ledge, Bacon could delude himself by the supposition that his fulsome dedication to the King was consistent either with the simplicity or dignity of philosophy, he must have forgotten what Seneca said to Nero, "Suffer me to stay here a little longer with thee, not to flatter thine car, for that is not my custom, as I have always preferred to offend by truth than to please by flattery." He must have forgotten that when sop said to Solon, "Either we must not come to princes, or we must seek to please and content them; Solon answered, "Either we must not come to princes at all, or we must speak truly and counsel them for the best." He must have forgotten his own doctrine, that books ought to have no patrons but truth and reason, (c)

I am dead;" but not content with this, he imagined that the protection of kings was necessary for the protection of truth, forgetting his own doctrine that," veritas temporis filia dicitur non authoritatis."

In his letter of the 12th of October, 1620, to the King, he says, speaking of the Novum Organum: "This work is but a new body of clay, whereinto your Majesty, by your countenance and protection, may breathe life. And, to tell your Majesty truly what I think, I account your favour may be to this work as much as an hundred years time: for I am persuaded, the work will gain upon men's minds in ages, but your gracing it may make it take hold more swiftly: which I would be very glad of, it being a work meant, not for praise or glory, but for practice, and the good of men."

If this opinion of the necessity of the King's protection, or of any patronage, for the progress of knowledge, be now supposed a weakness: if in these times, and in this enlightened country, truth has nothing to dread : if Galileo may now, without fear of the inquisition, assert that the earth moves round; or when an altar is raised to the "unknown God," he who is ignorantly worshipped, we may declare; let us not be unmindful of the present state of the press in our countries, or forget that, although Bacon saw a little ray of distant light, yet that it was seen from far, the refraction of truth yet below the horizon.

(c)" But in the mean time I have no purpose to give allowance to some conditions and courses base and unworthy, wherein divers professors of learning have wronged themselves, and gone too far; such as were those trencher philosophers, which in the later age of the Roman state were

and he must also have forgotten his own nervous and beautiful admonition, that "the honest and just bounds of observation by one person upon another extend no further but to understand him sufficiently whereby not to give him offence; or whereby to be able to give him faithful counsel; or whereby to stand upon reasonable guard and caution with respect to a man's self: but to be speculative into another man, to the end to know how to work him, or wind him, or govern him, proceedeth from a heart that is double and cloven, and not entire and ingenuous, which as in friendship it is want of integrity, so towards princes or superiors it is want of duty."

of divines

If his work had been addressed to the philosophy of the Objections country, instead of having confined his professional objec- and politions to divines and politicians, he would have explained ticians. that, as our opinions always constitute our intellectual and often our worldly wealth, prejudice is common to us all, (a) and is particularly conspicuous amongst all professional men with respect to the sciences which they profess. (a)

learned

men.

His objections to learning from the errors of learned Errors of men contain his observations upon the study of words; upon useless knowledge; and upon falsehood, called by him delicate learning; contentious learning; and fantastical learning; all of them erroneously considered objections to

usually in the houses of great persons, being little better than solemn parasites. Neither is the modern dedication of books and writings, as to patrons, to be commended: for that books, such as are worthy the name of books, ought to have no patrons but truth and reason. And the ancient custom was to dedicate them only to private and equal friends, or to entitle the books with their names; or if to kings and great persons, it was to some such as the argument of the book was fit and proper for but these and the like courses may deserve rather reprehension than defence."

(a) See postea, under Novum Organum.

Study of words.

learning; as the study of words is merely the selection of one species of knowledge; and contentious learning is only the conflict of opinion which ever exists when any science is in progress, and the way from sense to the understanding is not sufficiently cleared; (c) and falsehood is one of the consequences attendant upon inquiry, as our opinions, being formed not only by impressions upon our senses, but by confidence in the communication of others and our own reasonings, unavoidably teem with error, which can by time alone be corrected.

As it is Bacon's doctrine that knowledge consists in understanding the properties of creatures and the names by which they are called, "the occupation of Adam in Paradise," (d) it may seem extraordinary that he should not have formed a higher estimate than he appears to have formed of the study of words. Words assist thought; they teach us correctness; they enable us to acquire the knowledge and character of other nations; (e) and the

(c) See Nov. Org. Aph. 76. vol. ix. p. 227.
(d) Advancement of Learning, vol. ii. p. 55.

(e) The following ingenious observations are from the De Augmentis, book vi. chap. i. vol. viii. p. 309. "Atque unà etiam hoc pacto capientur signa haud levia, sed observatu digna (quod fortassè quispiam non putaret) de ingeniis et moribus populorum et nationum, ex linguis ipsorum. Equidem libenter audio Ciceronem notantem, quòd apud Græcos desit verbum, quod Latinum illud Ineptum reddat; ' Proptereà,' inquit, 'quòd Græcis hoc vitium tam familiare fuit, ut illud in se ne agnoscerent quidem :' digna certè gravitate Romanâ censura. Quid illud quòd Græci in compositionibus verborum tantâ licentiâ usi sunt, Romani contrà magnam in hâc re severitatem adhibuerunt? Planè colligat quis Græcos fuisse artibus, Romanos rebus gerendis, magis idoneos. Artium enim distinctiones verborum compositionem ferè exigunt; at res et negotia simpliciora verba postulant. Quin Hebræi tantum compositiones illas refugiunt, ut malint metaphorâ abuti quàm compositionem introducere. Quinetiam verbis tam paucis et minimè commixtis utuntur, ut planè ex linguâ ipsâ quis perspiciat gentem fuisse illam Nazaræam, et a reliquis gentibus separatam. Annon et illud

study of ancient literature in particular, if it is not an exercise of the intellect, is a discipline of humanity; if it do not strengthen the understanding, it softens and refines the taste; it gives us liberal views; it accustoms the mind to take an interest in things foreign to itself; to love virtue for its own sake; to prefer glory to riches, and to fix our thoughts on the remote and permanent, instead of narrow and fleeting objects. It teaches us to believe that there is really something great and excellent in the world, surviving all the shocks and accidents and fluctuations of opinion, and raises us above that low and servile fear, which bows only to present power and upstart authority. Rome and Athens filled a place in the history of mankind which can never be occupied again. They were two cities set on a hill which can not be hid; all eyes have seen them, and their light shines like a mighty sea-mark into the abyss of time,

"Still green with bays each ancient altar stands." (a)

But, notwithstanding these advantages, Bacon says, "the studying words and not matter is a distemper of learning, of which Pygmalion's frenzy is a good emblem; for words are but the images of matter, and to fall in love with them is all one as to fall in love with a picture." (b)

These different subjects are classed under the quaint

observatione dignum (licèt nobis modernis spiritus nonnihil retundat) antiquas linguas plenas declinationum, casuum, conjugationum, temporum, et similium fuisse; modernas, his ferè destitutas, plurima per præpositiones et verbâ auxiliaria segnitèr expedire? Sanè facilè quis conjiciat, utcunque nobis ipsi placemus, ingenia priorum sæculorum nostris fuisse multò acutiora et subtiliora. Innumera sunt ejusmodi, quæ justum volumen complere possint."

(a) See this passage in William Hazlitt's Table Talk.

expression of "Distempers of Learning," to which, that the metaphor may be preserved, he has appended various other defects, under the more quaint term of " peccant Humours of Learning." (b)

His observations upon the advantages of learning, although encumbered by fanciful and minute analysis, abound with beauty; for, not contenting himself with the simple position with which philosophy would be satisfied, that knowledge teaches us how to select what is beneficial and avoid what is injurious, he enumerates various modes, divine and human, by which the happiness resulting from knowledge ever has been and ever will be manifested.

After having stated what he terms divine proofs of the advantages of knowledge, he says, the human proofs are:

1. Learning diminishes afflictions from nature.

2. Learning diminishes evils from man to man.

3. There is a union between learning and military virtue. 4. Learning improves private virtues.

1. It takes away the barbarism of men's minds.
2. It takes away levity, temerity, and insolency.
3. It takes away vain admiration.

4. It takes away or mitigates fear.

5. It disposes the constitution of the mind not to be fixed or settled in its defects, but to be susceptible of growth and reformation.

5. It is power.

6. It advances fortune.

7. It is our greatest source of delight.

8. It insures immortality.

(b) See next page for the Analysis.