on that of their age.

FOR fecuring the mind completely from the weaknesses I have now been describing, and enabling it to maintain a steady course of inquiry, between implicit credulity, and unlimited scepticism, the most important of all qualities is a fincere and devoted attachment to truth; which feldom fails to be accompanied with a manly confidence in the clear conclufions of human reason. It is fuch a confidence, united (as it generally is) with perfonal intrepidity, which forms what the French writers

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Introduction. writers call force of character; one of the rareft endowments, it must be confessed, of our fpecies; but which, of all endow ments, is the most effential for rendering a philofopher happy in himself, and a bleffing to mankind..

THERE is, I think, good reason for hoping, that the fceptical tendency of the prefent age, will be only a temporary evil. While it continues, however, it is an evil of the most alarming nature; and, as it extends, in general, not only to religion and morality, but, in fome measure, alfo to politics, and the conduct of life, it is equally fatal to the comfort of the individual, and to the improvement of fociety. Even in its moft inoffenfive form, when it happens to be united with a peaceable difpofition and a benevolent heart, it cannot fail to have. the effect of damping every active and patriotic exertion. Convinced that truth is placed beyond the reach of the human faculties; and doubtful how far the prejudices we defpife, may not be effential to the well-being of fociety, we refolve to abandon completely all fpeculative inquiries; and suffering ourselves to be carried quietly along with the ftream of popular opinions, and of fashionable manners, determine to amuse ourselves, the best way we can, with business or pleasure, during our short paffage through this scene of illufions. But he who thinks more favourably of the human powers, and who believes that reason was given to man to direct him to his duty and his happinefs, will defpife the fuggeftions of this timid philofophy; and while he is conscious that he is guided in his inquiries only by

* Cette conviction forte de l'efprit, fi elle s'unit au courage, produit la force de charactere; et on fent combien elle doit ètre rare.Vie de Turgot par le Marquis de Condorcet, partie ii. p. 130.

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