us to judge by analogy. We perceive, that when the rays of light fall upon objects, with the form of which touch has made us acquainted, they exhibit to the eye a certain appearance; and when we observe the same kind of appearance in objects that are too distant, or too large for our grasp, we are intuitively led to believe, that they have the same kind of form. In the greater part of philosophical writings, a distinction is made between what are called the primary and secondary qualities of body; but as this distinction does not seem to be founded on the nature of things, it is not a little puzzling to the young student in intellectual science, and would be better laid aside. The word quality, as generally applied to matter, is significan. of something which we conceive to be necessarily in, or connected with a substance, and by which we understand it to be distinguished, either from other individual substances, or from other classes of substances; hence qualities may be properly divided into essential and accidental. When I press my hand on the table at which I am now writing, I find that it resists the touch, and I denominate it hard. Experience informs me, that every substance of a similar kind, possesses, in some degree, a similar quality, and hence I conclude that hardness is an essential quality of every species of wood; but as some tables are round some square, &c., and as pieces of wood may be cut into a vast variety of forms, I perceive that no particular form must necessarily belong to any piece of wood, and hence infer that roundness, squareness, &c. are only accidental qualities of body, These are the only qualities that substances can with propriety be said to possess; and when philosophers speak of primary and secondary qualities, the term quality is misapplied; for by primary qualities, they mean those qualities which, from the constitution of our nature, we are led to believe are in bodies, in consequence of the impressions which they make on our organs of sense; whilst by the secondary qualities they mean those effects, which the qualities of bodies are capable of producing on us. Thus, when we speak of the smell of a rose, we either refer to a sensation in our minds, or to something in the rose by which that sensation is produced; of the latter, philosophers speak as the primary, and of the former as the secondary quality, but surely there is a manifest impropriety in thus applying the same word both to the cause and to the effect. 151 OF THE PASSIONS. THE superiority of the mind will strikingly appear if it be considered, that with few exceptions, it is either the agent or the object in all human actions. When a man speaks or writes, employs himself in the works of art, or in the investigations of science, his mind is the agent; he endeavours to produce an effect or to accomplish a purpose, either as it respects himself or others; and when others engage in similar actions, it is equally their intention to affect his mind by their performances, so that in this case his mind is the object. The circumstances, or, as they have been termed, the principles of action, by which the mind is influenced, are various, but may be chiefly included in the instincts, the appetites, and the pas sions. Instinct is that principle by which every animal of the same species is led, when placed in similar circumstances, to act in the same manner with every other of that species, without any appearance of reasoning, or of consideration whether one thing is preferable to another; thus every bird makes its nest of the same form, of the same kind of materials, and in the same kind of situation, with that of every other bird of its own species. Man, who justly, though sometimes proudly, denominates himself a rational being, is, in some instances, influenced by instinct, when reason would come too late to direct his conduct. In walking or riding he loses his balance, and is ready to fall; he instantly makes an effort to regain his equilibrium. A stroke is aimed at him, and, without deliberation, he raises his arm to protect himself from danger. In these and similar cases, men act instinctively. The natural appetites are not numerous; hunger and thirst are the chief; their operation is not constant, but periodical, producing an uneasy sensation till sated with the object, which they lead us to desire. Natural appetites tend merely to the preservation of life; but by a frequent use of things which nature does not require, men create in themselves a kind of artificial appetites, that, in like manner, cause an uneasy sensation, and a desire to be gratified with their peculiar objects. Such is an appetite for snuff, for wine, &c. But no principle of action has a more powerful influence, in promoting the happiness or misery of man, than the passions. What Pope says of self-love, is true of them all. Self-love, the spring of motion, acts the soul, And but for this, were active to no end." Those states of mind, which we term the passions, are constantly stimulating us to act; and when we examine ourselves respecting the motive which, in any instance, has induced us to make exertion, we find it to be our love or hatred, our hope or fear, &c. What then is the nature of the passions which are thus active? It cannot have escaped the observation of those, who have attended to the nature and progress of the human mind, that language and opinion reciprocally affect each other. Those who first employed words to express what they understood of the manner in which their minds were affected by external objects, or by surrounding circumstances, seem to have been incapable of imparting to others this knowledge, otherwise than by comparing the various states of this incorporeal part of their nature, with the operations of such objects as are made known by the senses; or by applying to these states of the mind, the very words originally applied to external objects. According to the idea, that such persons entertained of the similarity between external, and internal objects or operations, they would make choice of words; and |