1851.] Helps for the Study of Sanskrit and Arabic. 469 into English, chiefly by Lieut. Eastwick, and in this form can be obtained in our country for about $13,00. rth. Pott. Etymologische Forschungen. Lemgo, 1836. 5 1-2 rth. Grimm. Geschichte der Deutschen Sprache. Leipzig, 1848. 6 2-3 rth. Schleicher. Die Sprachen Europa's, in systematischer Uebersicht. Bonn, 1850. 1 1-2 rth. Helps for the Study of Arabic. Petermann's Arabic Grammar, Berlin, 1840, gives a list of sixty Arabic grammars, lexicons and chrestomathies. A number have been published since that time. The most important in the list are the grammar of Erpenius, 3rd edition, Leyden, 1638; subsequent editions of the same by Albert Schultens; Tychsen's Grammar, Rostock, 1792; De Sacy's Grammaire Arabe, 2nd edition, 1831, two volumes, six hundred large octavo pages each, closely printed; Rosenmüller's Institutiones, Leipsic, 1818; Oberleitner's Fundamenta Linguae Arab., Vienna, 1823; and Ewald's Critical Grammar, 2 vols., Leipsic, 1831-33. The last named is a learned and original work, and considers the language in connection with the sister dialects. It is, however, wholly unfitted for the beginner. De Sacy's grammar is the storehouse from which most of the later grammars have been drawn. Its great merits are universally recognized. Still, from its large size, from its being printed in a solid form, so that the more important parts are not distinguished by the type, etc. it does not answer the purposes of the young scholar. He would only become confused in its immense details. The two latest grammars which have appeared are Caspari's Grammatica Arabica, in Latin, one volume, Leipsic, 1848, pp. 350, and Grammaire Arabe, in French, by Ch. Schier, Leipsic, 1849, pp. 466. "Both are essentially dependent on De Sacy and Ewald." Yet they are useful compends, and may be recommended to the young student in the Arabic language. We have Richardson's Grammar, which is now nearly obsolete, as it proceeded on a totally erroneous system; the grammar of Mr. Lumsden of Calcutta, which is incomplete, and unfitted for beginners; and the Practical Arabic Grammar of Duncan Stewart, London, 1841, pp. 302, catalogue price 16 shillings, which may be recommended, as "calculated for the use of those, who, not making the study of languages the chief pursuit of life, learn Arabic, less for the purpose of reading the many valuable books which it contains, than for its bearing on the religion and law of the Mohammedans," and for other practical purposes. An excellent book for beginners is Locman's Fables, with notes and a glossary, edited by Prof. Rödiger, 2nd edition, 1839, 75 cents. There are, also, the Arabic Chrestomathy of De Sacy, a thesaurus of materials, 2nd edition, 1827, 3 vols., 63 francs; Oberleitner's Arabic Chrestomathy, 2 vols., Vienna, 1823-4, 7 rth.; Freytag's Arabic Chrestomathy, Bonn, one vol., 1 rth., 23 sgr.; Kosegarten's Arabic Chrestomathy, collected from MSS., with notes and a lexicon, Leipsic, 1828, 4 Thlr., and many others. We have the Lexicon of Golius, 1 vol. folio, Leyden, 1653; of Willmet, for the Koran, the Life of Hariri, and the Life of Timour, Rotterdam, 1784, quarto, very useful, price about $8; Freytag's great work, in 4 vols., quarto, Halle, 1830-37, catalogue price, about $20; and an Abridgment of the last named, for the use of beginners, quarto, Halle, 1836, about $6. Helps in the Study of the Syriac Language. The Syriac Grammars are, A. T. Hoffmann's, Halle, quarto, 1827; F. Uhlemann's (Elementarlehre der Syrischen Sprache), 8vo., Berlin, 1829; Rev. George Phillips's Elements of Syriac Grammar, 2d ed., 8vo., London, 1845, pp. 208, catalogue price, $3, containing lessons for exercise, analysis, etc. As reading books, may be named the Syriac New Testament of Leusden and Schaaf, Leyden, 1717, and the Syriac Chrestomathy, with a glossary and grammatical tables, by Prof. Rödiger, Halle, 1838. Schaaf published a Syriac Lexicon of the New Testament, Leyden, 1717. Dr. Bernstein of Breslau, is now engaged in preparing a complete Lexicon of the Syriac language, partly from MSS. sources. ERRATA.- A few errata in the present and last Nos. of this work, es caped the vigilance of the proof-reader, owing in part to the circumstances in which the Bibliotheca Sacra and the American Biblical Repository were united. Page 105, l. 13, for causes r. cause ; 108, last l., for divine r. diverse; 109, 10, and 11, for which r. whom; 119, l. 1, put a colon instead of a period before Aristotle; 121, 1. 33, for then r. their; 126, 1. 5, for Telesos r. Telesios; 130, 1. 3, for Cloyné r. Cloyne; 183, 1. 33, for producing r. perduring; 211, l. 1, for atom r. color; 387, for ävdeov r. ävðqa; 347, 1. 29, for three r. there; 348, 1. 32, for solid r. valid; 349, 1. 2, for autonomy r. antinomy; 351, 1. 10, for avoid r. a void; 359, l. 23, for perduces r. perdures; 360, l. 11 and 19, ditto; 362, 1. 4, for soul r. sense; do. 1. 26 and 27, for our r. one four times; 364, 1. 34, for suiting r. meeting; 365, 1. 32, for proportions r. propositions; 370, 1. 39, for μedév r. μýdev; 371, l. 5, for architectural r. architectonal; do. 1. 30, for which r. while; 376, 1. 8, for in r. is. THE BIBLIOTHECA SACRA, NO. XXXI. AND AMERICAN BIBLICAL REPOSITORY, NO. LXXXIII. JULY, 1851. ARTICLE I. THE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE MIND, FOR A FUTURE JUDGMENT AND RETRIBUTION. By George B. Cheever, D. D., New York. IN tracing the materials and agencies in the human mind for a future judgment and retribution, we find, next after Remembrance, the article and operation of Remorse. We are first to find the law, under which this operation of a guilty nature acts. And this is one of the plainest, best developed, and most unquestionable of the facts and laws of our being. It is the faculty and law of Conscience. There is within the soul a silent, invisible, but ever present witness of all thoughts, feelings, words, and actions. This witness is named in our language, Conscience. The first and literal meaning of the Greek word, ovveidýσis, is a knowing with one's self, a consciousness. This is also the etymological, elemental meaning of our English word conscience, con-science, knowing with. Add to this the idea of the discernment and judging of right and wrong, with the approval or disapproval of the same, and we shall have the full definition of the faculty of Conscience. It is a word perhaps to be found in all languages, and it has the same meaning, all the world over. The conscience is sometimes called our Moral Sense, that is, an inward sense of moral qualities and actions, a sense of right and wrong, answering to our outward senses; and as these distinguish the qualities of external objects, distinguishing in like manner the qualities of moral objects, or the difference between moral qualities. Conscience is the judgment of the mind in regard to all the acts and VOL. VIII. No. 31. 41 movements of our being. Sometimes it is so slight as not to be noticed, being merely a consciousness, general and indefinite, that does not take shape in a particular judgment. There are five grand points, in reference to which we shall consider this faculty: 1. As universal in its existence; 2. Unceasing in its action; 3. Retrospective in its operations; 4. As affected by habit, and susceptible of perversion; 5. As eternal in its power. First then, this faculty of conscience is a universal possession of mankind. It is doubtless a part of our essential being as made in the image of God. The sense of right and wrong in ourselves, and the judgment of right and wrong in others is an experience and a process familiar, in some degree, to every man. The development, education, and action of this faculty are determined very much by men's circumstances; and it is a faculty which acts according to the degree of light that has been enjoyed in regard to duty. But in some degree the possession and action of conscience are to be distinguished everywhere, and the faculty is as surely a part of every man's being as the faculty of memory, or the power of reason. We inquire, to make this plainer, What would be the condition of the world without this faculty of conscience as a part of the human constitution? Conceive, if we can, of a man, an intelligent being, actually without a conscience. All sense of the difference between good and evil, right and wrong, would disappear from such a man's experience. Convenience and pleasure, self-enjoyment, present and to come, would be his only law. Utility would be his guide, and whatever was pleasurable would be regarded as useful, and the highest utility would be the production of pleasure for himself. All regard to God would cease, and all regard to man, save that of prudence in watching for his own interests, which would always, in his estimation, be above those of all other men in importance. There would also be no sense of guilt or crime in others, no condemnation passed upon others, except merely as a matter of utility or profit. The condemnation which we pass on others arises solely from the same constitution of our being which produces the consciousness of guilt in ourselves, the displeasure of our own moral sense at our own conduct. If this introspective conscience did not exist, there would be no circumspective conscience, no such thing as a moral sense or judgment of the qualities of other men's actions. The same act of our moral being which justifies or condemns another, and renders the character of our neighbor pleasing or displeasing to us in a moral point of view, is the power that acts upon ourselves; it is the 1851.] same power. ourselves. Conscience universal in its Operation. 473 It would not act upon others, if it did not act upon Without this faculty, there would be, in morals, no distinction of colors. As to a blind man, white, black, red, green, or blue, all are the same; so in a moral sense, without the faculty of conscience, would be all the qualities of actions to the soul. As to one who had lost the sense of taste, it were a matter of indifference what element his food were composed of, since wood, iron, stones, fruit, meat, bread, vegetables, all would be the same, so would it be to one who has lost the faculty of conscience with the moral character and qualities of all feeling, thought and action. The sun strikes upon all objects, and the reflection of his rays produces the variety of nature; but there is no perception of such variety by a blind man; just so, the moral sun shines upon all qualities, and is reflected back, but there is no perception of this by a being without a conscience. There would be, in such a case, no response to God's Word, no sense of obligation. There would be merely the sense of profit. There would be no gratitude. Favors received would be absorbed as a dry soil absorbs the rain, or as a tree receives nourishment from earth, air, and the elements; but there would be no return, no feeling of love, no sense of obligation. Parental kindness would beget no affection but that founded on self-interest; so far as a parent could be useful, so far he would be cherished, cared for, cultivated, but no farther. Just so it would be in regard to God. The idea of Deity itself, of the Creator, Benefactor, Judge, of the All-merciful, All-wise, just God, would be merely the idea of a vast utility; or, as self would be predominant and absorbing, the idea of an enemy, the idea of a being too vast to be controlled and used for selfish purposes, and therefore opposed to self-interest and an enemy. Take away conscience, and leave only utility, and you make every man, in his own view, God, every man to himself the centre of the universe. And that too without any sense of guilt, that too with the blind, straightforward, unchecked, unceasing, unrelenting instinct of selfishness, which, whatever stood in its way, be it man or beast, God or nature, would sacrifice and tread down all. If the world were filled with such beings, the world would be a hell, without hell's sense of sin; a chaos of conflict, where the strife, if it went on, would depopulate the globe, and where the only stop to it would be the universal experience of its misery, and the mutual agreement of restraint and check as a matter of sheer utility, expediency and necessity. Such would man be, such would the world be, without conscience. But conscience is universal. |