one be vastly more numerous than the other. But there is this difference betwixt the succession of time, and the composition of matter; that those who deny indivisibles, say, that no one point can be assigned: for if points could be assigned or numbered, it is certain that they could not be infinite; for an infinite number seems to be a contradiction but if the series of mankind were infinite, since this is visibly divided into single individuals, as the units in that series, then here arises an infinite number composed of units or individuals, that can be assigned. The same is to be said of minutes, hours, days, and years: nor can it be said with equal reason, that every portion of time is divisible to infinity, as well as every parcel of matter. It seems evident, that there is a present time; and that past, present, and to come, cannot be said to be true of any thing all at once: therefore the objection against the assigning points in matter does not overthrow the truth of this argument. But if it is thought that this is rather a sleight of metaphysicks that entangles one, than a plain and full conviction, let us turn next to such reasonings as are more obvious, and that are more easily apprehended.

The other moral arguments are more sensible as well as they are of a more complicated nature; and proceed thus: The history of all nations, of all governments, arts, sciences, and even instituted religions, the peopling of nations, the progress of commerce and of colonies, are plain indications of the novelty of the world; no sort of trace remaining, by which we can believe it to be ancienter than the books of Moses represent it to be. For though some nations, such as the Egyptians and the Chineses, have boasted of a much greater antiquity; yet it is plain, we hear of no series of history for all those ages; so that what they had relating to them, if it is not wholly a fiction, might have been only in astronomical tables, which may be easily run backwards as well as forward. The very few eclipses which Ptolemy could hear of is a remarkable instance of the novelty of history; since the observing such an extraordinary accident in the heavens, in so pure an air, where the sun was not only observed, but adored, must have been one of the first effects of learning or industry. All these characters of the novelty of the world have been so well considered by Lucretius, and other atheists, that they gave up the point, and thought it evident that this present frame of things had certainly a beginning.

The solution that those men, who found themselves driven from this of the world's being eternal, have given to this difficulty, by saying that all things have run by

I.

chance into the combinations and channels in which we see ART. nature run, is so absurd, that it looks like men who are resolved to believe any thing, how absurd soever, rather than to acknowledge religion. For what a strange conceit is it, to think that chance could settle on such a regular and useful frame of things, and continue so fixed and stable in it; and that chance could do so much at once, and should do nothing ever since? The constancy of the celestial motions; the obliquity of the zodiac, by which different seasons are assigned to different climates; the divisions of this globe into sea and land, into hills and vales; the productions of the earth, whether latent, such as mines, minerals, and other fossils; or visible, such as grass, grain, herbs, flowers, shrubs, and trees; the small beginnings, and the curious compositions of them: the variety and curious structure of insects; the disposition of the bodies of perfecter animals; and, above all, the fabric of the body of man, especially the curious discoveries that anatomy and microscopes have given us; the strange beginning and progress of those; the wonders that occur in every organ of sense, and the amazing structure and use of the brain, are all such things, so artificial, and yet so regular, and so exactly shaped and fitted for their several uses, that he who can believe all this to be chance, seems to have brought his mind to digest any absurdity.

That all men should resemble one another in the main things, and yet that every man should have a peculiar look, voice, and way of writing, is necessary to maintain order and distinction in society: by these we know men, if we either see them, hear them speak in the dark, or receive any writing from them at a distance; without these, the whole commerce of life would be one continued course of mistake and confusion. This, I say, is such an indication of wisdom, that it looks like a violence to nature to think it can be otherwise.

The only colour, that has supported this monstrous conceit, that things arise out of chance, is, that it has long passed current in the world, that great varieties of insects do arise out of corrupted matter. They argue, that if the sun's shining on a dunghill can give life to such swarms of curious creatures, it is but a little more extraordinary, to think that animals and men might have been formed out of well-disposed matter, under a peculiar aspect of the heavens. But the exacter observations, that have been made in this age by the help of glasses, have put an end to this answer, which is the best that Lucretius and other atheists found to rest in. It is now fully made out, that

ART. the production of all insects whatsoever is in the way of generation heat and corruption do only hatch those eggs, that insects leave to a prodigious quantity every where. So that this, which is the only specious thing in the whole plea for atheism, is now given up by the universal consent of all the inquirers into nature.

And now to bring the force of this long argument to a head: If this world was neither from all eternity in the state in which it is at present, nor could fall into it by chance or accident, then it must follow, that it was put into the state in which we now see it, by a Being of vast power and wisdom. This is the great and solid argument on which Religion rests; and it receives a vast accession of strength from this, that we plainly see matter has not motion in or of itself: every part of it is at quiet till it is put in motion, that is not natural to it; for many parts of matter fall into a state of rest and quiet; so that motion must be put in them by some impulse or other. Matter, after it has passed through the highest refinings and rectifyings possible, becomes only more capable of motion than it was before; but still it is a passive principle, and must be put in motion by some other being. This has appeared so necessary even to those who have tried their utmost force to make God as little needful as possible in the structure of the universe, that they have yet been forced to own, that there must have been once a vast motion given to matter by the Supreme Mind.

A third argument for the being of a God, is, that upon some great occasions, and before a vast number of witnesses, some persons have wrought miracles: that is, they have put nature out of its course, by some words or signs, that of themselves could not produce those extraordinary effects: and therefore such persons were assisted by a Power superior to the course of nature; and by consequence there is such a Being, and that is God. To this the atheists do first say, that we do not know the secret virtues that are in nature the loadstone and opium produce wonderful effects: therefore, unless we knew the whole extent of nature, we cannot define what is supernatural and miraculous, and what is not so. But though we cannot tell how far nature may go, yet of some things we may, without hesitation, say, they are beyond natural powers. Such were the wonders that Moses wrought in Egypt and in the wilderness, by the speaking a few words, or the stretching out of a rod. We are sure these could not by any natural efficiency produce those wonders. And the like is to be said of the miracles of Christ, particularly of his raising the

dead to life again, and of his own resurrection. These we are sure did not arise out of natural causes. The next thing atheists say to this, is, to dispute the truth of the facts: but of that I shall treat in another place, when the authority of revealed religion comes to be proved from those facts. All that is necessary to be added here, is, that if facts, that are plainly supernatural, are proved to have been really done, then here is another clear and full argument, to prove a Being superior to nature, that can dispose of it at pleasure and that Being must either be God, or some other invisible Being, that has a strength superior to the settled course of nature. And if invisible Beings, superior to nature, whether good or bad, are once acknowledged, a great step is made to the proof of the Supreme Being.

There is another famed argument taken from the idea of God; which is laid thus: that because one frames a notion of infinite perfection, therefore there must be such a Being, from whom that notion is conveyed to us. This argument is also managed by other methods, to give us a demonstration of the being of a God. I am unwilling to say any thing to derogate from any argument that is brought to prove this conclusion; but when he, who insists on this, lays all other arguments aside, or at least slights them as not strong enough to prove the point, this naturally gives jealousy, when all those reasons, that had for so many ages been considered as solid proofs, are neglected, as if this only could amount to a demonstration. But, besides, this is an argument that cannot be offered by any to another person, for his conviction; since if he denies. that he has any such idea, he is without the reach of the argument. And if a man will say that any such idea, which he may raise in himself, is only an aggregate that he makes of all those perfections, of which he can form a thought, which he lays together, separating from them every imperfection that he observes to be often mixed with some of those perfections: if, I say, a man will affirm this, I do not see that the inference from any such thought that he has formed within himself, can have any great force to persuade him that there is any such Being. Upon the whole, it seems to be fully proved, that there is a Being that is superior to matter, and that gave both being and order to it, and to all other things. This may serve to prove the Being of a God: it is fit in the next place to consider, with all humble modesty, what thoughts we can, or ought to have of the Deity.

That Supreme Being must have its essence of itself necessarily and eternally; for it is impossible that any thing

ART.
I.

ART.

I.

can give itself being; so it must be eternal. And though eternity in a succession of determinate durations was proved to be impossible, yet it is certain that something must be eternal; either matter, or a Being superior to it, that has not a duration defined by succession, but is a simple essence, and eternally was, is, and shall be the same. There is nothing contradictory to itself in this notion: it is indeed above our capacity to form a clear thought of it; but it is plain it must be so, and that this is only a defect in our nature and capacity, that we cannot distinctly apprehend that which is so far above us. Such a Being must have also necessary existence in its notion; for whatsoever is infinitely perfect, must necessarily exist; since we plainly perceive, that necessary existence is a perfection, and that contingent existence is an imperfection, which supposes a being that is produced by another, and that depends upon it and as this superior Being did exist from all eternity, so it is impossible it should cease to be; since nothing, that once has actually a being, can ever cease to be, but by an act of a superior Being annihilating it. But there being nothing superior to the Deity, it is impossible that it should ever cease to be: what was self-existent from all eternity, must also be so to all eternity; and it is as impossible that a simple essence can annihilate itself, as that it can make itself.

So much concerning the first and capital article of all religion, the existence and being of a God; which ought not to be proved by any authorities from Scripture, unless from the recitals that are given in it concerning miracles, as was already hinted at. But as to the authority of such passages in Scripture, which affirm, that there is a God, it is to be considered, that before we can be bound to submit to them, we must believe three propositions antecedent to that; 1. That there is a God. 2. That all his words are true. 3. That these are his words. What therefore must be believed before we acknowledge the Scriptures, cannot be proved out of them. It is then a strange assertion, to say, that the being of a God cannot be proved by the light of nature, but must be proved by the Scriptures; since our being assured, that there is a God, is the first principle, upon which the authority of the Scriptures depends.

The second proposition in the Article is, That there is but one God. As to this, the common argument, by which it is proved, is the order of the world; from whence it is inferred, that there cannot be more Gods than one, since where there are more than one, there must happen diversity and confusion. This is by some thought to be no good